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THE CRITIC'S RESPONSIBILITY*

John Peter

It is an occupational hazard of our profession that we should be obliged to read almost anything that can be read, and sometimes a good many things that can't, such as *Finnegans Wake* or our students' essays. All of us have gory scalps dangling from our belts—books that we've read, books that we hope never to read again—and if I produce one I hope it will be regarded more with the equanimity of the damned than with revulsion. My share in damnation, or part of it, goes by the name of *A Short-Title Catalogue of English Books, 1475–1640*, a compilation by two minor fiends improbably described as Pollard and Redgrave which I once read all the way through. Among its 26,000 entries there is admittedly much variety. Some of them, such as "A defence of the appendix to the Antidote," are secretive and enigmatic; others, such as "The batchelars banquet: or a banquet for batchelars," almost insultingly well-defined. Still, it isn't what one would call an engrossing book. The style is terse to the point of incomprehensibility, the plot inscrutable, the characters multitudinous and (like Calvin or Queen Elizabeth) poorly drawn. Having finished it one puts it aside concurring with the sentiment expressed on page 484: "Faultes, faults, and nothing else but faultes."

For arousing sheer depression in a reader, though, there must be many books to surpass this one, especially when it comes to books of criticism, or to those periodic digests, such as *The Year's Work in English Studies*, in which critical books and essays are summarized, usually with the rider that they offer "a valuable contribution" to their chosen field. It seems that "valuable" is one of those words that nobody bothers to use correctly any more, like "imagery" or "contemporary." One has to study the context before one can say what its connotations are. "Futile," "pedantic," "besotted," "written by a friend of mine"—we can add a meaning

*An address to The Association of Canadian University Teachers of English, June 1959.

or two, but these are pretty clearly the basic ones. Actually if you take the time to check one of these valuable contributions, testing its assertions against the text or texts it's supposed to be expounding, the chances are about one to five that you'll find your flesh creeping about in pure horror, and about two to five that, not being equipped to comprehend unintelligible dialects, it won't be given the chance even to creep. Let us get down to cases: at any rate let us get down to one representative and (I hope) unprovoking case, to illustrate the form such criticism can take. I can't pretend to have read the book from which my example comes all the way through—there are still some experiences a determined reader *can* avoid—but what troubles me is that so many of my students should try to read it, especially after I've told them to leave it severely alone.

I must begin by quoting two passages from Donne's intricate exercise "The Extasie," both of them taken from the second half of the poem, where, having conceded that love is primarily a conjunction or fusion of souls, Donne shifts his attention to the lovers' bodies and argues that these also have an important rôle to play in any amorous relationship. The beginning of his argument will be familiar enough:

> But O alas, so long, so far
> Our bodies why do we forbear?
> They're ours, though they're not we; we are
> The intelligences, they the sphere.
> We owe them thanks, because they thus
> Did us, to us, at first convey,
> Yielded their forces, sense, to us,
> Nor are dross to us, but allay.

"Allay"—"alloy" as we say nowadays. The lovers' bodies are not to be ignored or neglected, for it is through the means that they provide that the lovers' souls can perceive each other, and act upon each other too. Far from being waste products, impurities to be skimmed off as dross or raked out as slag from the molten union of souls, the man's and the woman's bodies are necessary and proper components in that union, ingredients which temper the fused complex of souls so that their cohesion is intimate and complete, like the cohesion of copper and zinc in the alloy brass. And what is the deduction which, at the end of the poem, Donne draws from this affirmation? Supposing some third party, himself a lover and consequently privileged to overhear them, has followed the colloquy between Donne's and his mistress's souls—this "dialogue of one" as the poet calls it, since their ecstasy has involved a fusion of their two souls into one. Supposing this onlooker carefully attends to the two human figures reclining on the grassy bank as their

souls now disengage themselves and return to their respective bodies, seeking the natural medium through which to express themselves, the tenderness of the flesh. Will this change seem to him a debasement? Will the souls be degraded—as Milton would say, "imbruted"—by their resort to a physical intimacy? Certainly not, Donne implies. To all intents and purposes the scene confronting the onlooker will be exactly the same as it was before, a kind of visual guarantee that the lovers' relationship is unimpaired.

> And if some lover, such as we,
> Have heard this dialogue of one,
> Let him still mark us: he shall see
> Small change, when we're to bodies gone.

In those last four lines the drift of the poem is clear. Like "The Flea," like a good deal of literature when you come to think of it, "The Extasie" tries to justify the act of seduction, though the defence it offers is unusually cogent and subtle. Recently a commentator in the *Review of English Studies* has shown how much of Donne's argument is drawn from sixteenth-century Italian sources; yet the poem still sounds original and fascinating, and has been understandably admired.

So much for these two passages; what about our chosen critic's comments on them? It would be tedious and confusing to quote the whole of his commentary here, so I've tried to paraphrase it and to make plain the lines along which it develops. One premiss with which he begins is that in Donne's line "Nor are dross to us, but allay" we have something that can be described as "coin imagery." Why we should be obliged to think of anything so precise as a coin at this point, and how the line can be called "coin *imagery*," might tax our understanding to decide, except that it is very soon apparent how the critic is twisting the evidence in the poem to suit an interpretation of his own. "A coin of pure gold—we have postulated," he says, "—symbolizes the lovers' communion of souls in ecstasy." Well, if it is no more than "postulated" then I suppose no one can say us nay: a postulate may well be a kind of convenient lie, and this is certainly a lie. When he goes on to maintain that the phrase "still mark us" means not only "continue to observe us" but also "mark us while we remain immobile," however, we begin to grope about for some kind of weapon. Consider again the lines in the poem:

> And if some lover, such as we,
> Have heard this dialogue of one,
> *Let him still mark us*: he shall see
> Small change, when we're to bodies gone.

"Let him still mark us"—by what prodigy of inattention to its syntax can that be interpreted to mean "Let him mark us while we stand still"? And, supposing that it could mean anything of the kind, what, besides meaningless imprecision, would the new reading add to the poem?

Of course it is at this point, just as we are breathing hard and losing our grip on reality, that the critic introduces his most audacious point. After bewildering us still farther with quotations from Donne's other works, quotations that are coerced into relevance merely because they mention bullion and money, he declares that when "The Extasie" ends with the words "he shall see Small change, when we're to bodies gone," the phrase "Small change" has taken up the "coin imagery" in the earlier line about "dross" and "allay," and that what is meant is the stuff that jingles in a pocket or a purse. "It seems to me," he says, "that the final lines echo (with a difference) the coin imagery of line 56." What the difference can be I am at a loss to determine, and I find it equally difficult to estimate how much faith the critic has in his own ingenuity. "It is altogether unlikely," he points out, "that *Small change* could have had for Donne's time its precise modern implication as a common phrase." That of course is true, though disingenuously expressed. The Elizabethans and Jacobeans might speak of scutes and silverlings, of small pieces, single money, or white money, but nobody has ever noted them speaking of "small change" when this was the idea they wanted to present. For "altogether unlikely," then, it might be more reasonable to substitute some phrase like "utterly impossible." But if the critic *knows* this, how can he put the construction he does upon Donne's phrase, particularly when he is determined to take the words as one of Donne's contemporaries would have taken them? Worse still, as with his interpretation of the phrase "still mark us," supposing it could be muddle-headedly conceded that his reading was even remotely possible, what contribution could it make to our understanding or appreciation of the poem? What does the conclusion of "The Extasie" now mean?

> Let him observe us while we are standing still. He will see nickels and dimes when we go—(though presumably while still standing still)—to our bodies.

"Sir," as the Duke of Wellington once said, "if you believe that, you will believe anything."

Do not suppose that in order to make my point I've had recourse to some obscure, discredited, and wilfully drivelling author. He himself tells us that his aim has been "to set up cautionary principles against misreading Donne," that he has relied on the "Evidence of dictionary

meanings" for the period during which Donne's poems were written, and that the approach he is advocating "is primarily the historical approach." *Sic*. His further disclosure that Yale University awarded him a Ph.D. for his book casts an interesting sidelight on the familiar line, "We're poor little lambs who have lost our way." One reviewer of his study—I may say that I've checked the reviews and found them uniformly favourable—speaks of "his avowed thesis . . . that the many misconceptions formulated about Donne's poetry result from superficial reading or the importation of patterns which do not fit it," implying that between his covers such mistakes do not occur; while another reviewer (in the *Times Literary Supplement*, no less) calls him "a clever commentator" and "a scholar with an eager desire . . . to follow the language written by the poet in its old sense and intimation, to catch the argument from the words themselves and not from wishes and ventures unknown to Donne." In the name of Holofernes, what is one to make of that?

Every critic or teacher of English Literature should find such comments alarming. I am not trying to impugn one critic, and have not omitted his name merely because it is a rather difficult one to pronounce. What I am impugning is a whole ethos, a climate of opinion which, in his heart of hearts, each of us knows to be fetid, not to say diseased. In what other learned discipline today, in what other field of intellectual endeavour, will you find this hit-or-miss, simpering, zany incompetence? Can you imagine a chemist arguing that, because the symbols for antimony and tin are rather similar, the elements must have common properties? Can you conceive of a mathematician observing that "54" and "89" might both be paraphrased as "rather a lot," and thereupon deducing that the conventional digits are interchangeable? Can you believe—I cannot, and this is what worries me most—that if they did they would be acclaimed as "clever" or "scholarly" in the *Journal of the Chemical Society*, or the pages of *Science* and *Nature*? Even within the broad province of what may be laughingly called our own discipline, English Literature, where else but in the field of literary criticism will you find a comparable propensity for glibness and anarchism? It is certainly rare in the field of literary history, where, as a result, a very salutary system of restraints and inhibitions still exists. You may believe, as I do, that the reason Milton abandoned "Adam Unparadis'd" was because the poet of a rival nation (and a Catholic to boot) had partly forestalled him by writing a biblical tragedy in Dutch, thus provoking him to go one farther, and to take up again the highest literary form of all, the epic; but you will scarcely choose to argue the point in print when

all you have to go on is your own intuition, some inconclusive evidence about Milton's egotism, and little more. And the same is true, or truer, of the bibliographers, those turncoat humanists with an unquenchable nostalgia for the simplicities of schoolroom science. If, like Professor Kenneth Muir, they are misguided enough to edit *Macbeth* and to introduce two question marks instead of one into the first two lines of the play—(or *vice versa* perhaps: I've forgotten which it was)—well, at least they know that a blunder so monstrous is more than enough to get their work condemned by the pettifoggers who will review it. They know, that is, that what is expected of them is a conservatism which is simultaneously costive and virulent. But the critic—*he* knows that literally anything goes; that silliness needs only self-confidence to make it acceptable; and that the more absurd one's thesis, the wilder one's misreadings, and the more impenetrable one's style, the more respect one's criticism will procure. Our brothers the scientists, looking to us for a call to arms against the twin barbarisms of the age, illiteracy and laziness, must take their choice between the dry little coughs of the evasive and the torrential garrulity of the unhinged. How easy it is to imagine an angry young man called Alexander Pope composing a latter-day *Essay on Criticism*. How easy it is even to predict what he might say.

> Lit. crit. is Nature horribly distressed,
> What can't be thought, or even well expressed;
> Something where truth has yielded to futility,
> That gives us back an image of puerility. . . .
> To err is human, to forgive divine,
> But at *this* stuff even gods would draw the line.

II

What are the reasons for the situation in which we find ourselves? In what ways is criticism losing touch with its proper function, with the usefulness it ought to have? We need not hope to answer these questions completely, but it is important that we should at least ask them. Only by asking them will we begin to understand what is wrong; only by understanding it will we be enabled to put it right. And here I think I should explain that, although I've been reproving the modern critic or pseudo-critic for imprecise thinking, I have no wish to fall into the opposite error, that of pegging criticism down too rigidly within the limits of a narrow definition. Some definitions may be like wives—dependable, hard-working and fruitful—but the majority are more like fiancées: even promiscuous men tend to prefer their own. In order to

steer safely past the Charybdis of rigidity let us eschew all definitions, and in order to pass the Scylla of imprecision let us resort instead to certain loosely defining propositions, propositions which are clearly applicable to the critic's activity though they are not discriminative or inclusive enough to define it precisely. There are three such propositions that I should like to discuss here, not because they are the only ones that deserve discussion, but because, though they are reasonable and pertinent, they do not seem to have been very fully discussed elsewhere.

The first proposition is that a critic must always attend to the uniqueness of the work of art he is considering, resisting the temptation to reduce it to its lowest common denominator with other works of art. I do not say this is easy. On the contrary, it is perhaps invariably difficult, and ultimately impossible. Who will tell us, finally and definitively, just where the meaning and magic of *King Lear* really lie? Who will do it with *The Prelude*? Indeed, who will do it even with the ode "To Autumn"? I am not demanding that a critic should. What I do say is that, unless he accepts this as his ultimate goal—the end towards which, though it be unattainable, he must make his way—his work will be largely sterile, and quite lacking in that fidelity which is, or should be, the hallmark of criticism rightly so-called. It should be his main task, not to submerge the work of art he has chosen in a stirabout of similar or related works, not to diffuse its meaning in a haze of irrelevance, but to expose and irradiate the identity which it uniquely has. He must not smudge; he must distinguish. He should not blur lines; he should draw them. In the example considered earlier, where the phrase "Small change" was misinterpreted, one can see that this is precisely what the critic failed to do. To him the noun "change" was a nimbus of undifferentiated meanings, a semantic blur, a complete ambiguity, and in consequence his reading of "The Extasie" was nonsensical. Poetic ambiguities are fractional, not complete, and to exaggerate them wantonly like this is to smear the poem illegibly. That is why the type of verbal analysis current today is so unsatisfactory, and even dangerous. It accepts words much as a lexicographer does, for their full range of meaning instead of for their context, and in consequence it obliterates the subtle shades of significance upon which poetry relies. Take Burns's line "O my love is like a red, red rose." Is the word "rose" there identical with its recurrences in Herbert's description of the "Sweet Rose, whose hue, angry and brave, Bids the rash gazer wipe his eye" and Blake's line "O Rose, thou art sick"? In the eyes of the analyst, intent as he is on all seven types of ambiguity, such verbal recurrences tend to be identi-

cal. He smudges poems together as if they were pigments, and the results are no more appealing than the depredations of a child let loose among the paint-pots. Individual pieces of literature, sharp and bright and challenging, disappear in a drab mist called "Irony" or "Significance," and the reader's attention must follow them there.

I believe much the same is true of that kind of analysis which concerns itself with the archetypal patterns which lie under the individual surfaces of literature. That there are such things as archetypes, and that they can often be traced in this way, I suppose most of us would reluctantly allow —reluctantly, because we want to be free to dissociate ourselves from the enthusiast who interprets "Mary had a little lamb" as another "Ode on the Morning of Christ's Nativity." But here again, though such archetypes exist, and though psychology and anthropology confirm their existence, to see poetry in terms exclusively of them is like seeing buildings only in terms of their foundations, and never as the diverse structures which they actually are: graceful or ugly, plain or elaborate, lofty or squat. Literature, on this view, is largely a matter of repetition, and what is important about "The Ancient Mariner" and *The Waste Land* is not the differences between them (which, after all, are crucial) but the fact that they both contain the archetype of rebirth. There is an essay that is uncomfortably close to this position in a recent issue of *Essays in Criticism*, and I'm sure all of us can think of more radical examples for ourselves: cases where the archetypal analyst, like the verbal analyst, can be seen ignoring those qualities in a text which make it what it is, and reducing it instead to its least significant ingredients, the words or the basic patterns it might share with almost any other text. Even when he is trying to respect the unique identity of a text, to see it sharply and comprehensively, the assumption that anthropology can help him in what he is doing will tend, I believe, to throw a critic off balance, to cloud and restrict his view. Since it is sometimes assumed that anyone who ever published an essay in *Scrutiny* must be a bigot, pledged to defending a dogmatic party line, let me be tactful and take my example from there. Mediaevalists will remember John Speirs's article on *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* in volume XVI, an essay which *The Year's Work in English Studies*, for once extending its enthusiasm to *Scrutiny*, duly proclaimed to be outstanding. In it Speirs demonstrated how large a residue of mythic and vegetative reference the poem contained, and argued from this that it was a very special kind of poem, a profane celebration of fertility and of the values of a pre-Christian world. The whole piece, he maintained, was alive and tingling with a sort of heathen

energy, and its true subject was not really an encounter between two champions but rather this heathen energy itself, the pagan zest over which a mantle of chivalry had been loosely draped. Thus the poem was, in his words, "an assertion of belief in *life*," and he italicized the word "life" to show that it meant a good deal more than the process of drawing breath.

Now, as usual, there is a certain amount of truth in all this. Without question the poem does contain a good deal that would be of interest to an anthropologist, and without question this material does give a special sort of significance to the Green Knight, and to the scenery and incidents that are described. Still, to leave the discussion there, as Speirs does, is surely to offer *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark. If the Green Knight is a symbol of paganism and fertility, as one can agree that he is, then Gawain is just as clearly a symbol of Christianity and courtliness, and what *he* should be doing among the fanes and heathen altars is far from clear. Even the pentangle on his shield, you will remember, is explained in Christian, not in pagan terms. And he, after all, is the hero of the poem. Surely then, if *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* is "an assertion of belief in *life*," that is to say in seasonal superstitions, it is a remarkably heretical assertion? The Christian protagonist, Gawain, escapes all the snares of sorcery and deception that have been set for him. He proves himself a hero in every important respect, a victim of superstition only in one respect, a matter so trivial that all but himself are ready to overlook it. How can such a tale be construed as a celebration of *pre*-Christian values? Once again, in his hunt after the ingredients of literature, the critic has failed to respect, and thus to identify, the unique quality of the work of art before him. Gawain's history can quite reasonably be regarded as a symbolic contest between *two* creeds, with the younger one triumphing, but to represent it as an affirmation of the older creed, merely because that is present, is to be unable to see the wood for the golden boughs.

That is my first proposition, I hope not too grossly oversimplified. The second is even more difficult to set out briefly, but since it may be equally important I must try to state it as well as I can. This proposition claims that criticism is more a product of the reason than of the imagination, and that the intrusion upon it of the imagination, of those mental processes which we usually call "creative," is more likely to spoil than to strengthen it. What appear to be two obvious objections to this contention, objections which spring to mind at once, are not, I think, really objections at all. In the first place it is perfectly true that in English our

greatest critics have all been practising poets. But that does not mean that the same total consciousness was involved in their poetry and their criticism, and in fact I should argue that it wasn't: that the intuitive side of Coleridge's mind wrote "The Ancient Mariner," and that the rational side wrote those brilliant pages in the *Biographia* where Wordsworth's poetic theory and practice are criticized. Wordsworth, it is true, tended to write criticism out of the same consciousness as he wrote poetry, and the result is that his criticism, like D. H. Lawrence's, is generally inferior to his creative work. In the second place, again, although it is certainly true that in order to perform the vital preliminaries of criticism efficiently—that is, to read well—much more than intellect is required, it seems to be just as true that in the subsequent stages of criticism—analysis, appraisal, and exposition—it is intelligence, and intelligence above all, on which a critic must rely. And this, broadly speaking, is where my second proposition comes in. I think that today a lot of people who in more favourable conditions might have been creative writers have suffered a form of defeat or disappointment, that they have turned to criticism as a second best, and that their practice has been such as to make it a very poor second indeed. It has been well said that to write a play, or a novel, or a long poem is an act of faith, and to summon up the necessary faith is not always easy. Many modern critics seem to me to have failed to summon it up, and to have turned to their criticism as a substitute or compensation, making of it a spurious quasi-creation, not out of life but out of literature. In their criticism one finds, characteristically, a pronounced tendency to consider a text not for what it contains but for what it can be made to suggest—sometimes by a process amounting to free association—and even more characteristically one finds a style that is dreadfully tortuous, not because it needs to be but because it is unconsciously aping the richness and suggestiveness of the prose or verse which, as a creator, the critic would have hoped to write. Of course there are other reasons for this stylistic obscurity. One of the most obvious is the craving to hide behind a secret language, intelligible only to initiates (if indeed to them), and thus to draw together as a secret society or cult, a few stout hearts defying a hostile world together. Schoolboys and soldiers do this with their slang, doctors once did it with their prescriptions, and literary critics are becoming increasingly prone to do it, especially when their criticism is trash. They fear their environment, they suspect that if what they are saying were set out clearly and lucidly it would be hooted at, and so in time their prose becomes more and more esoteric, more and more obscure. One of my

personal favourites is an essay in the *Sewanee Review*, by a well-known American critic, called "The Vegetal Radicalism of Theodore Roethke": "vegetal radicalism," perhaps the politest way of describing a turnip yet devised. But such gobbledygook isn't only a product of fear and isolation. It stems too from the dilemma of the thwarted creative writer who has turned to criticism. Striving always to write suggestively and excitingly, he forgets that what he is now writing ought also to make coherent sense. He forgets too that criticism, not being "autotelic" or self-sufficient, must be closely related to the object criticized, and not a free fantasia on the critic's personal reactions to that object. He forgets, in fact, that criticism ought to be criticism, rather than circuitous autobiography. It's all very well, you see, for a poet's eye to roll about in a fine frenzy, but a critic's must be steady and clear. If an individual hasn't the self-confidence to write poetry, but wants to roll his eyes anyway, it is to some other occupation that he should turn: watching tennis matches, perhaps, or performing in a minstrel show. As for the writer whose style incessantly clogs up in turgidity and jargon, let him also seek employment elsewhere—as a clerk in a cipher office, or a professor of education. Certainly he shouldn't be able to get within hailing distance of a Department of English.

These remarks may seem both intolerant and pointless, a diatribe against the ills of criticism which makes no attempt to prescribe for them. I don't myself feel that the case is as negative as that, since a diagnosis must always precede, and is already a part of, any cure one may be seeking; and in any event the secondary implications of my diatribe seem wholly constructive, and maybe even a little starry-eyed. When I try to project the line along which my thoughts have been tending, to see where it is likely to end, I am surprised to find that where it appears to end is in something like a national school of critics, a Canadian movement or group. Such a school, if it came, would not be slavishly subservient, let us hope, to some common doctrine or constricting orthodoxy. Its members would be bound together more intangibly, and indeed more firmly too: by the lucidity, pertinence, and cogency of their writings; or, to put it even more generally, by a degree of good sense and acuteness which, in time, the literary world might come to regard as distinctively Canadian. It is hard for a naturalized citizen to speak of these matters without sounding like a jelly-bellied flag-flapper, but in all seriousness such a goal does not seem to me as remote or unattainable as it might seem. Surely this country, already by tradition the political mediator between the United Kingdom and the United

States, could mediate also between British and American literary criticism, avoiding both the dullness and dilettantism that spoil so much of the British contribution, and the irrationality and verbosity that spoil so much of the American? Why not a school of Canadian critics, men and women striving to mate the ingenuity and seriousness of their cousins across the border with the scepticism and lucidity of their cousins across the sea? All that is really needed is a determination on our part to maintain a decent and irreducible standard—of fidelity, of intelligence, and of style—and perhaps the rest will follow by itself. Working as individuals we will nevertheless create a community of interests, and in due course of achievements too. But in order to prepare for any such development we have to remind ourselves of what criticism should be. In particular I think we have to remind ourselves that what is really vital to a literary critic is not a specific technique of criticism, an unvarying method or procedure, but a proper proficiency in literature as a whole, a thorough experience of books against which any fresh work can be examined and assessed. And so I come to my last and most inclusive proposition, a proposition which seems to me indispensable if we are to understand the weaknesses of modern criticism, and so contrive to avoid them. This proposition maintains that what a critic really needs is not a do-it-yourself kit of critical instruments, but a love of literature and a wide familiarity with it. Perhaps as a rider we might add that it is desirable for a critic to have a reasonably comprehensive experience of life as well, since after all the subject-matter of literature happens to be life, and not thematic structures, or even irony. If a critic must have some kind of method let it be something as far removed as possible from routine—from what Matthew Arnold would call machinery— something as vague and unstereotyped as Arnold's own "touchstones," perhaps, or I. A. Richards' notion of a ritual of seriousness. But the best critic of all will not trouble himself even with such techniques as these. He will be content simply to bring to literature a mind that is sensitive, disciplined, retentive, and detached, for it is out of that kind of meeting that the best criticism will always proceed.

It seems to me that today this is something that we in the universities are already failing to do, and to coax others into doing by our example. Young people decide, sometimes midway through their first degrees, that English literature probably offers as promising a future as advertising or insurance, and that it is much easier, and the next thing you know they're sitting in an Honours Seminar with some borrowed apparatus set up in front of them, pushing poems and novels into it, turning

a crank, and handing over the resulting mince as criticism. Let us be thankful that this is still fairly uncommon in Canada, and that we still have students who have been reading ever since they learned how to do it. To judge from the writings emerging from them the situation in many American universities is far more serious, and that is a fact that we have to face, particularly since a proportion of our better students will be doing postgraduate work there. How fruitful will their new contacts be, when they find that literary study is mainly a matter of choking down some Freud, or Froude, or Frazer, and criticism mainly a matter of sorting out ambiguities, or ironies, or archetypes, or Thought with a capital *T*? How long will our English Departments be able to resist routines that are so ubiquitous, and so acceptable to the student with no literary background at all? Yet surely it is the background that makes the focus, the apprenticeship that makes the expert, the resourcefulness that makes the craft. Without the discipline of literary experience a critic might as well be drunk. He can pick up a poem and read it, but the attention he gives it is as eccentric as the attention my children give to television: watching the commercials in engrossed silence, and relapsing into noisy indifference as soon as the programme is resumed. Let us convince our students that this is the truth. Let us have them commit to memory those all too relevant pages in *The Advancement of Learning* where Bacon discusses "fantastical learning, . . . delicate learning, vain imaginations," and the rest. If necessary let us present them with texts and samplers to hang on their study walls, abrasive reminders of the critical abuses they will encounter everywhere. There are some good texts in *The Advancement*, but my own choice would be a remark made by Gulley Jimson in *The Horse's Mouth*, eminently quotable, though to quote it here requires all the effrontery I can command. "All this amateur stuff," he says, "is like farting Annie Laurie through a keyhole. It may be clever, but is it worth it?" I can't think of a better caveat with which to conclude.

THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL

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Apart from the history of the anti-corn law movement and the distinguished biographies of Cobden and Bright, the Manchester School has received little serious study. The average informed person, if asked to comment on their views, would probably reply that they were free traders. If pressed as to their political ideas, he might add that they were Little Englanders. If challenged as to whom the Manchester School included, he would answer Cobden and Bright, and possibly, as an afterthought, Goldwin Smith. Yet there is more to be said than this. From the 1840's to the 1870's, the ideas of the Manchester men, although often unpopular, were the most potent elements in British liberalism.

Manchester liberalism has often been criticized as negative, economically and politically. This view sets up a straw man of singular flimsiness, unless one holds that belief in liberty is necessarily negative. The Manchester faith in free trade meant faith, not only in the removal of restraints, but in the positive assets of emancipation—material, moral, and political—for the masses of labourers as well as for employers. Their faith in Little Englandism in imperial affairs and non-intervention in international disputes, although frequently attacked as indifference to England's position as a great power, in reality rested on a positive conception of national duties and of what made a nation great. One reason why they hated war was their belief that its costs were largely paid by the ordinary people, who had no voice in making foreign policy. At a time when faith in nationality and the independence of nations was becoming an important tenet of many liberals, the Manchester men were internationalists. In an age when Marx and Engels contended that significant social change could come only through class struggle, they

maintained that it could be accomplished by co-operation among all classes in the community and all nations in the world.

Their political ideas can be grouped under the broad heading of an attack on privilege: political, social, economic, and religious. They turned their famous struggle for the abolition of the corn laws into a contest between aristocracy and democracy. Technically Liberals, in temperament and practice the Manchester group were independents, with a deep-seated distrust of parties. "There is no party which can in my time govern this country," wrote Cobden to a friend, "for whose advent to office I would care to take the trouble of walking down Parliament Street."[1] As their independence unfitted them for being really good party supporters, so their middle-class background detached them from class passions. The Manchester School, John Morley once observed, were "the best representatives the middle class has ever had."[2] Most of them were practical men of affairs interested in practical reforms, men who had been forced to make their own way in the world and had more first-hand knowledge of the problems they discussed than was possessed by most members of Parliament. Cobden's interest in repeal of the corn laws, for instance, was that not only of a devoted follower of Adam Smith but of a man who had seen for himself the poverty and at times semi-starvation of the agricultural labourers. His interest in the problems of industry was that of one who had started his career as a lad in his uncle's warehouse. His interest in an extended franchise was that of a farmer's son at a time when agricultural workers had no votes. His interest in public education was that of a man who had no formal schooling after the age of fifteen, but who by systematic study taught himself to speak excellent French and to become more expert on economic and commercial questions than any other English statesman of his day.

J. A. Hobson, in his brilliant study of *Richard Cobden, the International Man*, tried to alter the usual emphasis on the purely economic achievements of the man chiefly responsible, as Peel generously acknowledged, for securing abolition of the corn laws, as well as for concluding the commercial treaty with France. From the perspective of the twentieth century few would deny that the economist was outshadowed by the international man, a sobriquet first bestowed on Cobden by his French friend Emile de Girardin. The Manchester School as a whole stand in need of rescue from being similarly misinterpreted as a group of manufacturers whose dominant belief in economic laissez-faire was

dictated largely by self-interest, enlightened though this may have been. An examination of who they were and what they believed and did reveals the unfairness of such an assessment.

Bright and Cobden, the David and Jonathan of English politics, were of course the great founders and leaders of the School. In many ways they complemented each other. Bright, the Quaker business man and cotton manufacturer, was all fire and fervour and oratory. After his famous House of Commons peroration on the Crimean War in which he declared "the angel of death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings," Disraeli said he would have given everything he possessed to be able to make such a speech. Cobden, the calico printer, who as a boy herded sheep on his father's farm, was all facts and reason and common sense. "I know exactly my own field of usefulness," he observed. "It lies in the advocacy of practical questions, apart from mere questions of theoretical reforms. My exertions are calculated to bring out the middle class, and that will pave the way for a junction with the masses."[3] He believed strongly that the only friends who could really help the workers were "the rational radicals of the middle class." He was not a natural orator like Bright, but by the ability and sincerity of his maiden speech against the corn laws he won and never thereafter lost the attention of the House, in which landed proprietors were as numerous as they were influential. "Nothing seems to be so decided a stigma," Cobden remarked to his brother, "as to brand a man as a mill-owner." The fact that three leading political figures of the mid-century, Disraeli, Bright, and Cobden, were all brought up outside the charmed circle of the governing class, without initial advantages of birth, breeding, or education, was a significant indication that the old order was giving place to the new. Their common success in a career then conspicuously not open to the talents provides a partial explanation of the curious friendship between Bright and Disraeli.

Among other stalwarts of the Manchester School were W. J. Fox, one of the great orators of the century, an advocate of political liberty and free schools; Thomas Milner Gibson, the opponent of the taxes on knowledge; Sir Louis Mallet, the economist and civil servant; and Thomas Bayley Potter, who attacked slavery in the United States and organized the English friends of the North during the American Civil War. There was Goldwin Smith, journalist and historian, defender of a wider franchise and of the separation of church and state, attacker of a privileged aristocracy, and prophet of the modern commonwealth.

And there were other lesser figures, such as Henry Ashworth and Archibald Prentice, the historians of the Anti–Corn Law League, men better known in their own day than in ours, who played a significant part in the great movement for reform for which the name of Manchester came to stand. Among the Philosophical Radicals most closely connected with the Manchester School were Sir William Molesworth, the colonial reformer, and Joseph Hume, the supporter of economy in government.

Most of these men called themselves Radicals. As early as 1838 Cobden announced that he was a "Radical Reformer," although on occasion he took the lead against Radicals and Tories alike. The Radicals of the 1840's were in fact a mixed bag. They included the Manchester men, led by Cobden and Bright, but also others like John Arthur Roebuck, M.P. for Sheffield, the friend of John Stuart Mill and the critic of aristocracy and privilege. On few other points had he any sympathy with the views of the Manchester School, as was illustrated by his comment that the best guarantee of peace is to be prepared for war.

Despite their radicalism few groups were less revolutionary or valued tradition more. It was Bright who first spoke of England as "the home of freedom and mother of parliaments," who once described himself as "the perfect Conservative" and asked "what there would have been left of Conservatism for Conservatives to conserve . . . but for me." His reverence for the "ancient and noble" English constitution yielded little in admiration to that of Burke. "I am in favour," he said, "of the constitution, which has come down to us from our forefathers, with such amendments as circumstances and our own experiences seem to warrant. Convinced that it depended on a balance of classes, not on the dominance of one, he yet roundly asserted that he did not pretend to be a democrat. He favoured as much freedom as would give security, but not such freedom as would destroy it. Herbert Spencer argued in 1884 that the Liberals and Conservatives had changed places, that new Liberalism was but old Toryism writ large. A quarter of a century earlier Bright had maintained that in intention he was more conservative than the Conservative members of Parliament, and that it was the Tories, not the Radicals, who by opposing reform were "the turbulent party of this nation."

The core of Manchester School teaching is generally considered the economic gospel of free trade; yet their views were in fact based on political as much as on economic discontents. Their economic and political ideas and the practical reforms which they advocated formed interwoven parts of a logically integrated whole, and in the close

connection between them lay much of the group's effective power for reform. Cobden and Bright considered their political and economic views inseparable. Of these two elements in their thought it is the political, and ethical, too often overlooked or underestimated, which are the more important. The great contribution of the Manchester School was their appreciation of the close interrelationship among economics, politics, and ethics. Men like Cobden and Bright saw most of their goals, from free trade to international peace and prosperity, as moral issues.

At a time when most nonconformists were Liberal and most churchmen Conservative there was an intimate connection between reform and dissent, which Cobden, himself an Anglican, once described as the soul of the Liberal party. Bright showed little Quaker humility when he declared that "if a good measure is to be carried in this House, it must be by men who are sent hither by the Nonconformists of Great Britain." Both he and Cobden were markedly influenced by deep religious convictions which led them to emphasize the ethical aspect of the problems of their day. What many reformers considered simply economic or political errors, they regarded as moral wrongs. The Manchester men, who are remembered as manufacturers and often accused of being blind to the hardships of the workers, in fact were first and foremost crusaders for righteousness. Even on mundane questions of the market-place their writings were pervaded with moral fervour. Hence they tended to exalt economic doctrines into moral precepts. For Adam Smith free trade was a means to the wealth of nations. For Cobden and Bright it was both a moral (though not immutable) law and a practical reform. Free trade, declared Cobden, was "the international law of the Almighty," because it rested on interdependence and peace among nations. They believed profoundly that their liberal faith was based on the moral imperatives of justice, liberty, and respect for the personality of individuals. For all this, they strongly objected to trying to make men moral, or even healthy, by act of Parliament. "Men may persuade each other," Bright observed, "to do many things which it would not be proper for the law to compel them to do."

"Adam Smith," remarked Walter Bagehot, "created Cobden and Bright." In a sense the great exponent of free trade might be called the founder of the Manchester School, yet neither Adam Smith nor the men of Manchester can be casually dismissed as the unqualified advocates of the inactivity of governments which they have sometimes been painted. No men who so devoted themselves to public issues and public

life could properly be described as "against government." To Cobden and Bright free trade, like parliamentary reform and an extended franchise, was a means to the ends of peace, prosperity, and a secure freedom. They thought of it as an international division of labour which broke down the barriers between nations, and hence as the necessary condition of both national and international progress. If they stressed that it was for the national good of England, this was largely because they realized that such an appeal would win readier support in Britain than one to international goodwill. To them free trade was far more than an economic doctrine: they believed it would "draw men together, . . . thrust aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language, and unite us in the bonds of eternal peace." Thus the agitation for free trade and the movement for peace appeared to them the same cause, as was illustrated by the motto composed by Goldwin Smith for the Cobden Club: "Peace, free trade, goodwill among nations." If Marx stood Hegel on his head, the Manchester School may be said to have stood Marx on his. They are remembered as exponents of an economic doctrine, but to them commercial prosperity at home was simply the corollary of peace and goodwill abroad.

Their other ideas followed logically from this premiss. The repeal of the navigation and corn laws meant the end of mercantilism, and in the minds of the Colonial Reformers as well as the Little Englanders heralded the emancipation of colonies. Removal of the struggle for markets and colonies as causes of dispute among nations held out the promise of fewer wars. Abstention from interference in the affairs of other countries, the arbitration of international disputes, the abolition of maritime blockades, and the reduction of armaments were among the causes which Cobden had most at heart. Here again economic and political ideas were intertwined. Large expenditures on defence and on the armed services seemed to him, not only a provocation to other nations, but an unjustified waste of public funds which might far better be spent to improve conditions at home. Among the bonds between Gladstone and the Manchester School were their dislike of war and their belief in economy in government. Their particular *bêtes noires* were indirect taxes. The Manchester view was that if funds for a "spirited" foreign policy such as Palmerston's were simply not available, if Parliament refused to vote large sums for the army and navy, this would of itself make a warlike policy more difficult. Yet even Bright the Quaker was not an unqualified pacifist. Like Cobden he recognized that on occasion war might be necessary, though in general

both believed its ills far outweighed its possible gains, and considered Britain's foreign policy had been consistently unwise if not immoral.

Cobden's views on the subject were based on a knowledge of the major European countries unexcelled and perhaps unequalled by any English public man of the day. From 1846 to 1847 he refreshed himself after the long struggle over the corn laws by visiting Spain, Italy, Germany, and Russia. In Spain free-trade banquets were held in his honour, in Rome he was granted an interview by the Pope, and in Naples by the King. In Austria he was received by Metternich, in Germany by the King of Prussia and by Baron von Humboldt, and in Russia by leading financiers and business men. Everywhere he preached the gospel of free trade, internationalism, and peace, and studied the political and economic problems of Europe. The more he saw the more convinced he became that interference in the domestic affairs of foreign countries did little good and much harm, chiefly encouraging other nations to indulge in similar interference. Again from 1859 to 1860, when conducting negotiations for the commercial treaty with France, he spent most of his time in Paris, and in a series of interviews with the Emperor did much to convert him to a reduction of tariffs if not to free trade.

Cobden led the parliamentary protest against the Crimean and Chinese Wars, as Bright led that against the British governing classes' sympathy with the South during the American Civil War. Their critics dubbed them the two members for the United States. It was characteristic of both men that Bright thought of their endeavours as a crusade, whereas Cobden, who felt quite as keenly, said he simply hoped to prevent the Foreign Office from undoing the good to the people which had been accomplished by the Board of Trade. Their outspoken opposition to the Crimean War transformed the Manchester School from the position of popular idols, which they had been accorded at the time of the corn laws' repeal, to that of the most unpopular men in the country. Bright was burned in effigy and caricatured in Tennyson's *Maud* as

> This broad-brimm'd hawker of holy things,
> Whose ear is cramm'd with his cotton, and rings
> Even in dreams to the chink of his pence.

In the general election of 1857 Bright and Cobden, like others of their group, lost their seats in what Cobden described as "the stoning of the prophets."

> In the sudden break up of the "School" in which we have been the chief Professors [Bright wrote philosophically] we may learn how far we have

been, and are, ahead of the public opinion of our time. We differ from other, or from many other politicians in this—we propose not to make a trade of politics, & not to use, as may best suit us, the ignorance and the prejudices of our countrymen for our own advantage—but rather to try to square the policy of the country with the maxims of common sense & of a plain morality.

The country is not yet ripe for this—but it is far nearer being so than at any former period—& I shall not despair of a revolution in opinion which shall, within a few years, greatly change the aspect of affairs with reference to our foreign policy. During the comparatively short time since we entered public life, see what has been done. Through our labours mainly, the whole creed of millions of people, & of the statesmen of our day, has been totally changed on all the questions which affect commerce, & customs duties, & taxation. They now agree to repudiate as folly, what, twenty years ago, they accepted as wisdom. Look again at our Colonial policy. Through the labours of Molesworth, Roebuck, & Hume—more recently supported by us, & by Gladstone, every article in the creed which directed our Colonial policy has been abandoned, & now men actually abhor the notion of undertaking the government of the Colonies—on the contrary they give to every Colony that asks for it, a Constitution as democratic as that which exists in the United States. . . .

But if on commercial legislation—on Colonial policy—on questions of Suffrage—&, I might have added, on questions of Church, for a revolution in opinion is apparent there also—we see this remarkable change, why should we despair of bringing about an equally great change in the sentiments of the people with regard to Foreign Affairs![4]

In colonial, as in foreign and domestic policy, the political and economic views of the Manchester School were again inseparable. They believed that the logical political complement to the abolition of restrictions on trade meant freeing the settlement colonies from political subservience, as they had been freed from the economic dependence of mercantilism. When trade was considered the chief cement of empire, to advocate free trade was almost synonymous with advocating colonial emancipation. Yet as Goldwin Smith never wearied of reiterating, they were not Little Englanders in the sense that they ever wanted to make England little. They simply believed that her greatness lay not in the extent of her empire but in herself and in the free institutions carried by her colonies to the four corners of the earth. Colonies ripe for self-government in their view should be allowed to govern themselves. If Britain attempted to hold them by force she would lose them as surely as she had lost her American colonies. "I want," said Cobden, "to retain them by their affections." In imperial affairs he advocated the complete and permanent abandonment of a policy of territorial aggrandizement, in Ireland and India as well as elsewhere. Moralists as they were, the

Manchester men were convinced that retribution was in store for nations which lusted after power and the extension of imperial rule. Such views ran counter to the passionate convictions of many of their contemporaries, particularly among the governing classes, who believed that the springs of England's greatness lay in her control of the seas and in her far-flung empire. Yet while the Manchester School preached the colonies' right to govern themselves, they equally insisted on their duty to defend themselves. For the mother country to continue to assume the burdens of imperial defence seemed plain misappropriation of the money of British taxpayers, particularly when the sums involved were urgently needed to raise standards of living in England. Moreover the alleged necessity of colonial defence, constantly used as a pretext for maintaining vast military and naval forces, simply added to the danger of war.

Sir Louis Mallet, who worked closely with Cobden on the French treaty and succeeded his cousin, Herman Merivale, as permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, argued that the possession of India not only greatly strengthened the military element in the English body politic, but perverted the political instincts of Englishmen connected with its administration. The close contact of a privileged race with an alien and subjected people he considered degrading to both alike:

> I believe that we do not know how much our national progress is retarded, and our national conscience obscured, by the presence amongst us of so large and powerful a class, the whole current of whose ideas is opposed to social and economic reforms. This class, by the law of its being, is favourable to schemes of Imperial ambition, to a reactionary foreign policy, to personal government and to privilege, to a lavish expenditure and to indirect taxation.[5]

To men of such views, as to Adam Smith, dependent colonies, held by force, seemed costly appendages of aristocratic government. They believed that what England could take legitimate pride in was her position as the mother of free nations, who shared inherited free political institutions, and a tongue which had "become the language of freedom in all the world."[6]

On such questions the opinions of the Manchester School were closer to those of the Colonial Reformers than is always recognized. While these views were anathema to men of Lord Palmerston's stamp, the expediency of letting the colonies go was widely held, from the 1840's to the 1870's, by British statesmen of varying political persuasions. After the loss of the American colonies and the abandonment of mercantilism, many Englishmen came to consider ungrateful colonies, which

even levied tariffs against the goods of free-trading Britain, as liabilities rather than assets. But it was left to the Manchester School, whose most eloquent spokesman on colonial affairs was Goldwin Smith, to envisage a commonwealth of autonomous communities linked by a common belief in free political institutions.

This faith in the ideas and institutions of the English-speaking peoples, coupled with their dislike of aristocracy and privilege, led many of them to feel a warm, if half-romantic admiration for the American republic at a time when the more usual interpreters of the United States to Britain were such critical novelists as Mrs. Trollope and Charles Dickens. Few English public men of the day had any first-hand knowledge of America, but Cobden travelled widely there on two occasions, and Goldwin Smith, after a brief visit in 1864, decided four years later to make his home on the other side of the Atlantic. Three years after Cobden's first visit in 1835, the Manchester petition which launched the Anti-Corn Law League declared in Jeffersonian accents that "the inalienable right of every man freely to exchange the result of his labour for the productions of other people" was one of the principles of eternal justice. When in 1861 the American Civil War broke out, the sympathies of free-trading England were at first with the primary-producing South. The governing classes, led by *The Times*, continued until almost the end of the war to be strongly pro-South, but the Manchester men aligned themselves wholeheartedly on the side of the North.

Raw cotton was then England's largest import, manufactured cotton her largest export, and Manchester itself for some one hundred and fifty years had been the centre of the industry. When the supply of cotton ceased owing to the embargo, one after another the Lancashire mills, including that of John Bright, had to close. Yet Bright, Thomas Bayley Potter, and Goldwin Smith at once threw themselves into a campaign to arouse public opinion against slavery and for the North. The American Civil War proved a far more popular cause with the working class than had repeal of the corn laws. The latter might be interpreted as motivated by the economic self-interest of manufacturers, although such an interpretation was a travesty of the real motives of men like Cobden and Bright, the former of whom had impoverished himself by devoting all his time and attention to the cause in which he so passionately believed. Support of the North by British cotton manufacturers and operatives, however, was clearly in direct opposition to their financial interests. If ever there was a moral issue it was provided by a crusade against slavery. The struggle was again represented by the

Manchester School as one of democracy versus aristocracy, and hence helped to unite behind them the British workers, who had refused to follow their attack on the Crimean War, and had doubted the *bona fides* of manufacturers who opposed factory legislation.

By the same token it estranged them yet further from the ruling class and from a considerable section of the middle class. The South was so widely considered to be the aristocratic side that to support it was looked on, as Cobden observed to Bright,

> as rather a test of gentility, and the partisans of the North are scarcely regarded as being quite fit for good society. You will hardly find a rich man within Temple Bar who does not conform to this view.—And the same spirit extends very deeply into the upper strata of the middle classes, who are little inclined to soil their gentility by espousing a low democratic cause.[7]

Britain owed her failure to be drawn into war against America during these years to two main causes: the tactful intervention of the Prince Consort and the public opinion aroused by the Manchester School.

Bright consciously tried, with considerable success, to foster in England the association of triumphant democracy and free institutions in the United States with the cause of parliamentary reform at home. The struggle for an extended franchise, in which he and Goldwin Smith were conspicuous, was a natural crusade for opponents of the corn laws. The attack on the corn laws was primarily economic, yet it sprang in part from the bitterness felt by the great industrial centres of the north against the lion's share of political power which, even after the Reform Act of 1832, was still enjoyed by the large landowners. Bright argued that, as manufacturing and trade developed, a balance must be struck between the power of the land and of industry. In his view the case for parliamentary reform was, if anything, even more glaring and undeniable than the case for free trade. Like the anti-slavery campaign, it was a far better rallying cry for the working people of the country. Repeal of the corn laws was accomplished by winning over certain sections of the ruling class and by the political education of the people. This agitation provided the first real demonstration in nineteenth-century Britain of what could be accomplished by developing an informed public opinion. When the Manchester School directed their energies to parliamentary reform they made good use of the lessons thus early learned.

As far back as the 1830's Cobden had advocated redistribution of seats, electoral reform, shorter parliaments, and above all the secret ballot, which he considered a necessary preliminary to securing the

kind of Commons which would pass the reforms they wanted. Extension of the suffrage, he argued, would provide the best guarantee for the safety of public institutions and the just administration of public affairs. He believed, in addition, that it would make for international peace, since as ordinary people in various countries acquired more political power they would use their natural interest in peace to curb their governments' desire to go to war. In 1849 Bright and Cobden founded the Parliamentary and Financial Reform Association to work for extension of the franchise and reduced taxation. In Parliament they supported Hume and Roebuck in pressing for the "Little Charter": household suffrage, the secret ballot, triennial parliaments, and a more equal redistribution of seats, and Bright in particular addressed many meetings in the larger cities on the subject of parliamentary reform. With Palmerston at the helm, neither reform nor moral fervour could make much headway. When he died in 1865, to be replaced by Lord John Russell as Prime Minister with Gladstone as leader of the Commons, the stage was set, not only for extension of the franchise but for the development of modern liberalism, based on many of the tenets of the Manchester School. The Second Reform Act of 1867 was finally passed by Lord Derby's Conservative Government, but owed much to the Liberal advocates of a wider franchise, and in particular to the Manchester men who had played a leading rôle during the two preceding decades in keeping to the fore the cause of parliamentary reform.

From the beginning of his career Cobden believed that public education was the key to social, economic, and political progress. "Schoolmasters," he wrote in 1838, "are a first step to Radicalism. I have unbounded faith in the people and would risk universal suffrage tomorrow in preference to the present franchise. But we shall never obtain even an approach towards such a change except by one of two paths—Revolution or the Schoolhouse."[8] Throughout his life he strongly advocated the establishment of a national system of public education, secular, universal, and compulsory. His political sympathies, he avowed, were with the masses, who in England still suffered from a semi-feudal social structure. The middle class he considered largely an accomplice of the privileged order, anxious to be admitted to its charmed circle. The only chance for the manual workers lay in their greater intelligence.[9] He was too conscious of the gulf between classes to believe in the natural identification of interests, but he did believe in the natural harmony of morals and economics, and held, like Lord Acton, that the fundamental problems of politics were moral issues.

These views were supported by Bright and by another Manchester adherent, W. J. Fox, Member of Parliament for Oldham, who declared that a decent education was the birthright of every boy and girl in the country. In 1851 Fox moved in the Commons to establish free primary schools, supported by local rates and managed by committees elected for the purpose by the ratepayers. Although the motion was defeated by a large majority, supporters of the scheme continued to press for its adoption. "I maintain," said Bright in 1868, "that if we were to establish throughout the country a system of primary education, simple but sound, and give to the people the power to read and to think, we should lay a broad and great foundation from which would arise almost all else that we want."[10] Two years later the first national education act was passed.

Allied to the movement for public education was the agitation for repeal of the so-called "taxes on knowledge": the paper duty, the newspaper stamp, and the advertisement tax. The prime mover was Milner Gibson, a southern landowner who began his parliamentary career as Tory member for Ipswich, a seat he later relinquished to espouse the reform politics of Manchester. At a time when the *Manchester Guardian* was opposing the doctrines of the Manchester School this group had a personal interest in working for repeal of the newspaper tax. A few months after its abolition the *Morning Star* was founded as a spokesman for their views. Cobden had no financial interest in it but became its chief adviser and provided much of the material for its editorials. "The case must be brought before Parliament and the country as an *education* question," he wrote a friend during the campaign for removal of these taxes. "We may shame the present government into some concession on that plea. At all events, I am sure that Gibson, Bright, and I can smash all opposition in argument in the House as effectively when pleading for free trade in knowledge as when contending for commercial freedom."[11] The repeal, between 1853 and 1861, of the three taxes on knowledge was primarily owing to the efforts of the Manchester School.

Towards the end of his days Cobden declared that if he were younger he would like to lead a movement, similar to the Anti–Corn Law League, for free trade in land. By this he meant the removal of the artificial scarcity of good land caused by entailed estates owned by a few great families. On economic, political, and social grounds he attacked the whole system of primogeniture and the growing concentration of land in the hands of a diminishing number of large proprietors. The existence

of such estates, and the custom of preserving property for hunting and shooting meant the withdrawal from cultivation of thousands of acres whose produce might have helped to feed poverty-stricken labourers. It also made almost impossible the development of a class of independent small farmers who owned and worked their own land. It perpetuated a situation under which tremendous economic and political power was concentrated in the hands of a small number of great landowners, and hence perpetuated a class structure which Cobden considered both archaic and pernicious. In his last public speech at Rochdale, in November 1864, he bequeathed this cause to the younger generation, telling them that they could do more for their country by freeing the land than had been thus far secured by freeing trade.

The enthusiasm of the Manchester School for free land, free newspapers, abolition of the death penalty, local self-government (the first public cause espoused by Cobden), and the separation of church and state (an issue on which Bright, as a Quaker, felt particularly strongly), should be remembered by those who criticize them as laissez-fairists pure and simple, and cite their attitude towards factory legislation as evidence of narrow-minded self-interest. Cobden, in fact, supported restrictions on the labour of children in factories, though not on that of adult men and women. Speaking at Stockport, a factory town in Lancashire, in 1837, he said he hoped to see the day when everyone agreed with him that no child under fourteen should work in a mill, and that for older children the hours should be reasonable and the labour light. A decade later, however, he criticized Lord Ashley's Ten Hours Bill on the ground that the only effective way to shorten working hours was by removing restrictions on industry. Yet when the sanctity of freedom of contract was invoked in opposition to the factory laws, Cobden answered that freedom of contract sometimes meant freedom of coercion. Bright, however, attacked all such legislation with the argument that state intervention in the relations between employers and employed was unjustifiable in principle and mischievous in results.

Sir Louis Mallet, on the other hand, although a fervent adherent of the Manchester School, approved of factory legislation both on humane and on moral grounds. He also argued that as national productivity increased, a larger share of the country's wealth should go to the workers, although he thought that as the political power of the wage earners increased there was less need every year for state intervention to secure their fair share in the nation's prosperity.[12] Most Manchester men were suspicious of trade unions on the old ground that they were combina-

tions in restraint of trade. Moreover they believed that wages depended on economic laws which could no more be changed by force or persuasion than could the ebb of the tides or the course of the seasons. They preached the virtues of self-reliance and independence as sovereign precepts for working out one's own salvation. "Look not to Parliament," Cobden counselled the working men, "look only to yourselves."[13] His last speech in the Commons was an attack on state-run industries, in which he cited Burke's discussion in 1780 of the reasons why governments should not themselves undertake manufacturing but should depend on the products of competing private industrialists. Even the production of uniforms, ships, and arms, Cobden argued, should be in private hands.

For all this, the liberalism of the Manchester School, as has been suggested, cannot be summed up as purely negative. They wanted not only the removal of restraints, but the positive conquests of freedom. They attacked the Established Church as a hindrance to free religious inquiry and to secular education, they attacked a powerful landowning aristocracy as a barrier to political and social liberty, and they attacked the monopoly of effective power in the hands of a small governing class. Their aim throughout was not merely to remove abuses but to procure such positive social reforms as economy in government, a wider distribution of land, an extended franchise, and an educated electorate. In an age when political corruption was common they were incorruptible, completely disinterested, and indifferent to personal popularity. When Palmerston offered him first a cabinet post and later his choice of a baronetcy or a Privy Councillorship, Cobden flatly refused to consider accepting any of these appointments from a man whose views he had for years publicly attacked.

Although the Manchester School formed an influential wing of British Liberalism, during their lifetime their views never became the accepted creed of the party as a whole. These were clearly as remote from those of Lord Palmerston as could well be imagined. They had far more in common with Gladstone, whom they helped to educate. Many elements in Gladstonian liberalism were Manchester-made. A fitting epitaph for the men of Manchester was given by one of their latest supporters, another Liberal prime minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. In a speech at Dundee on November 15, 1900, he declared that

> if there is a remnant among us either of the men or of the ideas of the Manchester School, I am profoundly grateful for it. . . . Their main doc-

trines are enshrined in the public policy of this country. . . . They were fighting against the whole forces of the Tory Party and against nearly the whole force of the privileged classes in the country. Their doctrines were the doctrines of freedom of trade, love of peace, due regard to economy, non-intervention in the squabbles and jealousies of other nations, and the bestowal of free institutions among our colonies, so that the colonies might gradually be trained, nay, might train themselves, to become nations on their own account in co-operation . . . with the people of this country from whom they sprang. . . . If there are men who still keep proclaiming these sound old cardinal principles, who still preach righteousness and still warn us against a love of Empire and pride of Empire running into greed of Empire, I thank heaven for it. It is not only that they are essential to the completeness of the Liberal Party, they are essential to good government of the country.[14]

Although the Manchester School were chiefly known to their contemporaries for their economic doctrines, their political ideas were more significant and longer-lived. Over a quarter of a century ago England regretfully decided that the position of a free trade country in a protectionist world was untenable. But faith in the need for international co-operation, for the reduction of armaments, for the arbitration of disputes among nations, and for peace rather than war, is even more apposite in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth. Cobden's "sovereign principle of the interdependence of the world" is the cardinal fact of modern politics. The men of Manchester would have agreed whole-heartedly with Keynes's dictum that the problems of economics are neither the most important nor the most enduring.

NOTES

1 Letter of June 17, 1856, to Henry Richard, cited in J. A. Hobson, *Richard Cobden, The International Man* (New York, 1919), 156.

2 "Democracy and Reaction," *Miscellanies*, IV (London, 1908), 266.

3 Letter to E. W. Watkin, October 9, 1841, in E. W. Watkin, *Alderman Cobden of Manchester* (London, 1891), 80–1.

4 Letter from Bright to Cobden, April 16, 1857, "Bright Papers," British Museum, Add. MS. 43,384, ff. 92–3.

5 "Egypt," letter to M. de Laveley, March 10, 1878, in Sir Louis Mallet, *Free Exchange*, ed. Bernard Mallet (London, 1891), 12, 112–13.

6 John Bright, Speech at Birmingham, Dec. 4, 1876, in Thorold Rogers, ed., *Public Addresses by John Bright* (London, 1879), 319.

7 Letter from Cobden to Bright, October 30, 1864, "Cobden Papers," British Museum, Add. MS. 43652, VI, f. 198.

8 Cited in W. H. Brindley, *The Soul of Manchester* (Manchester, 1929), 49.

9 Letter from Cobden to Henry Richard, July 31, 1856, quoted in Hobson, *Richard Cobden*, 164–5.

10 Speech on February 5, 1868, at Birmingham, in Rogers, ed., *Public Addresses by John Bright*, 63.

11 Letter to C. D. Collet, December 5, 1853, in E. W. Watkin, *Alderman Cobden of Manchester*, 153–4.

12 "Free Trade and Free Enterprise," a speech given at a dinner of the Cobden Club, June 1873, published in Mallet, *Free Exchange*, 103.

13 Letters to W. C. Hunt, October 21, 1836, and to Henry Richard, August 1, 1856, cited in Hobson, *Richard Cobden*, 166, 393.

14 J. A. Spender, *Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*, (London, 1923), I, 303–4.

THE NEED FOR DISBELIEF: A COMMENT ON *PIPPA PASSES*

D. C. Wilkinson

Browning is not a poet who has made any very strong appeal to modern sensibilities but this, naturally and rightly, has not prevented scholars and critics from trying to ascertain and place his contribution to Victorian Letters. Within the last six or seven years there have been at least three books devoted to the study of Browning: H. C. Duffin's *Amphibian* (1956), J. M. Cohen's *Robert Browning* (1952), W. C. DeVane's *Browning Handbook* (1955). There is a fourth work also, E. D. H. Johnson's *The Alien Vision of Victorian Poetry* (1952), in which considerable space is allotted to the work of Browning. The need for accurate historical and biographical detail in all literary fields is certainly being met today by adventurous and diligent researchers both in the universities and outside them, but the need for stimulating, helpful, and scrupulous valuation of the poets' works seems as hard to come by as ever—to judge not only by these four works.

The point in this instance can perhaps be illustrated by comparing the contents of *Pippa Passes* with the comments of some modern critics: by contrasting the action and dialogue with the sort of claims made for it, particularly in *The Alien Vision* and in the *Handbook*, where *Pippa Passes* is dealt with more fully.

I would suggest at the outset that I think Mr. Johnson's essay on Browning is a most manful attempt to do the fullest possible justice to Browning as a thinker, and it will remain for me at any rate a useful reference book for the "growth of Browning's ideas," which have here been given order and shape in relation to his poetic output. I've a suspicion, though, that Mr. Johnson has a very much clearer view of what it was that Browning thought than Browning himself had, for Browning is seldom as cogent in his thinking as this critic of his—as a

glance at the criticism will show. Mr. Johnson has also, I suggest, done more than justice to Browning as poet, which is a disservice. In this matter, too, I would say much the same of the other three Browning scholars—though of Mr. DeVane only when he undertakes to ascertain and place Browning's "contribution." At any rate, the general trend is to overestimate *Pippa Passes*: or to be so partial to what *Pippa Passes* ought to be as to miss what it is. Standards of comparison are either misapplied or in abeyance. The only explicit comparison is from the ***Handbook*** (p. 93):

> Perhaps it is worth noticing that the intensity of the emotional crises, as well as the language occasionally, shows that Browning had begun to study Shakespeare as a dramatic model.

Three lines of *King Lear* (Act III, scene 2, lines 49–51) are then quoted to support the statement:

> Let the great gods,
> That keep this dreadful pother o'er our heads,
> Find out their enemies now. . . .

There is indeed some kind of similarity of image in the following extract from *Pippa Passes*:

> Buried in woods we lay, you recollect:
> Swift ran the searching tempest overhead;
> And ever and anon some bright white shaft
> Burnt thro' the pine-tree roof, here burnt and there,
> As if God's messenger thro' the close wood screen
> Plunged and replunged his weapon at a venture,
> Feeling for guilty thee and me.

Similarity of image maybe, but Lear sees the storm as a symbol of a universal anguish and horror, while this other storm merely gives Ottima the opportunity for enjoyable self-dramatization, where the whole universe is seen to be *vainly* in opposition to their "glorious guilt." The similarity is only a matter of the surface, really. It would in fact be a good day for Browning were Shakespeare to be left out of the account.

Any valuation of *Pippa Passes* must of course offer some kind of analysis of the four critical scenes between Ottima and Sebald, Jules and Phene, Luigi and his mother, and Monsignor the Cardinal and the Intendant.

The scene between Ottima and Sebald has called forth most comment. Mr. Cohen writes that "In the scene between Ottima and Sebald, which, in Arthur Symons' view, reached the highest level of tragic utterance

Browning ever attained, the guilt of their love is expressed in every line. . ." (p. 25). This is a fairly common view, though, I suggest, a false one. According to Mr. Johnson, it is one of those scenes that "pose the problem of emotional assent to conventional morality and involve a concept of love," which is a highly intellectualized statement of the underlying theme, and fairly leads us to expect a considerable exploration of love and the restrictive weight of conventional morality. It is the sort of critical statement that one might expect of, say, *Antony and Cleopatra*. Mr. Johnson further refers to their relationship as one of "splendidly reckless passion"—again a critical phrase worthy of *Antony and Cleopatra*. There seems little doubt, though, that Browning invites such critical description,[1] for the language has the inflated ring of High Passion, as for instance in the climax:

OTT: My hair is fallen now: knot it again!
SEB: I kiss you now, dear Ottima, now, and now!
This way? Will you forgive me—be once more
My great queen?
OTT: Bind it thrice about my brow;
Crown me your queen, your spirit's arbitress,
Magnificent in sin. Say that!
SEB: I crown you
My great white queen, my spirit's arbitress,
Magnificent. . . .
[Interrupted by Pippa's song—"God's in his Heaven."]

It is painfully obvious that this is not *Antony and Cleopatra*, while it is equally obvious that it is intended to be, if not Shakespeare, at least a "splendidly reckless passion." This intention, however, does not in itself give a critic grounds for telling us that it is achieved.[2] What kind of passion is it, in any case? Ottima's three lines ending with that unfortunately banal "Say that!" seem to be very much more in the tradition of that grand self-dramatization already noted, and of imperious self-assertion, than to be in any way connected with a mature or significant "concept of love." It is the combination of high, impassioned posturing—"magnificent in sin" and the banal "Say that!"—that marks the central flaw in the scene. Any close reading of the text will reveal the disastrous mixing of the language of grand passion with naïve trivialities. A good example is to be found after Pippa's song has interrupted the lovers at their peak of extravagance. Pippa's song is a mere eight lines. It is followed by a line and a half from Sebald:

SEB: God's in his Heaven! Do you hear that! Who spoke?
You, you spoke! [A rather improbable ejaculation!]

to which his great white queen, his spirit's arbitress, replies (just ten lines after the grand exchanges):

> OTT: Oh—that ragged little girl!
> She must have rested on the step: we give them
> But this one holiday the whole year round.
> *Did you ever see our silk-mills—their insides?*
> *There are ten silk-mills now belong to you.*
> [My italics.]

This is no more nor less than boy-girl chat. It is surely by just such an exchange that the word "bathos" is defined and exemplified. Is this indeed the intensity of emotional crisis that shows Browning has been studying Shakespeare as a model? And if it is, we may well ask what it is that Browning has learned from the elder poet. No, obviously it is unfair to force upon him a comparison which he can ill afford to submit to. It is unlikely, too, that a "splendidly passionate" Cleopatra figure would, after adultery and murder (the repudiating of conventional morality?), begin to affirm a "concept of love" with words such as, "Kiss and be friends, my Sebald! Is it full morning? Oh, don't speak then!" Nor is it only the triviality of the occasional boy-girl exchanges that mars the scene. Apart from the confusion of idiom, at one moment archaic and pseudo-Shakespearian and at the next banally colloquial, there is a sort of simple symbolism which is uncomfortably obvious—as for instance in the use of the open lattice and the opening of their hearts, the shut lattice and the shutting out of the world:

> OTT: Oh shut the lattice, pray!
> SEB: Let me lean out. I cannot scent blood here,
> Foul as the morn may be.
> There, shut the world out!
> How do you feel now, Ottima? There, curse
> The world and all outside! Let us throw off
> This mask: how do you bear yourself? Let's out
> With all of it!

Was ever a dramatic "confession" so blatantly introduced? (And notice that banal "How do you feel now?"—repeated in its archaic form two lines later.) The shutting out of the world (and conventional morality) as the prelude to the examination of their consciences is quite shockingly *explicit*, with its "Let's throw off this mask!" and the school-masterish "Let's out with all of it!" Moreover the quality of conscience that, after murder and adultery, expresses itself in *clichés* of this kind, is not likely

to lead to any very satisfying exploration of crime, conventional morality or love.

It is in the latter half of the scene, however, after Pippa's song, that the real meaning of the fable is revealed. It would seem that Browning has been at great pains to make all explicit; and many of his critics have been gracious enough to take him at face value. They have analysed the "passions" in this scene to mean what Browning probably intended them to mean. But the intention is far from the facts. There is at all events a whole Atlantic between the passions expressed in the scene itself, and the conclusions reached about them by some commentators. Here is what Mr. Johnson has to say on the matter (p. 87):

> Pippa's passing awakens the conscience of individuals hitherto enslaved by self-interest. . . . In each case the ultimate decision negates personal inclination and so discredits the materialistic values endorsed by society. Thus, Ottima and Sebald, having discovered a sense of guilt, will commit suicide.

"Awakens consciences enslaved by self-interest, a sense of guilt discovered." It were well if it were so. One cannot proceed without the quotation relevant to what Mr. Johnson here refers to:

> SEB: Leave me!
> Go, get your clothes on—dress those shoulders!
> OTT: Sebald!
> SEB: Wipe off that paint. I hate you!
> OTT: Miserable!
> SEB: My God! and she is emptied of it now!
> Outright now!—how miraculously gone
> All of the grace—had she not strange grace once?

The crudity of the language and sentiments (and all the exclamation marks) at this point makes analysis itself blanch; but it is too late to stop. Further on he continues:

> SEB: My God!
> Those morbid, olive, faultless shoulderblades—
> I should have known there was no blood beneath!
> OTT: You hate me, then? You hate me, then?
> SEB: To think
> She would succeed in her absurd attempt,
> And fascinate by sinning.

Now this is revulsion, and then scorn; hardly "an awakening from self-interest." And should it be asserted that it is guilt (as Mr. Cohen has said) that underlies the revulsion, the answer is that guilt is by no means at the very bottom of Sebald's motivation, if we are to believe

the words Browning has put into his mouth. Sebald hates and despises Ottima now. His prime horror, though, is that he has come to see not his own actions, or himself, but Ottima, as lewd and vicious. Or rather, he and his actions are become vicious because tainted by her. Now this, along with his scorn and rejection of her, amounts to one thing—a grand shifting of responsibility. It is *her* foulness which he finds directly to blame (we have no cause to believe him), and it is towards her that he feels his moral revulsion—as well as towards his own complicity with such a creature. The last words that he addresses directly to her are "Wipe off that paint. I hate you!" From that moment to his death he merely debates in public, as it were, her foulness, *in the third person*, and is cruelly deaf to all her panic-stricken questions. He withdraws himself entirely from her, and then proceeds to imply certain unhappy distinctions between his own moral conscience and hers. "Don't think I don't know the difference between good and evil," he implies—thus making pious nonsense of the past:

> SEB: . . . Though I be lost,
> I know which is the better, *never fear*,
> Of vice or virtue, purity or lust,
> Nature or trick. [My italics.]

And he draws consolation from his own willingness to face punishment, when he continues:

> I see what I have done,
> Entirely now! Oh, I am proud to feel
> Such torment—let the world take credit thence—
> I, having done my deed, pay too its price!
> I hate, hate,—curse you! God's in his Heaven!
> [An ironical juxtaposition.]

If Sebald had taken the punishment through love for Ottima, it would no doubt have been an act of expiation. But he avowedly took it from pride and hatred. Surely this is revenge—simple, calculated revenge. Curse her, shift the blame onto her, and then commit suicide to make clear your attitude (and if she still loves you, the more perfect is your revenge). The whole scene emphasizes what she has done to him and what she has brought him to. This can be only revenge. Nor is it the "materialistic values endorsed by society" that Sebald is discrediting—it is Ottima he discredits. The only alternative interpretation is that he is so concerned to dramatize himself that he is unconscious of her presence, in which case of course his indifference cannot be thought a calculated revenge—but is still thoroughly nasty.

At all costs, a religious interpretation (such as Miss Glen argued in these pages, July 1955) seems to me rather misplaced; and I find myself forced to disagree too with Mr. DeVane's comment (p. 97):

> In an excellent analysis of the scene, Mr Ariail shows that salvation means to Browning the realization of one central truth involving repentance and expiation before death, apprehended in one supreme moment.

There seems little in the text to support this statement. In fact I should be more inclined to believe that suicide here amounts quite simply to the last desperate assertion of the ego! This certainly seems closer to the mark than Mr. Johnson's "In each case the ultimate decision (of the four main characters) negates personal inclination." But when Mr. Johnson later says: "The act of suicide . . . does not seem an additional crime, but rather a confirmation of love's intensity issued in repudiation of society and its usages" (p. 88), then I think he cannot have read the play more than once. At no time after Pippa's song do either Ottima or Sebald imply that there is a society that needs repudiating. At no time does Sebald express anything but revulsion against Ottima, a sense of pride in his own tardy moral perceptions, and revenge and/or self-dramatization. No doubt the "confirmation of love's intensity" is meant to reside in Ottima's anguish at the course Sebald is taking. And Ottima does forgive, and wishes to be the sacrificial victim herself (which is in keeping with her view of herself); but her speech is at this point rendered dramatically ludicrous by the entire inappropriateness of:

> OTT: I always meant to kill myself—wait, you!
> Lean on my breast—*not as a breast*; don't love me
> The more because you lean on me, my own
> Heart's Sebald! *There—there*—both deaths presently!
> [My italics.]

which can hardly be expected to confirm the intensity of anything. It is true of course that suicide can be a confirmation of love's intensity. It is true, for instance, of *Romeo and Juliet*; as it is also true that their deaths were in part a repudiation of the immediate restrictions that society imposed on them. But what has this to do with Ottima and Sebald? It seems to me that both Browning and Mr. Johnson have an idea of what the suicide of lovers can mean, and neither of them questions any further.

Mr. DeVane quotes an essay by J. M. Purcell,[3] in which, among other things, it is maintained that "Ottima and Sebald are not saved by

Pippa's song and that it is a perversion of Christian doctrine to infer that murder and suicide are compensation for adultery and murder" (*Handbook*, p. 97). Mr. DeVane objects to this, and complains that it has a "theological slant." Certainly there seems very little trace of a Christian ethic within the texture of the play. References to God are only nominally references to a traditional Christian God, and critics are probably misled who look for indications of that code here. Adultery is after all condoned even by the innocent Pippa. Hatred and curses are justified by Sebald and some of the commentators on the grounds that God's in his Heaven. Yet if it is meant to be Christian, then Purcell is clearly not very far out. Furthermore, I don't think it is very fair of Mr. DeVane to complain of the theological slant when he himself uses terms such as "repentance," "salvation," and "expiation" without defining them.

Suicide in *Pippa Passes*, in fact, seems to entail not much more than a fairly simple assertion of will, related at best to a primitive code of honour, and based really on straight-forward egotism. From an earlier comment of Sebald's when discussing the old husband Luca, it is clear that he accepts and vindicates the morality of egotism or, in its cruder form, that might is right:

> SEB: What if he did reproach
> My perfidy and threaten, and do more—
> Had he no right?

The easy manner of his saying this, his intrinsic indifference, indicates the assurance and satisfaction of one who has the *power* to secure his own pleasure, and so to remain untroubled by perfidy. Revealed here is the underlying ethical assumption—that his power to assert his own will and passion is the measure of man's rights—a romantic view—and to judge by the crudity of exposition alone, a somewhat coarsened ethic. It is not often in the play that we see it so clearly stated, for much can be hidden beneath that "intellectual" roughness of manner, beneath the confusion of idiom old and new, and beneath the juxtaposition of the grand and the trivial. Confusion is at all times difficult to penetrate; but when stated moral issues are different from the issues revealed in tone and dialogue, it is all the more difficult to discern the motivations.

If the moral issues are unsatisfactorily pursued, there is a still grosser failure in the dramatic movement of *Pippa Passes*. Browning, in his effort to be explicit, makes great use of the near-soliloquy, but the elements debated in these are frequently too low-powered even for prose drama.

There is a "rational" quality in them, moreover, which makes nonsense of psychology.

Let us turn to the scene between Jules and Phene, and take a look at the "rational" explicit debate by which Jules, after Pippa has sung her song of the queen and the page, comes to his decision:

> JULES: If whoever loves
> Must be, in some sort, god or worshipper,
> The blessing or the blest one, queen or page,
> Why should we always choose the page's part?
> Here is a woman with utter need of me,—
> I find myself queen here, it seems!

This as an examination of motive, and an incitement to generous action, is almost totally inept. In these few lines he passes over the crisis of his dramatic change of heart. It is a rational oversimplification of the way emotions work—as though by a mere assertion of the simplest reasons for loving, a man could come to love. But it is the rational and explicit manner of debating the matter that makes the change so hopelessly undramatic; to say nothing of the awkwardness of rhythm in "I find myself queen here, it seems!" One dare not talk of dramatic techniques or psychology at moments like this really. It will be noticed, too, that as Jules begins to accustom himself to his new state of being in love, he comes more and more (like Ottima and Sebald) to dramatize himself, keeping Phene strictly in the third person:

> JULES: Look at the woman here with the new soul,
> Like my own Psyche's,—fresh upon her lips
> Alit, the visionary butterfly,
> Waiting my word to enter and make bright,
> Or flutter off and leave all blank as first.

"In turning," says Mr. Johnson, "from hatred of the students to selfless love for Phene, who shares Pippa's natural innocence, Jules flies directly in the face of convention and thereby attains salvation" (p. 88). The convention that Jules flies in the face of, we must remember though, is an ancient convention of "honour," to which we in the twentieth century are almost altogether insensitive, nor is it a convention we are made to feel the force of within the play. But of course it is that "selfless love for Phene" that makes any careful reader part company with Mr. Johnson. Jules is quite clearly delighted with his own power "to please or not to please." It is this *noble* assertion of his own power, ironically enough, which fills his lines to the end of the scene. After Pippa's song he delivers a monologue which at no time is Phene allowed to interrupt,

and then the curtain falls. His unconsciousness of her presence is underlined by a remark that is something of a give-away:

> JULES: But I told you, did I not,
> Ere night we travel for your land—some isle
> With the sea's silence on it?

Of course he has not told her. No doubt this is just a dramatic device on Browning's part to indicate the plan, but it is nevertheless symptomatic of Jules that he should be oblivious of having omitted to inform her. He does not even look for a thank you. Her pleasure and agreement are completely taken for granted; which is not to act selflessly—or even generously.

His next sentence epitomizes his dramatic attitude towards himself:

> JULES: Stand aside—
> I do but break these paltry models up
> To begin Art afresh.

No. The only salvation I can see for Jules is of a purely selfish kind, namely, in the *possession* of an artless woman who will give him cause to renew his assaults upon the arts, and who will in all likelihood not react with undue vigour against being addressed in the third person. It is the essential self-deception which has the unpleasant significance, for the author himself seems involved in it. There is no evidence in the play to suggest that Browning is critically aware of Jules's pretensions to selflessness and magnanimity; no evidence to suggest that there might be deeper levels of generosity and love than Jules has revealed. The superficiality of Browning's own moral and psychological perceptions was never made more obvious—except perhaps in the scene between Luigi and his mother which follows.

In this scene the point briefly is that a mother's selfishness is deterring a son from sacrificing his life to save his country from tyranny. Pippa's song confirms the son in his choice of self-sacrifice. Put as simply as that, the son's action would seem certainly to "negate personal inclination" in favour of some higher end, but only if put as simply as that. This seems to be the level at which Browning's moral perceptions function. Should the situation become more complex, more developed in its details, Browning contrives to remain singularly oblivious to the further moral complications. One would surely want to know, for instance in the present case, just how well the son understood the task he was contemplating. Luigi, with a fine gesture of determined irresponsibility, when asked for an explanation by his mother, replies:

LUIGI: He has . . . they have . . . in fact, I understand
But can't restate the matter; that's my boast:
Others could reason it out to you, and prove
Things they have made me feel.

It is not his ignorance of the facts, but his abandoned indifference to them, his satisfaction in his own failure to grasp the matter, that must make one suspicious of any good resulting from his action. But when it is clear that he is bent on political assassination (on the grounds of that most dubious of all sanctions—patriotic nationalism), it would be a bold moralist who would support Luigi's decision simply and without comment, which is what Browning does. Yet what makes the whole case ten times worse is that Luigi (as we slowly come to see) suffers from a perfectly ineradicable stupidity.

MOTHER: You will never escape!
LUIGI: Escape—to even wish that would spoil all!
The dying is best part of it,

as meringues, no doubt, are the best part of a high tea. Moreover, in the "debate" that follows, he talks with such naïve indifference about dying that we know only too well how little it all means to him:

LUIGI: I can give news of earth to all the dead
Who ask me:—last year's sunsets, and great stars
That had a right to come first and see ebb
The crimson wave that drifts the sun away—
Those crescent moons. . . .

The whole thing is a kind of happy romantic daydream. Here is a man, if ever there was one, chronically ill-equipped for serious action of any kind, gifted only with a fine capacity for rashness; a man with a proclaimed intent to commit political murder, moreover, and who can rhapsodize over his ignorance of the issues. The alternative for him is to stay at home and subject himself to the "selfish" demands of his mother (the strength of whose selfishness is by no means obvious). When Browning votes that the assassination *under these circumstances* is preferable, there is no need any further to try to vindicate his moral sensibilities (and his poetic) from the charge not only of superficiality, but of rank indifference into the bargain.

After this one can have little patience with a critic who maintains that one of the themes of *Pippa Passes* (obviously referring to this scene) "poses the problem of intellectual assent to established institutions and involves a concept of power" (*Alien Vision*, p. 87). It is just too much. There is every possibility that Browning was concerned with such a problem, but it is quite another matter to maintain that he

embodied it within the dialogue of this scene. Intellectual assent to anything but private preference is quite unknown to Luigi, and established institutions provide him with no problem—however much others might reason rightly or wrongly about them. The Austrian will be assassinated, and there's an end.

It is not altogether for reasons of fatigue that I shall omit any detailed comment on the last scene of Monsignor the Cardinal and the Intendant. It is in near-Elizabethan prose, yet in spite of that is moderately successful—more so, I feel, than the other scenes, for it has a deftness of touch and tone not accorded to the poetry. The choice the Cardinal makes is, in one sense, unselfish, but it too is a dubious choice. We are to believe that he is nearly tempted to have Pippa murdered (it is difficult to believe). His "choice" is to reject this temptation, but at the same time he would seem to condemn his tempter to death, and as in the scene between Ottima and Sebald, there seems to be an element of revenge in the choice, which complicates the whole matter—and Browning does not explore the complication.

To return, though, to the play as a whole. Certainly the moral themes do not bear much examining, nor can anyone with a moderately scrupulous ear and a fairly impartial desire to read what is there, accept the many passages of explicit banality without flinching. To affirm that *Pippa Passes* is one of the stars in Browning's poetical crown, as Mr. DeVane does, may perhaps be something of a truth, but without a further qualification as to the value of the crown itself, the assertion could be misleading. Mr. Cohen remarks that "this poem was Browning's first completely successful creation, and Pippa the first of his characters to take independent life" (p. 24). Mr. Duffin tells us that *Pippa Passes* "is brilliantly original—what we now call experimental" (p. 77). Such praise is undue, and even unfair to Browning. Mr. Johnson puts before us the development of Browning's ideas, but he gives a high-serious ring to these ideas which the poetic bell, when struck, is seen to falsify. All in all, what one misses in these books is critical discrimination with implied standards of comparison, and this lack makes them a little less useful than they need be.

Here then is a play, with four scenes in which the songs of a naïve girl, overheard at critical moments, bring about decisions in others of which she is unaware. The fact that she remains unaware throughout is an agreeable irony. Further, it would seem to be implied that the decisions in each case negate evil and affirm good. To test these "decisions" in terms of language and dialogue is to find strong grounds for rejecting both the meaning Browning intended and the values he in

fact presented, and to charge him with indifference. What is surprising when one recalls his later dramatic monologues is to find his "psychology" functioning so poorly. Only in the last scene does one get a hint of his later psychological assurance and strength.

However, his perceptions at all times were open to interference from the general optimism of his nature. It is common to ascribe to him the kind of optimism expressed in "God's in his Heaven." No doubt this is indeed only the optimism of innocent Pippa. But this is not to refute the fact of Browning's own hardly less naïve optimism—the kind that can permit the adulterous, murderous, man of the world Sebald to oversimplify his own salvation by repeating that "God's in his Heaven" with conviction. This is in line with the over-all optimism of the play—the assertion of the power of innocence over minds entangled with vicious self-interest. The very ease with which this "power of innocence" operates is suspicious, gives cause for disbelief. It is an oversimplification; and the only comment on such an oversimplification, as it is the only comment on *Pippa Passes* as a whole, is that it trifles with morality and psychological probability. In addition it must be said of the complete work that it is quite shockingly uneven in its poetry.

If this is to treat *Pippa Passes* too realistically or too seriously, then I believe it is still left to someone to prove its merits—but on the level of fairy tale. What is to be done with the arts' students and the trollops in that case is difficult to say. Browning clearly invites us to suspend our disbelief, but we must have little disbelief to suspend if we can call the scene between Ottima and Sebald "the finest single dramatic scene in the 19th century" (*Handbook*, p. 96). There is need for a certain disbelief. It is one's duty to *Antony and Cleopatra*, to *Romeo and Juliet*, just as much as to *My Last Duchess*, to maintain disbelief except where we are persuaded, forcefully persuaded, to suspend it.

NOTES

1 "Ottima is a deplorable creature lost in sensual passion, but she is given the finest lines. (A. R. Skemp found her almost a Cleopatra)." Duffin, *Amphibian*, 73.

2 "For those seeking impressive, striking drama, this is inevitably a favourite scene and the parallel of *Macbeth* II, 2 is often aptly suggested." Margaret Eleanor Glen, "The Meaning and Structure of *Pippa Passes*," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XXIV (July 1955), 415.

3 "The Dramatic Failure of Pippa Passes," Studies in Philology, XXXVI (1939), 77–8.

DETERMINISM AND CHARACTER

David Gallop

"She can't help herself, I'm afraid. It's her character, you see."
Dostoyevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, Part I, chap. II.

People who are impressed by the discoveries of the natural and social sciences are sometimes inclined to think that all human actions, like other events in nature, are inexorably determined. For these discoveries suggest to them that personality is wholly determined by factors of heredity, physique or environment; and therefore that particular actions, since they are in turn only the expressions of personality or character, must likewise be completely determined. The consequences for morality are well known and paradoxical. A man's faults and assets lie not in himself, but in his glands or his school teachers. As there is not much he can do about those things, why should he be commended for his achievements or blamed for his misdeeds?

With the starting point of this argument, the contention that character is wholly determined by factors of these types, the present discussion is not concerned. Let it be assumed that character *is* determined by these or by factors of any other kind that may prove to be relevant. Does this impugn the notion of a free action, hence the moral commendation or criticism of any action whatever? What truth is there in the thesis that all a man's actions must needs express his character, the thesis of "character determinism," whose lapidary formulation is Heracleitus' *ethos anthropo(i) daimon*?

At first sight it would seem absurd to take this literally. Not *all* actions could be the expression of character. For much of our less interesting behaviour, such as the cleaning of teeth or the tying of shoelaces, is not readily ascribable to any recognized character traits at all. In this respect it differs from the behaviour of fictional characters,

whose creators tend to "select" from their imagined lives only those actions that can be seen as typifying the character they wish to depict.[1] Anyone who asserts, therefore, that each particular action of our daily lives is determined by our characters, might reasonably be asked to specify the character trait of which each particular action is the expression. In reply he could, of course, always posit *ad hoc* propensities for explaining every piece of conduct. He could say, for example, that each act of teeth-cleaning manifested a *virtus dentifriciosa*. In this way he could always save the thesis of character determinism, but only at the cost of turning it into a tautology. Alternatively he could refuse to regard these uninteresting pieces of behaviour as "real actions" at all. But if so, we might ask him how those "real actions" that are (on his view) determined by character should be defined.

Moreover, people sometimes act out of character. Once again, it could always be insisted that an abnormal piece of conduct was the expression of some special *ad hoc* character trait. In practice, however, no need for such hypotheses is felt. If we want to explain a man's departure from his usual mode of behaviour, we look for special circumstances attending the exception. For example, quarrelsome behaviour on the part of a normally good-tempered man might be put down to extreme fatigue.

But these objections will leave the determinist unmoved. For, he will say, the area that they leave open for the exercise of free will is quite unimportant. Teeth-cleaning and shoe-lace tying are not the kinds of thing that we ordinarily want to commend or censure. As for actions out of character, they are usually felt to be less commendable or less blameworthy just because they *are* explainable by special circumstances. We make more allowances for the lapses of a good-tempered man who is not himself than for the rudeness of an irritable one who is. Evidence of good character commonly supports a plea in mitigation of an offence. It is, in fact, just in the case of trivial or untypical actions that we feel least need of the moral concepts to the use of which determinism is a challenge. Therefore it is not much good invoking these cases in order to "make room" for free will.

Moreover (the determinist will continue), these cases are the exceptions that prove the rule. For in making the choices that really matter, in choosing their motor cars or their wives, for example, people do not act out of character. They are quite themselves when they buy their cars, get married, or take other responsible decisions. They act in character

most of the time. Our argument, therefore, while releasing a few untypical actions from the determinist's grasp, implicitly abandons to it all the typical ones, that is, the vast majority. He can still hold that most if not quite all of our actions are determined by our characters.

But why should he say this? It is, clearly, a large step from saying that an action is *in* character to saying that it is determined *by* character. For an action in character is only an action that is typical of the agent's conduct; not one whose nature is dictated by some inner force. The usual object of saying that some particular action is in character is only to indicate that it resembles many of the agent's other actions. It is just like him.

There is, admittedly, a sense in which *some* actions that are in character might properly be said to be determined by character. For one thing is commonly said to determine another when it is a basic consideration in reaching a decision about that other thing. Thus the funds available for a building may determine its size, and the number of delegates at a conference may determine the choice of a meeting hall. Similarly, a person's own character may, if he knows it, be a basic consideration affecting his decisions. He may, for example, decide not to attend a social function because he knows that he is shy. Even more commonly, his conduct may be determined by the necessity for living up to his character; by the need, that is, to confirm the opinion that he supposes or desires others to hold of him.

In saying that his actions are thus determined, however, no kind of limitation on his freedom is implied. The man who avoids a social function because he is shy acts no less freely than the man who hires a hall to accommodate a specific number of delegates. Moreover, a person's character could scarcely be held to be a consideration determining *all* (or even *most*) of his actions in this way. The decisions of a personnel manager are not (in this sense) determined by his own character, but by those of his employees. The decisions of a cook, a chess-player or a plumber are not (in this sense) determined by the character of anyone at all, but by factors of quite a different type.

All this, however, may seem to press the implications of the word "determined" unduly and even pointlessly. For the determinist need not use this word, and he would not, in any case, hold that all conduct is determined in the sense just discussed—that is, in the sense that it is designed to take account of or to display qualities of the agent's own character. What he claims is that the conduct is the *expression* of character, that it *expresses* the agent's character, whether or not he

intends it to do so. A selfish man, for example, may constantly display selfishness, yet never see himself or his actions in this light. He may even be (as we say) incapable of an unselfish action. But if so, surely it could be argued that his conduct is simply and inevitably the expression of his selfish character, and should as such be exempt from moral criticism. How, indeed, could we reasonably blame him for failing to do something of which he was *literally* incapable?

Even this formulation, it may be noticed, involves some strain on the concept of "expression." For *actions* would not ordinarily be said to express anything in their own right. We should say, rather, that persons express themselves,[2] their views or their sentiments *in* their actions or words, knowing full well that they are doing so. Moreover, the things that are typically said to be expressed (*con espressione*) are occurrent feelings or reactions such as gratitude, surprise, or disgust, rather than permanent qualities such as selfishness, laziness, or tact. Facial expressions (smirks, scowls, etc.) tend to register reactions of the moment rather than long-term qualities of character. Furthermore, sentiments may be expressed without being felt: one can express admiration or regret without admiring or regretting.

All this points to some distortion in the claim that actions express character. It would, however, be pedantic to labour such objections. For whatever the drawbacks of "express," *some* word or other may well be needed to stand for the connection between a person's character and his conduct. Should the determinist resort to obvious metaphors and say that a man's actions "flow" or "stem" from his character, it would be futile to object that only liquids can properly be said to flow or plants to stem. If there is *any* connection between specific qualities of character and corresponding conduct, its nature matters more than the word used to refer to it. We must, therefore, now consider what connection, if any, there may be.

One possible view of it is suggested by the fact that we commonly ascribe conduct to abstract character concepts, such as cruelty or kindness, laziness or generosity. When, for example, someone is said to have acted "out of kindness," this may be taken to imply that his action was the effect of a quality "kindness," working as a force within him, and issuing inevitably in actions of that sort; or (in modern terminology) that in acting thus he was actualizing a "disposition" or "tendency" to respond in that manner to certain sorts of situation. On this view, idioms such as "from kindness" or "out of cruelty" might be thought to lend character determinism some support.

But this view, common as it is, appears to mistake the function of such expressions. For to say that a man has acted out of kindness is not even to imply that he is a kind man, let alone that this is the reason why he has so acted. It is rather to say that he has *on this occasion* acted from the sort of motive that is characteristic of kind persons,[3] for example, a desire to help others in difficulties or to avoid hurting their feelings. An action done from kindness need not be one that issues from a kind disposition, even though this be a natural inference to draw from the fact that a man has so acted. Scrooge acted out of kindness on Christmas morning, but those who knew him would probably have regarded it as a seasonal flash in the pan.

These idioms, therefore, give the determinist no help. But this is not likely to trouble him. For he need not maintain so crude a thesis as that entities called "kindness" or "cruelty" compel a man to engage in kind or cruel behaviour.[4] All he need say is that men necessarily act kindly or cruelly just because they are kind or cruel. Without using abstractions, he can still say that what a person *does* is a necessary consequence of what he *is*.

To dispose of this let us, therefore, consider what is meant by ascribing a character trait to someone in the simplest possible terms. What is meant, for example, by saying that a man is lazy? On a plausible view this amounts to saying that he tends to shirk any form of exertion. It is a compendious way of referring to his actual and possible shirkings, of alluding to his past shirking record, and of indicating how he can be expected to behave if further exertions are required of him. If this is correct, then his being lazy will certainly entail that he shirks exertion on many occasions. But this entailment is of a purely logical nature. The necessity is only that which links a description in terms of a comprehensive predicate such as "lazy" with the more specific statements that justify that description or give it its meaning. It is like the entailment holding between the assertion that a man is rich and the assertion that he has a great deal of money or property. The entailment requires, in our case, only that the man shall perform a number of actions *of the shirking type*. His laziness does not ordain that he shall shirk on any particular occasion, nor does it determine the specific form that his individual shirks will take. The fact that he is lazy (whether or not by his own fault) no more compels him to do any particular action than the fact that he is rich compels him to own any particular piece of property. Moreover, a rich man is not precluded, merely because he is rich, from giving all his money away, on the ground that he will thereby

cease to be rich, and therefore no longer be the man he is. Such a defence would not even get a camel through the eye of a needle. Similarly, we might therefore argue, a lazy man is not precluded from exerting himself merely because he is lazy. No doubt it is true that if he *does* exert himself sufficiently from now on, he will cease to be the man he *now* is. But this, so far from being impossible, seems not only perfectly possible but highly desirable.

This, however, will not satisfy the determinist. For he will point out that a man's own actions, particularly those of early life, have an important effect on the development of his character.[5] The relation at least between those formative actions and his formed character is not, therefore, the purely logical relation of the specific to the comprehensive description. In this respect richness and laziness are not comparable. Repeated shirking makes a man lazy not merely in the way in which the possession of money and property "makes" him rich, but rather in the way in which repeated practice on the trumpet "makes" him a good player. (Contrast "He was twenty in 1939; that *makes* him forty now" with "Early to bed, early to rise, *makes* a man healthy, wealthy and wise.") The relation is causal as well as logical. But if there is a causal relation between formative actions and formed character, it could be argued that there is a causal relation between formed character and subsequent actions in keeping with it. Just as the trumpeter's practice enables him (*via* the embouchure, breath control, etc. that it develops) to play a difficult solo, so the "practice" of a lazy man disposes him (*via* the character trait, i.e. laziness, that *it* develops) to shirk exertion whenever he can. But whereas the trumpeter's skill in no way compels him to give a good performance, but is only a prerequisite of his doing so, a man's laziness is quite differently related to his lazy conduct. It is not a prerequisite of it, for one may behave lazily without being a lazy person. It is rather a dispositional state that inclines him against exerting himself, somewhat as the bias of a bowl inclines it to diverge from a straight course. To say that the bowl has a bias is not merely to say that it always diverges, but to ascribe to it a tendency to diverge, or even to point to the features of its design which cause it to do so. Similarly, to say that a man is lazy is not merely to refer to his shirking record, but to ascribe to him a *tendency* to shirk exertion, and perhaps also to suggest that some (as yet unknown) feature of his constitution causes him to behave in this way.[6]

For this reason, the determinist will argue, a description of a man's character in such terms as "lazy" differs from an account of his finances

in such terms as "rich." The latter tells us nothing about what he tends to do, and hence it affords no grounds on which we could predict his conduct. The former, however, does tell us how he tends to behave; hence a knowledge of his character, together with a knowledge of any actual situation confronting him, *does* enable us to predict what he will do. A licence to make such predictions is granted in describing him as "lazy."

How seriously, we must therefore ask, does such predictability threaten the concept of a free action? Not so seriously, at first sight, as is sometimes supposed; for our actual ability to predict conduct is easily exaggerated. Even from a good knowledge of a person's character and of some actual situation confronting him we may be far from able to predict infallibly and exactly what he will do. If we knew, for example, that a man was lazy, and that he was faced with the duty of mowing the lawn, we should not necessarily be able to predict whether he would do the cross-word puzzle or take forty winks. We should perhaps be able to predict that he would shirk the mowing, but not that his shirking would take this or that particular form.

But this may still fail to satisfy. For, it may be argued, the reason why we cannot always in practice predict from knowledge of his character and circumstances exactly how a man will behave is that our information is often not sufficiently detailed or precise. If we had a *complete* knowledge of his character, and if we were accurately informed about *all* the circumstances of his decision, then we *should* be able to predict his conduct without any possibility of mistake. Thus the determinist will admit that if he knew *only* that the reluctant lawn-mower was lazy, he would not be able to predict whether he would do the cross-word or take a nap. But if he also knew that he was fond of cross-word puzzles, and that this week's puzzle lay uncompleted on the table, then he could certainly predict which he would do. To this we might answer that his prediction could, even so, be wrong; for the man might be unusually exhausted, so that the cross-word did not make its usual appeal to him. But the determinist can (once again) counter by saying that in that case his information was defective. Of course if he had known how tired the man was, he could certainly have predicted that he would take a nap.

Moreover, he might say, no actual statement of facts and no actual description of character is, in the nature of things, exhaustive.[7] Truth lies at the bottom of a well. However plainly a statement of the facts, together with a character portrait, suggests that a man will act in a

particular way, further facts and a more subtle delineation of his character can always be imagined that will frustrate an attempted prediction. In practice, therefore, infallible prediction may well be impossible. Nevertheless, it would still be possible *in principle*, given *really* comprehensive information, to predict exactly what the man would do.

There is something suspicious here about the determinist's method of arguing. At every turn he requires that any actual account of the facts offered him be supplemented just at the point where it fails to make successful prediction possible. He talks of "a complete account of the facts" as if this were something obtainable "in principle." Yet he takes good care, on principle, that no such account is ever actually obtained. We may wonder, therefore, whether his contention that all events would be predictable, given a complete account of the facts, is not itself an enormous tautology. For by "a complete account" it may turn out that he means only "such an account as would make successful prediction possible."

However, the notion of a complete account of the facts may be invoked in good faith. It may really be supposed that an account could be given of all relevant facts, from which together with a complete understanding of the agent's character, his every action could be seen to follow as a necessary consequence. But if so, what would be meant by "relevant facts"? They could hardly be just those facts a knowledge of which would ensure successful prediction. For this would once again reduce the determinist's claim to a tautology. Yet, as our earlier discussion with him suggested, there is (theoretically) no limit to the facts that could be imagined as having a bearing on the action to be predicted. No ordinary, limited statement of facts and portrait of character will provide him with grounds for an *absolutely unshakable* prediction. For this purpose he would require nothing less than an exhaustive survey of the state of the whole universe immediately prior to the action in question. Were such a complete inventory of facts available, *then* (he might still claim), given complete understanding of the laws of nature, infallible prediction of any event (including any human action) whatever would be possible.

To this we can only reply that his thesis has now cut loose from its scientific moorings. For his talk of particular events as determined by the state of the whole universe is itself a travesty of what is meant, in any ordinary or scientific context, by saying that one thing determines another. The scientist, needless to say, does not study states of the whole universe to discover uniformities subsisting between them and

specific kinds of occurrence. In trying to discover what determines, say, the colour of our eyes, he hopes to correlate eye colour not with states of the whole universe but with other circumstances, limited in number and of a definite type (e.g., the colour of our parents' eyes). This limitation in the nature of his answer does not render it inadequate, any more than "the last straw" is an inadequate answer to the question "What broke the camel's back?"

In other words, if some things are factors in determining the colour of eyes, then other things are not. If we were to insist on regarding everything as a factor, we should debar ourselves from attending to certain specific features of the world in order to understand certain others. If this is essential to scientific (or any genuine) explanation, then determinism—in the broad form of it that we are now considering—does not rest upon any truly scientific basis. As a philosopher's thesis it may be defensible by arguments of another kind. But its scientific credentials are spurious.

NOTES

1 Cf. E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel*, 63–79. Writers can lend colour to determinism in other ways. They can represent a man's fate as the outcome of his character by high-lighting just those aspects of character of which crucial decisions in the story can be seen as the expression. Similarly they can construct a plot hinging upon a number of contingent circumstances, each of which is necessary for the tragedy to happen as it does, but any of which could easily be imagined otherwise. Both these methods (to say nothing of tragic irony) are used by Sophocles in ***Oedipus Rex***.

2 A man may express himself or his "personality" by growing a beard, or by painting his house pink and purple. "Self-expression" in this sense is no doubt too specialized for the determinist's purpose, tendentious piece of jargon though it is.

3 It may also serve to rule out any suggestion of special reasons for what has been done. Thus, to ask a question out of curiosity is to ask it just because one wants to know the answer, and not because knowing the answer will further any particular purpose one may have. To stay in bed out of laziness is to stay there not because one is ill or exhausted, but just because one cannot be bothered to get up. The use of "sheer" with many abstract terms, especially pejorative ones like "laziness," "cruelty," "rudeness," "vanity," or "greed," reinforces the suggestion that no special considerations explain or justify what has been done.

4 Hobbes, however, thought it worth tilting at this windmill: "Upon the same grounds [i.e. the doctrine of "separated essences"] they [the scholastics] say, that faith, and wisdom, and other virtues are sometimes *poured* into a man,

sometimes *blown* into him from Heaven; as if the virtuous, and their virtues could be asunder." *Leviathan*, chap. XLVI.

5 Hence Aristotle argues (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1114a) that since a man freely performs those actions from which his character develops he cannot evade responsibility for the actions in which that character later finds expression. But is it enough to say this? For while a man's character may be affected by what he himself does, it may also be affected by what he suffers.

6 Cf. R. J. Spilsbury, "Dispositions and Phenomenalism" in *Mind* (1953), 350–4.

7 It is perfectly true that no mere summary of character qualities does justice to the uniqueness and complexity of personality. Our stock of character epithets is limited, and the character of any individual person, especially if he is a "character," will often defy adequate description in terms of them. Moreover it is not what we know of a person from *description* that warrants detailed predictions of his behaviour, so much as what we know of him from *acquaintance* (hence many a domestic row). A testimonial is a poor substitute for an interview.

The Islamic Near East

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FOREWORD

[I have had to rely entirely in the matter of this Supplement on the advice and far-reaching assistance of my colleague, Professor G. M. Wickens of University College, University of Toronto, and I take this opportunity of thanking him for having made the realization of the idea possible. Mr. Wickens has contributed the following foreword. EDITOR]

For the layman there is today no shortage of books and articles on the East, whether Near, Middle or Far.[1] Some are serious and informative, more are light and "newsworthy," many downright trivial and even misleading. The fact that few are written by scholars, or by experts in any real sense of the word, does not, unfortunately, mean that those which are so written always fall perfectly into the first category. But, without the qualifications of scholarship—or that increasingly rare attainment of equivalent non-academic expertise (I am thinking, of course, of men such as Sir Reader Bullard, Sir Arnold Wilson, and C. J. Edmonds)—it is safe to say that nothing of any ultimate value to the layman will be produced. He may be amused, he may even gain many irrelevant, uncoordinated fragments of knowledge, or a useful talking point or two; but he will seize nothing of the "inwardness" of another culture, or experience moments of intellectual and spiritual kinship with its representatives. At the most, he will see "problems," without understanding people: he will assuredly never rise to an awareness of himself and his like in their capacity of potential "problems" to others.

So much said, it will be realized that the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, with this number, is not entering into competition with the pundits of *Time*, *Life*, *Maclean's*, or any of the many other journals that now "process" the East for easy public assimilation. The following articles differ considerably in style and method and subject-matter, but they are drawn together not only by their common preoccupation with aspects of the Islamic Near East, but also by their concern with a

total culture as seen and experienced, in little and obliquely, by several specialist workers in respective subdivisions of the field.

If all the contributors are professional experts, whose understanding is based on the firmest grasp of the languages involved, each has long specialized in one or more branches of Islamic Studies: one is of outstanding eminence, the doyen of Islamists in the English-speaking world, two are themselves Muslim scholars of an authority acknowledged in both East and West; of the rest, the one who does not at present hold an academic post, has unique qualifications of experience and training, and lives and works at a most sensitive point of cultural interpenetration.

The broad plan of the number is clear from the titles: separate articles pass in review the political and social life, and the literature, of the Arabic-speaking lands, of Iran, and of Turkey; other studies are devoted to two polarities among the gamut of reactions in the life of the area's all-embracing religion, Islam. Each article is self-contained, and was written in total independence of the others, a situation that was probably desirable, but which was in any case imposed by the scattered locations of the various contributors. Yet there is much in each that will sharpen the significance of the others; nor do the lines of relationship run only vertically, within the linguistic sub-areas of the field, but horizontally as well, from one language-culture to another.

If the light that comes from the East has often dazzled and made blind, it is hoped that these articles may serve as mirrors, to catch some rays thereof and cast them back in clarification of their origin. Indeed, a distant examination of the resulting chiaroscuro may provoke desire for closer scrutiny in a light more whole. It is time, willingly or against the grain, to admit that Robert Bridges' ironical prophecy, in the *Testament of Beauty*, if ever valid, was so for a very brief term: few Asians now make "outlandish pilgrimage" westward, merely to "worship" the *ersatz* brilliance of "electric light," but the eternal irradiation of the East (will-o'-the-wisps and all!) is today all the more intense for the elected blackness round about. (G. M. WICKENS)

NOTES

1 It will be noted that the terms "Near East" and "Middle East" are used indiscriminately in these articles. No harm can flow from the general realization that this is common practice nowadays, whatever ephemeral distinctions, fine or broad as the case might be, may have been drawn at different times in

the past. The Islamic territory primarily connoted by such terms is as follows: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. By extension on some occasions (as here), one or more of the following areas are also included: Arabia proper, the Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The question of transliteration is less happily disposed of, especially in a series of articles based on different linguistic foundations. It is fairly easy, in writing of modern Turkey, to use the modern Turkish alphabet without conversion; Arabic words and names of all periods are equally capable of being rendered, without undue trouble, into one of several acceptable systems of transliteration. But Persianists stand in uneasy truce in their often passionate espousal of one of two main systems, a modern, phonetic style or a classical, quasi-Arabic manner. Then, again, what of Arabic names, words and phrases as used in Persian, or similar Arabic and Persian forms as used in Ottoman Turkish or Urdu? How about the purely Turkish part of Ottoman Turkish, or (so to speak) the Urdu part of Urdu? Above all, how should one deal with the many forms already in common, or at least accepted, use in English ("Caliph," "Mecca," "Saladin"), or with the arbitrary Latin spellings often adopted, e.g. for their own names ("Naficy" for "Nafīsī"), by Muslim writers with Western contacts?

As scholars care much about these things and the general public rather less (both with justice), only a necessary minimum of uniformity has here been imposed editorially. No common form has been pedantically distorted beyond popular recognition; no scientific form so simplified as to offend the learned eye. Arabic, Persian and Turkish specialists will readily recognize their own, while the layman will have as fair a chance as he ever did of pronouncing these *exotica* correctly from the printed page. Only one advantage need be given him: the modern Turkish *c* is pronounced as an English *j*.

POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

Sir Hamilton Gibb

The longer my connection with the Middle East, the less sure I am of either my knowledge or my comprehension, and the more unpredictable seem to become the policies and actions of its leaders. Partly, no doubt, this is due to the fact that the generation with which I grew up is now passing from the scene, and a new generation is coming forward, a generation with which I have not had the same close contacts and whose ways of thinking I have not learned by long and intimate personal association. But at the same time, the impulsive, sometimes even irrational, element that has always been present in Middle Eastern politics (and not always absent from politics elsewhere) seems to have grown more pronounced and to have found a freer field of action. Revolutions are always just around the corner, but who could have foretold, even a few days before it was announced, that Egypt and Syria would join in a "United Arab Republic"? Who, even now, can say confidently how solid is the union or what may come of it? It was hailed in some quarters as a "union of peoples," and it is true without doubt that in its first fine glow it offered a measure of satisfaction to a deep-seated and powerful emotional drive for Arab unity. But a real union of peoples? Nobody who has heard the hypnotized masses of German youth chanting "Heil Hitler" will place too much confidence in frenetic demonstrations at Damascus, or Cairo, or Baghdad. Yet they undoubtedly display in some way, or symbolize, a factor that has to be reckoned with in any survey of the contemporary Arab world. The problem is to identify that factor, and to assign to it its true valuation in relation to other factors in the Arab world, and the true measure of its significance for the relations of the Arab world with other nations of the East and West.

The sudden formation of the U.A.R. is typical of the headaches which

beset a Western student of the contemporary Middle East. Here is a given political event: what materials are there available for an observer to interpret it, assuming that he already possesses a specialist knowledge of the Middle East, its history, and its social institutions? It is obvious that there are two general ingredients: (1) the historical setting, that is, the underlying frame of social relationships and organization and the series of past events leading up to, or at least preceding, the given event; and (2) the immediate factors involved in that particular event. The student may be expected to be reasonably well informed on the historical setting, although there are still considerable limitations to his knowledge; but he can scarcely ever pin-point the immediate factors, the precise stimuli that motivated the action itself. Even the public declarations of the actors themselves may obscure rather than clarify the situation. Such declarations, even when not deliberately designed to mislead, are too often *post hoc* rationalizations or apologetic for what was in origin and essence an instinctive or impulsive reaction to a given circumstance. All that the observer may say is that the action either chimes in with the past course of events and may therefore be called a natural or logical development, or else appears to be a completely unforeseeable and erratic deviation. If it is the former, he will be inclined to regard it as a substantial and durable step in a continuing development, a fact that can be built upon as an indication of future developments. If the latter, he will be inclined to regard it as an atypical and temporary aberration. Yet, however aberrant an event may seem in itself, the fact of its happening (and still more its public rationalization) carries both pragmatic and programmatic consequences. The particular instance of the union of Egypt and Syria, although in one sense typical in the abruptness of a *fait accompli* which postpones the resolution of the resulting problems to an uncertain future, aptly illustrates the principle.

In dealing with the Middle Eastern region, then, and more especially with the Arab countries, a political scientist is really up against it. His ordinary techniques of study—the careful investigation of the structure of existing political institutions and of the composition and behaviour of different social and functional groups, the analysis of their potential political significance and action, and so forth—all of these, however keenly he may be aware of evolutionary elements or revolutionary tendencies, furnish him with highly precarious data. Within 24 hours they may have become entirely irrelevant to the political evolution of a given country. The more the Middle East becomes itself, the more politics in the Middle East reverts to what it has usually been in the

past—an art, and a highly personal and opportunist art, scarcely more amenable to political generalizations than the Kentucky Derby.

Where then shall we seek and hope to find the truth, the *realia* of Middle Eastern affairs? Surely, one might think, in the writings or speeches of Arabs themselves, born and educated in their own social environments, and trained in methodical investigation and the dispassionate recording of their data? But the results of any quest in this direction would prove to be disappointing. There are few writings by Arabs in Arabic, and none by Arabs in English or French, to my knowledge, which in handling political issues are not programmatic or apologetic, which do not present a highly selective view of the actual facts, which are even aware of the basic issues and problems in political psychology. If thirteen American States could draw up a federal constitution and thereby *become* the United States, why should not nine Arab states agree upon articles of federation and thereby reunite the Arab world as a single political entity? It is just as simple (and simple-minded) as that. Let me hasten to add, however, that there are a few studies written in Arabic by Arab writers who offer a more searching analysis of the factors that hamper and obstruct the aspirations for Arab unity—usually to the great displeasure and indignation of their fellow countrymen.

Why then has the Arab world presented this spectacle of inner disunity and political instability? The thesis which underlies most of what follows is this: that during the last hundred years (or, in more human terms, for three generations or so) the traditional and familiar social institutions of the Arab community (as well as of Persia) have been breaking down, and have in some areas disappeared; that the tentative efforts to build new institutions on Western models have failed, for lack of natural foundations; that this has resulted in a series of movements more or less (generally less) organized around some personality or some emotional urge, all reacting in different ways to the disturbing effects produced by the invasion of Western institutions, with or without the support of Western military or political power; and that the inner impulse towards a remobilization of the native forces and their expression in new institutional forms has hitherto found itself continually and repeatedly frustrated.

It would take too long to expound and to document this thesis in one article, especially when political, economic, social, and religious factors are inextricably entangled in each phase of this process, and the phases themselves follow different time-scales in different countries. All I can

do is to illustrate briefly some of these factors, and then press on to current developments.

A century ago (in Egypt, a century and a half ago), the social pattern in the Middle East was a relatively stable one. Except for marginal individuals, every person was a member of a large family group and an established economic group, closely integrated and often identical. These groups offered a measure of social security and spiritual satisfaction to the individual; governments did not interfere with their ways of life and livelihoods, except to exact a proportion of their produce in cash or kind, and their economic foundations were relatively secure. But why go back a hundred years? For this reason, that this relatively blessed state of social and economic equilibrium in the pre-capitalist age not only had been built up with infinite difficulty over a long period of time, but also in its building up had fused with an Islamic setting the millenial mechanisms of Middle Eastern society and thus anchored them profoundly in Muslim attitudes and psychology.

Today all this has been changed. New codes of law based on Western models have replaced the old customary systems and structures; the new contractual forms, braced by legal sanctions, have on the whole operated in favour of the wealthy and powerful; the old leasehold systems of land tenure, for example, have been replaced by private ownership and exploitation (in passing let me say there is nothing "feudal" about the ownership of land in the Arab world—it is the creation of the last hundred years); new commercial codes have favoured the importers and mercantile *entrepreneurs* (native and foreign), and completed the ruin of the old guilds, which can no longer protect the individual against the increasing interventions and controls of governments in economic life; new industrial developments have created larger or smaller concentrations of workers, unprotected by effective social organizations. Simultaneously there is the fact of a rapidly increasing population, especially in Egypt. This in itself would probably have weakened or broken down the traditional institutions by overloading them; but it has intensified the newer social tensions, and created a growing "proletarian" problem by depressing living standards and inducing the migration of unemployed rural labour to the ever swelling cities, cutting them off from the protection of their family groups.

It is all too easy to imagine the strains which these changes have produced. We tend in general to fix our attention on the economic progress attained in this century: the great extension of cultivated lands, the enlarged production of cash crops replacing a largely subsistence

economy, the development of local industries despite shortages of raw materials and fuels, and now the new wealth pouring in from oil royalties. Or else we stress the emergence of new professional "middle" classes—doctors, lawyers, journalists—or the transformation of old ones—civil servants, teachers, merchants; and the reconstruction of legal and political institutions on more democratic lines. All these are real advances in the social and economic armatures. But alongside them all lie immense question marks: how far have they changed the basic social attitudes and recreated the institutional structures of society? at what price have these advances been bought? is the account still to be rendered, and to whom?

A historian will not need to be reminded that changes in economic and political systems do not immediately produce corresponding changes in social institutions, attitudes, and loyalties. On the one hand, there is the fact that the older institutions linger on in large segments of the population, more and more "inefficient" in material terms, uneasily fitted into or in actual conflict with the demands of the newer systems, a standing challenge to impatient "reformers," both from within their own society or among well-intentioned foreign planners. The list of these demands could be almost indefinitely prolonged: land reforms, capital accumulation and investment, widened and improved education, enlargement of opportunities for women, increased mobility of capital and labour, and at a deeper level the breaking down of traditional social inhibitions.

On the other hand, there is the no less patent fact that even in these "advanced" or "evolved" circles, there still survive elements of old institutional attitudes and loyalties. Atavistic, no doubt, but encouragingly human—even if in any rational analysis they are elements of discordance, hindrances to the achievement of that new and more perfect society which will rejuvenate the Middle East and regain it its place in the sun. But here precisely lies the crux. Where is this new society to come from? What is it going to be built on? It is this, then, that is the most agonizing problem of the Middle East in this day and generation. Only the Turks have answered it boldly by saying "We shall rebuild our society on the patterns of the West," and even the Turks are perhaps a little less sure today than they were twenty or thirty years ago. Everywhere else there is hesitation, doubt, a kind of paralysis and tendency to let things take their own course. The West is out of favour; its institutions held up to public execration as materialistic and immoral. Somehow the Islamic values must be preserved. But where shall they be found, and how ex-

pressed? When the religious leaders are consulted—or raise their voices without waiting to be consulted—their prescriptions are rejected by the professional classes as mediaeval and out of touch with modern thought and needs: "We are not a primitive bedouin society, or the subjects of a mediaeval Caliph or Sultan." Thus there is a gnawing intellectual and moral insecurity in modernist circles—a horror of the West and at the same time a desire to emulate the social and economic institutions of the modern world, as illustrated by the West—which does not make for positive and effective action, however much they may push the contradiction aside by concentrating on their professional tasks.

To make matters worse for the modernists, the artisan classes and the proletariat, who have borne the heaviest strains and the hardest knocks, have taken seriously their denunciations of the West. Blaming the West for all their sufferings and hardships, they show a decided trend towards following those popular leaders who put forward programmes for reconstituting society on traditional Islamic lines and restoring active authority to Islamic law and its institutions. Such were the causes for the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, and similar, though less spectacular, movements in other countries. The forcible suppression of these movements by governments in power clearly does not remove those causes, and for intellectuals and professionals as well as for the proletariat the question remains: what kind of society are we moving towards?

All social and economic strains generate psychological attitudes. It is the direction taken by these that determines the future of nations. The psychological reactions of the Middle Eastern peoples in such circumstances are often, but wrongly, thought to take the form of fatalistic quietism. There is probably a misunderstanding here; the quietism of past centuries was more likely to have been connected with the stability of the social system, and apart from this, eruptions have been by no means infrequent in Middle Eastern history. During the past century, the social and economic strains were more severe than any previously experienced, while at the same time the social system itself was partly breaking down. The reactions of the population were thus directed outwards, and easily captured by nationalist leaders, who had no difficulty in channelling these resentments against the Western Powers, and using them to establish their own political control. Even when they themselves failed to treat effectively the social and economic problems—which indeed increased under the national governments rather than diminishing—this fact did not change popular attitudes. Their failures

were laid at the door of continuing political and economic controls exercised by the Western nations; and by now, when anti-Western polemic and propaganda have had a clear field for two generations, it has become an ingrained article of belief. One of the great errors of American policy in the Middle East (be it said in passing) has been to suppose that, in face of the vast and increasing scale of American economic enterprise in the area, the Middle Eastern peoples would except America from this general attitude towards the West.

The total result of all this is that all psychological reactions converged on the desire for *power*: national power conceived in the crudest terms as open defiance of Western governments and policies. Hence the mortal offence given by any description of the Middle East as a "vacuum," seeming to imply a denial of national capacity to meet and to deal with its own problems and destinies.

A further factor which has contributed not a little to this concentration of psychological attitudes on the public expression of power is—paradoxically at first sight—the influence of religion. Except for small communities of Christians, the peoples of the Middle East are all Muslims. It is true that Islam and Christianity belong, in any world-view of religions, to the same group; and it is wholly legitimate for those groups and persons who are deeply concerned with inter-religious understanding to stress their community of basic beliefs and common elements. But their common elements have been developed and combined in very different ways and proportions, and have produced divergent attitudes among their adherents. Of the factors of divergence, none, probably, has been more powerful than the history of Islam. Even within the lifetime of its founder, Muhammad, the religious faith of Islam was identified with a political community, and a triumphant political community. This identification was immensely reinforced by the sweeping conquests of the Muslim Arabs in the following centuries, by later expansions in Asia and Africa, and in most recent memory by the Ottoman Empire. For a Muslim, therefore, the conviction that his religion was the superior and final religion, destined to supersede the corrupted forms of monotheism called Judaism and Christianity, was confirmed by the political victories of his faith. It can well be imagined—I need not stress the fact by going into elaborate detail—how confusingly contrary to the established order of the cosmos, how unthinkable, it was that the Christian world should ride roughshod over the Muslim world and the Christian lord it over the Muslim—how maddening and intolerable to see the Jew establish a

Zionist state in Palestine at the expense of its Muslim Arab population, and contemptuously throw back the armies of the Arab States.

It was this event above all which acted as the catalyzing agent. In the second half of the nineteenth century and well into recent decades, the Muslim (as distinct from the nationalist) reaction remained on the whole on the religious plane. Its leaders concentrated on internal reform, on preaching in season and out of season that the disasters which had befallen the Muslims were the just consequences of their own disregard and corruption of the principles and practices of Islam, and that salvation would come, along with political power, when Muslims once more were sincere and united in defence of their faith. But in the storms and stresses of the last twenty years, the religious demand proper has weakened before the assertion of Islam as political power. Arab nationalism, especially, has welded together the religious and the political motivations into one inseparable aspiration. It may be that many Muslims (especially among the professional classes) feel no longer sure what the inner values of Islam as a religious system should be in the modern world, but they feel also that that problem can wait until Muslims can once again hold up their heads in the world and determine their own future.

To this extent those Western observers who say that Islam, as a practically effective system of rituals and ethics, is no longer a dominant factor in the Middle East may seem to have facts on their side. But Islam is what Muslims make it—what Muslims feel in their hearts; and there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority still feel themselves profoundly, even fiercely, Muslim. I do not deny that there are dangers in the present situation from the religious point of view, but as things are, Muslim feeling remains the strongest integrating force in the Middle East. And I would go so far as to say that, in any presently perceptible future, only in the degree that Muslim feeling is conjoined with military power will any unitary political structure be built up or endure in the Arab world. This is the significance of Colonel ʿAbd an-Nāsir (President Nasser) in the present conjunction of events. Again and again he is hailed by the crowds as the "new Saladin"; and while I cannot wholly accept the identification—for Saladin was the most chivalrous and religiously single-minded figure in Muslim political history—yet we should remember that even Saladin did not hesitate to seek and to obtain the benevolent support of the Second Rome in his struggle against the Western Crusaders.

But a stable political structure has to be built up on much more than emotion and the fluctuating distribution of military power. True, with modern instruments a military oligarchy may suppress opposition, at the risk of alienating its other support in Muslim opinion. The continuing problem in the Arab Middle East and in Persia, and perhaps even in Turkey, is to construct that web of interlocking interests which alone can maintain a stable and unified state. It has not yet been achieved in any Arab country, and if the United Arab Republic is to endure, or to expand, this is its first and crucial problem.

The lessons of history in this respect are not very encouraging. It has never been of the genius of the Arab peoples to build up those intermediate political institutions, those groupings of citizens of different status and occupation on a basis of free association, which characterize our Western societies. Some of the new Western-introduced professions have of course attempted to create their own organs for co-operation and protection—the legal profession, for example, has recognized bar associations. Even for their own professional groups, however, these have seldom been of as much social utility as the old guilds. The embryo trade unions of the workers are even less effective, and are strictly supervised or even controlled by the local governments.

The traditions of government in the Middle East are authoritarian. A governing group, of whatever composition, is inclined to look with suspicion on any kind of association among its subjects which might challenge its authority. Furthermore, the recent experiments in democratic forms of government have done little to encourage a belief in the efficiency or patriotism of political parties, and their suppression brought few tears to the eyes of any but professional politicians. Yet the authoritarian governments are caught in a dilemma, now that in modern times they no longer have the slave armies that formed the mainstay of the mediaeval sultanates. On the one hand the urgent social needs of the masses, deprived of the support of their traditional institutions, and now clamorous for all the benefits of a modern welfare state, look to their governments for satisfaction; and it is in the interest of the governments for their part to appear at least to be the source of all benefits. They know also that, in spite of temporary enthusiasms for their displays of power, it is by their internal administration that they will in the long run be judged by their subjects. But few governments in the Middle East have either the financial means or the administrative experience to meet all these needs. However genuine their desire to improve standards of life, the pace remains desperately slow, in spite of a few model

villages and the bulging files of blue prints in government offices. And meantime, babies continue to be born in staggering numbers, and the cost of living to rise almost as staggeringly.

Hence the other face of the dilemma. The only prescription for a long-term remedy known to governments is to build up a modern economic and industrial technology. But industrial development does not come of itself; somebody has to find the money, and somebody (usually not the same person) to supply the enterprise and technical knowledge. The rate of industrial investment by private individuals in all Middle Eastern countries (except Israel) remains disappointingly slow. Practically nothing—in some countries not one cent—now comes in from outside to support or develop private enterprise—in striking contrast to the inflow of capital which built up their economies in the period of "colonialism." The funds poured in from oil royalties, from most of American aid, and now from Soviet aid, are all administered by or in the service of the governments; all go to strengthen the control of the governmental machine. There is no prospect that in any Middle Eastern country there will be built up anything like the Western structure of industrial enterprise, in spite of the local success of the Arabian-American Oil Company and some other oil companies in developing auxiliary contractor services. The course is set for state capitalism, although we must hope (as I shall explain later) that there will still remain some field of opportunity for private industrial enterprise.

I have no competence to estimate or discuss the economic consequences of this state control of capital funds, but the fact itself seems to me to carry a number of political and social implications, and perhaps I can best bring this article to a close by risking (with full awareness of the dangers and folly of prophecy) a survey of some of these implications.

In the first place, the fact of state control of the major sources of capital, especially in the oil-rich countries, is likely to reinforce the factors of division between the Arab states. In the past, and even yet, much stress has been laid on dynastic rivalries and such historical causes of division. Of course they did, and in some respects still do, exist. The Arab is still the world's supreme individualist, in whose language the word for "obedience" means also "subjection," and the word for "politics" means "mastery." In so far, however, as the new nationalist states, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf shaikhdoms, constitute viable political units retaining control of their populations (and this is a question on which I have no opinions to express), the indications are that they have

no inclinations to share their fortunes with less fortunate political neighbours. Egypt and Syria, and even Lebanon (should it go the same way), are all states which enjoy only fringe benefits from the oil wells, and they have little to lose by unification—although Lebanon, with its world-wide trading connections and advantages as a free market, and its majority of Christian (if rival Christian) communities, would, I think, have to be coerced into sinking its individuality inside a unitary state. A clever political leader might perhaps lessen the obstacles to union by promising that the provincial governments would retain their exclusive control of their oil royalties for a period, say of twenty years—but who is to guarantee that the promise would be kept, when the needs of the other provinces are so patent and so clamant?

The internal concomitants of state capitalism raise still more searching questions. It seems impossible to build up an effective industrial system without training up a body of relatively independent managerial and technical experts. These skills are still sadly deficient in all Arab countries and in Persia, except at the lowest levels; but it can be assumed that in the course of the next decade or two they will expand considerably. At the present moment, the governments, whether royal, military, or controlled by landowners, are confronted by two main groups among their subjects: the professional classes and the proletariat. They *must* have the support of one or other. The inner struggle may not be overt, but it exists, even if from time to time overlaid by major issues. Until recently, the professional classes saw their advantage in a Western-style democratic system. But they have cut the ground from under their own feet by their violent denunciations of the West and their own political ineptitude, aided (let us not forget) by the errors and follies of all the Western nations. I do not say that these classes are now solidly anti-democratic, but their faith in the efficiency and merits of democratic government has been sadly shaken. At the same time, they have steadily lost political influence, especially in Egypt, where the régime has more and more openly addressed itself to the suffrages of the proletariat.

At this point we enter a particularly difficult and treacherous area. It is often said—so often that it is almost an article of faith among writers on Eastern questions—that it is among the disinherited proletariat that the best opportunity for Communism lies in the countries of the East. So far as the Arab world is concerned, I believe this to be a total misreading of the situation. The masses may applaud Mr. Khrushchev, but I suspect that is because he typifies the kind of rejection of the West that is one of their strongest emotional stimuli, not because they are attracted to

Communism. Nor are the régimes attracted to Communism. It is among the frustrated intelligentsia that Communism holds out the promise of recovering power and influence.

By themselves, however, the intelligentsia are impotent. In face of Western political controls they were able to rally the masses behind them; but this they cannot do against a national government. If it should happen that the masses were seized by a spirit of unrest and became ripe for revolt, the intelligentsia, the professional men, might supply the leadership, and uneasily attempt to ride the storm. In default of this, there is only one way that I can see in which they might regain political power at some future time, and this is by an alliance with the developing managerial and technician classes, as the industrial economy expands and establishes itself.

If there is anything in this argument (and I admit that there is a lot of hypothesis in it), then the future political structure and stability of the Arab countries, and probably of Persia too, will largely be determined by their economic development and by the attitudes and outlook of the rising managerial and technician groups. This will be the focal point of the struggle for some form of communist government or some form of democratic government. The omens for a democratic outcome look, at this moment, none too good. Dazzling though the rewards of industry and commerce are in the American economy, the status of the technician in Russia offers counterbalancing attractions, and the Arab technician, avid for status, cannot but be tempted by the prospect of an economy geared to industrial expansion—at whatever price. There are, indeed, evident signs that the Soviet leaders realize this, and are opening up opportunities for training the future industrial managers in Russia or by Russians. The Western countries, of course, are by no means doing nothing along this line, but I believe they are far from realizing the crucial importance of the personal element in industrial development, and of doing everything possible to foster free enterprise at a high level. This is not easy, bearing in mind both the jealousy of governments and the backlog of suspicion of all Western and Western-supported economic activity as "exploitation." But it is going to take a long time anyway to build up the economic structures of these countries to anything like the level that this argument presupposes; and if we of the Western nations can leave behind the mutual jealousies and propaganda against one another by which we have only cut our own throats, we are not so devoid of intelligence and resource as to be unable to fight our way back, and swing the balance in favour of a measurably free economy

co-operating with a measurably representative and responsible government.

Finally, I said a few moments ago that the struggle was between "some form" of communist or of democratic government. I do not see any prospects in the Middle East at present of either a communist government on the Russian model or a democratic government on any of the Western models. Any form of government in the Arab world must, to be reasonably stable, satisfy both Arab and Muslim feeling. Those who fear Soviet ambitions in the Middle East overlook the enduring force and surge of these strong and vital factors; welcome as the support of the Soviet government may be to Egypt or Syria against the fear of Western domination, the Russians too are still, for all Arabs and Muslims, "foreign devils." The "new Saladin" has already shown himself to be as wary of the Third Rome as the original was of the Second Rome. A stabilized Middle East is of the utmost importance for the peace of the world; and if ultimately the Arab world is stabilized under "some form" of communist government, as may well happen, my guess is that it would be Muslim communism, proud of its Arab and Muslim heritage, and prepared to maintain its independence in face of both the West and Russia.

THE ESSENCE OF ISLAM: AN INDIAN MODERNIST VIEW

A. A. A. Fyzee

The essential teaching of a religion is often obscured by studies relating to its polemics, history, law, literary tendencies, and philosophical concepts. From time to time it becomes necessary to ask the question: what does Islam stand for? The answer to this question depends upon the time when it is asked, the country in which the answer is given, and the person who answers it.

Many authors have attempted to answer this question in India, notable among whom in recent times are Ameer Ali, whose *Spirit of Islam* is considered a classic (London, 1922; repeatedly reprinted), and Iqbal, whose *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* was first published in Lahore in 1930, and republished later.

Broadly speaking, these two authors stand for two different points of view. Ameer Ali writes a profoundly appreciative life of the Prophet, and tries to explain his greatness as a human being, and the manner in which he tried to cure the evils in the Arabia of his time. Ameer Ali does not seem to classify clearly the causes of the weaknesses that have since grown into the religious fabric of Islam. He is essentially an apologist saying that if one applies the true principles laid down by Muhammad, one will be able to solve all modern problems.

Iqbal on the other hand was deeply versed in modern philosophy, particularly mysticism, and he put forward a definite view of "active" Islam, as distinguished from the pacifism of the Sūfīs. He propounded a method of reform in Islam which was allied to the ancient principle of *ijmā'* (consensus), and also closely in conformity with the modern concept of legislation. Iqbal has a considerable following both in India and Pakistan, particularly because he is a great poet, and many of his principles are pithily expressed in striking verse, Urdu and Persian.

There are many ways in which a solution of the problem can be

attempted. One method is the historical. Islam can be considered in history, and its tendencies so analysed as to give some kind of result. Another is dogmatic, that is, to examine the main teaching of the Qur'ān and the sacred law (*sharī'at*) and extract from it what in the estimation of the author are the basic principles. There may also be other methods, such as legal or philosophical, into which we need not enter.

It is proposed in this paper to examine the work of a modern Indian author, Abul Kalam Azad, and give a brief summary of his teaching. Azad (1888–1958) was one of the greatest of the Muslim leaders of Modern India. A writer, thinker, and statesman, he was recognized as one of the profoundest scholars of Islam that India has produced during the last two hundred years. His main work is the *Tarjumānu'l-Qur'ān*, a translation of the Qur'ān, with brief commentary in Urdu. Unfortunately it is incomplete, and the two volumes take us to chapter 23 of the Qur'ān, that is a little more than one half of the Holy Book. The first volume however is of great importance, for in it we find the *Ummu'l-Qur'ān* (Mother of the Qur'ān), namely, a detailed and extensive commentary on the first chapter, *The Fātiha*, which seeks to state the essential principles of Islam in about two hundred pages.

A brief account of his teaching is proposed to be given in this paper for the following reasons. First, Azad is by any standards a deep thinker, a profound scholar, and the creator of a new style in Urdu literature. Secondly, he is an eclectic, accepting and emphasizing the truth of all great religions. Thirdly, he is against any distinctions of race, caste, creed, or country. Fourthly, he shows a remarkable familiarity with modern thought and comparative religion. As his work is in Urdu, and European scholars are generally not familiar with it, it appears to me highly desirable that the main teaching of Azad may be placed before the Western world in a simple and methodical form.[1]

Azad uses his commentary to the *Fātiha* as an occasion for giving us a philosophical account of Islam in its fundamental aspects. He emphasizes the fact, already well known to students of comparative religion, that the belief in one God is the bedrock of faith in Islam. He then discusses the three attributes of God, namely, *rubūbīya* (Providence), *rahmat* (mercy), and *'adālat* (justice). Throughout his discussion, he emphasizes three principles: (*a*) that all religions are in their own sphere perfectly true, (*b*) that all teachers sent by God are true teachers, and (*c*) that Islam is nothing more than a confirmation of the true faith taught by previous religions and teachers.

The opening chapter of the Qur'ān is often likened to the Lord's

Prayer; it is the most recited of all the *sūras* (chapters) of the Holy Book; it is to be recited at least 17 times during the day in the obligatory prayers; and it is often considered as the essence of the teaching of the Qurʾān. In the traditions we have "There can be no prayer without the *Fātiha*." It is called "the opening of the book," "the mother of the book," "the treasure," "the foundation," and in the Qurʾān it is designated as "*Sabʿ mathānī*," the "seven oft-repeated ones" (Qur. 15: 87). The Qurʾānic notion of God and how man should worship Him is stated in it. To facilitate reference, we shall begin by giving Pickthall's rendering:[2]

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.
(1) Praise be to Allah, Lord of the worlds,
(2) The Beneficent, the Merciful.
(3) Owner of the Day of Judgement,
(4) Thee (alone) do we worship; Thee (alone) we ask for help.
(5) Show us the straight path,
(6) The path of those whom Thou has favoured;
(7) Not (the path) of those who earn Thine anger nor of those who go astray.

In order to understand the true meaning of this prayer, Azad explains the main purposes of a religion. These are four (*Tar.*, I, 27): (1) to have a correct conception of the attributes of God; (2) to believe in a law of just returns; that is, the belief that good actions will have a good return and evil actions will be followed by due punishment; (3) to believe in life after death; and the judgment of God; (4) to understand and follow the path of rectitude or right conduct.

Keeping this in mind, the first word to be understood is "adoration," or "praise" (*hamd*), because this is the first word in the prayer. Adoration follows the wonder and mystery that is created in the human mind when seeking God as the architect of the universe. The mind of man should be uplifted by the feelings of wonder and mystery and love; not filled with fear and terror and thoughts of retribution. Islam propounds a god of mercy and justice, rather than that of power and revenge.

The first attribute of God is *rubūbīya*, "lordship," "providence." This follows because he is "master" or "Lord" of all the worlds, that is, the universe created by Him. *Rubūbīya* is the abstract noun; while *rabb* is a common Semitic word for "lord," "master," "sustainer." According to Arabic lexicographers *rubūbīya* means "to rear and nourish a thing from stage to stage in accordance with its changing needs and conditions until it attains its full or perfect stature." Thus God possesses the attribute, not only of being the creator, but also of the one who nourishes, main-

tains, and develops a living being until it reaches its full stature. A child is born and it is but a lump of flesh. It is the mother who gradually feeds it first by her own milk and then by various kinds of food until it rightly develops and becomes strong. Thus *rubūbīya* is instilled into the mother by God. What happens to a child is common to all creation and there is a definite plan in it.

Nourishment or maintenance follows the law of equitable proportions. Every gift of God is bestowed in due measure. The Qur'ān says:

> And there is not one thing, but with us are the stores thereof. And we send it not down save in appointed measure. [15:21.]
> And everything with Him is by measure. [13:8.]
> Lo! We have created everything by measure. [54:49.]

In the process of upbringing, in addition to the law of proportion and just measure, there is also an inner meaning, which Azad designates as "inner guidance." It is this inward aspect which is even more important than the external, or merely material, aspect. In order to explain God's guidance two more notions must also be explained, namely *taqdīr* (fate, destiny) and *hidāya* (guidance). The Qur'ān says, "He hath created everything and hath meted out for it a measure" (25:2).

Taqdīr means the proper assessment of something and prescribing a certain state or condition of existence for it. Nothing can move outside the limits of that fixed state. The planets cannot leave their orbit; the oceans cannot leave their bed; the birds cannot live in water and the fish cannot exist on land; the tropical plants cannot be transplanted in the Polar regions and the Polar bear cannot survive near the Equator. That is the Destiny ordered by a wise and beneficent Maker. Every being is equipped for life within its environment, and similarly every environment is so ordered that its products and effects are according to fixed laws, so that there is stable adjustment between the environment and the beings which exist in it and life is not endangered.[3]

The Islamic notion of destiny is thus connected with the notion of assessment, of fixing a due share in accordance with certain principles, rather than an arbitrary decree, based on the will of an all-powerful deity.

The second aspect of "providence" is *hidāya*, "guidance." *Hidāya* means "to show the way," and there are several kinds of guidance. Guidance may be instinctive or based upon the faculty of reason. Our author takes two felicitous illustrations and it is difficult to convey in English the spirit and beauty of his exposition. His illustrations are (1) a child seeking his mother's nipple, and (2) a female cat about to give birth to her kittens. No one has taught the child to suck or the

would-be mother to take all the precautions necessary for the protection of her kittens; and yet both act instinctively in perfect consonance with nature.

The second stage of divine guidance is through the senses and the faculty of reasoning. Man, animals, birds, and all living beings perceive certain things through their senses and use their faculties for their own guidance and protection. Thus the Qurʾān says, "Our Lord is He who has given everything its force, and then granted it guidance" (20:50). And finally it lays down four stages of creation and development:

> He who hath created, and given right order and proportion; who hath fixed a right measure (for every being), and then granted it guidance. [87:2–3.]

Thus "providence" implies (1) creation, (2) right order, (3) correct measure, and (4) guidance. The Qurʾān emphasizes a rational and methodical approach to religion, and to the acceptance of a God possessed of (*a*) providence, (*b*) mercy, and (*c*) justice.

The principle of creation coupled with order in the universe is a basic dogma of Islam. It lays down that God first created the universe out of nothing. He then gave it a right "order," that is, formed and shaped it in due proportions. Next, he gave it the right measure, that is, after giving it a form, He made it of the right size. Size, shape, form, and quantity were all the concern of the Almighty, in the process of creation. And finally He gave "guidance" (*hudā*) to all created things. Inanimate objects followed the laws of nature; that was their guidance. Animate creatures followed their instincts and their senses, and man was additionally guided by reason.

The Qurʾān speaks of the attribute of providence by asking:

> Say [unto them, O Muhammad]: Who provideth for you from the sky and the earth, or Who owneth hearing and sight; and Who bringeth forth the living from the dead and bringeth forth the dead from the living; and Who directeth the course? [10:32.]

According to Azad, the Qurʾān argues as follows. (1) Previous to the message of Muhammad, the current conceptions of God and religion were untouched by reason and were based on irrational dogmas or superstitions. The Qurʾān offers a rational conception for the worship of God. (2) The call of the Qurʾān is addressed to understanding and rational thought. It particularly calls upon man to consider the whole of nature, reflect upon it, and see in it the handiwork of God. (3) The universe shows that everything in it is created with a purpose, and not

arbitrarily. (4) Once this order becomes clear to man, he will begin to reflect and follow the path of truth.

If God provides for the material needs of his creatures, it is impossible to deny that he furnishes moral guidance as well. And this is done by means of revelations given to Messengers. Azad says, "If He is the creator of the world and such is the fulness of his providence that each atom has its fill, and each ant its sufficiency, then how can one believe that he does not provide for the moral guidance of man?" (*Tar.*, I, 56.)

Then comes the argument of immortality. If man, the apex of creation, is created, provided with the means of sustenance and moral guidance, then is it possible that he is completely mortal and that nothing of him will survive, and that the soul is not immortal? "Do you think then that We had created you for naught, and that ye would not be returned to us? Now Allah be exalted, the True King! There is no God save Him, the Lord of the Throne of Grace." (23:115–16.)

The evolutionary process by which simple creatures gradually become more complex beings, developing by the will of Providence and reaching certain goals, is visualized thus:

> Thinketh man that he is to be left aimless? Was he not a drop of fluid which gushed forth? Then he became a clot; then (God) shaped and fashioned. [75:36–9.]
>
> And surely from state to state shall ye be carried forward. [84:19.]

Thus when man leaves this mortal state and stands before his God to be judged, he will be faced with the teachings of messengers and revealed messages which were meant for his guidance.

We have completed an examination of the first verse which deals with (*a*) adoration of God; and (*b*) the attribute of providence. We shall now try to understand the concept of "mercy" or "compassion" as explained by our author. In the second verse, God is addressed in two words, *rahmān* and *rahīm*. Both words signify mercy or compassion, but in the Arabic usage the form of *rahmān* is used for a transitory quality, whereas the form of *rahīm* expresses a permanent attribute. This explanation, commonly given by certain commentators, is accepted by Azad and is certainly in consonance with classical usage.[4] According to him the designation *rahīm* has a wider connotation, and therefore God is compassionate not only in particular instances but as the result of an inherent and permanent attribute, for God says in the Qurʾān "My Mercy embraceth all things" (7:156).

The whole of the Universe is created on the principle of order, as

distinguished from disorder, and of beauty as distinguished from confusion. And this is due to the mercy of the Creator. Since man is the best and most favoured of all creatures, God has

> created the heavens and the earth and causes water to descend from the sky, thereby producing fruits for your food. And he has made the ships subject to you, that they may traverse the oceans by His command. And He has subjected to your service the rivers and also the sun and the moon, constantly pursuing their courses, and the night and the day. He has granted you all that you require, and if you could count his gifts you could not reckon [His bounty]. [14:32–4.]

And yet man is full of ingratitude!

Azad's conception of beauty needs further examination. He says that the beauty of nature consists in the harmonious blend of a variety of shapes, sounds, colours, and smells. The singing of the nightingale is to be contrasted with the cawing of a crow; but both together constitute a harmony in their diversity (*Tar.*, I, 70). This external beauty has a relation to internal beauty. The beauty of man's character depends upon reason, moderation, and goodness in human behaviour. Thus the external beauty of nature is integrated with the inner beauty of the spirit and character of man. And in the process of evolution, that alone is preserved by nature which is more useful. The Qurʾān teaches the survival of the most "useful" rather than that of the fittest.

After creating man, the question of man's right guidance in this world is of basic importance, and it is part of God's mercy that He has sent His messengers and teachers for the guidance of man. Not only Muhammad, but his predecessors such as Moses and Jesus were sent as Messengers of God, and they were sent as part of His mercy.

> We sent thee [the Prophet] not save as a mercy for all people. [21:107.]
> And before it [the Qurʾān] was the Book of Moses, as an example and a Mercy. [11:17.]

Just as in the physical aspect of nature, the most useful survives, and the less useful disappears, so in the inward aspect there is a strife between the truth (*haqq*) and falsehood (*bātil*). The literal meaning of "truth" in Arabic is "durable," so truth is conceived as something which is durable and falsehood as that which vanishes—"And say truth hath come and falsehood hath vanished away. Lo! Falsehood is ever bound to vanish." (17:81.) Although God destroys falsehood and upholds the truth, it must not be supposed that this is a sudden process; like everything else in nature, the process is gradual and evolutionary, giving time to man to correct himself, and God does not im-

pose any undue hardship in such a process. This process of gradual elimination of falsehood and giving an opportunity to man to correct himself is an important aspect of mercy; for if opportunity for correction were not afforded man would face ruination constantly.

If Allah took mankind to task by that which they deserve, He would not leave a living creature on the face of the earth; but He reprieveth them unto an appointed term. And when their time shall come, then verily God's eye is on the servants. [35:45.]

So it is that if a man wishes to profit by this latitude, he can do so; but if he wastes opportunities one after another, he goes down and the punishment of God will inevitably overtake him. This law of truth and falsehood governs not only men, but also nations and groups. And just as the law destroys or upholds men and other created things, so also it causes the rise and fall of nations and states.

And every nation hath its term, and when its turn cometh, they cannot put it off or advance it even by an hour. [7:34.]

And we destroyed no township but in accordance with a known decree. No nation can outstrip its term nor can they lag behind. [15:4–5.]

The principle laid down in the Qurʾān does not suggest that the door of correction is wilfully closed by God. The Qurʾān says that truth is bound in the end to succeed; so if one is doing evil actions, the mercy of God is such that it will give time and opportunity for correction; but if one fails repeatedly to take advantage of this merciful *locus poenitentiae*, then the law of God will apply and punishment will follow. This aspect has been misunderstood by certain commentators who have given varying interpretations to certain verses of the Qurʾān. But the true spirit of Islam is to be found in verses such as these:

Say: O my slaves who have been prodigal to their own part! Despair not of the mercy of Allah, who forgiveth all sins. Lo! He is the forgiving, the Merciful. [39:53.]

Those who shall repent and believe and do good deeds; as for such, Allah will change their evil deeds to good deeds. [25:70.]

The Qurʾānic teaching emphasizes that the relation between man and his Creator is one of love; God is not only to be worshipped; he is also to be *loved* (*Tar.*, I, 99). And the best way to love God is to love his creatures. This has been very felicitously taught in one of the traditions:

On the day of judgment God will address an individual as follows: O son of Adam, I was ill and you did not come to visit me. And the man will say: How can I visit thee? Thou art the Lord of the worlds (implying that God

cannot be subject to disease). God will reply: Do you not remember that one of my servants was ill and you did not visit him? If you had done so, you would have found Me near him.

Similarly, God will ask: O son of Adam, I had once asked for some food, but you would not give it to me. And the man will say: O Lord, how can I feed thee, and Thou are the Lord of the worlds? God will reply: Do you not remember that one of my servants asked you for food, and you refused to give it to him? If you had given him food, you would have found Me beside him.

Likewise God will ask another: O son of Adam, I had asked you for water to drink, but you did not give it to me? And the man will say: How can I give thee water, when thou art the Lord of the worlds? And God will reply: One of my servants was thirsty and asked you for water, but you did not give it to him. Had you done so, you would surely have found Me beside him. [*Tar.*, I, 100.]

This teaching is similar to that of Jesus Christ in Matthew, chapter 25.

The teaching of mercy is an essential part of the faith of Islam. The Qurʾān constantly stresses the mercy of God to man, and man is thus taught to show love and kindness to his fellows. There are over three hundred references to Divine Mercy in the Qurʾān, and if related qualities or attributes are also taken into consideration, then the Qurʾān from the beginning to the end is nothing but a message of God's mercy to man.

In considering the relations between man and man, it must be borne in mind that Islam does not teach the principle that one should love one's enemies, for that would be contrary to human nature. In order to understand the Islamic doctrine, Azad compares the teaching of the Qurʾān and the Bible. Christ was acutely conscious of the hypocrisy, ritualism, and the lack of true morality among the Jews. Therefore he preached his message of love, self-sacrifice, and purity, and said "whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also," and "I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you . . ." (Matt. 5:38–44).

But what was the significance of these expressions? Was Christ laying down a new law, or was he asking for spiritual awakening? According to Azad, it is a matter for regret that both Christians and their opponents have misunderstood the true meaning of Christ. Both have taken his words too literally and have failed to realize the true import of his teaching. They have thus been forced to admit that it is impracticable. Christians can point to no one except a few saints who has ever been able to practise what Christ preached; and their opponents demonstrate the utter impracticability and unreal nature of this teaching.

Islam cannot repudiate the doctrine of the Bible, for that would be making a distinction between Jesus and Muhammad, both true messengers of God. The nations to whom Jesus preached had become corrupt, hypocritical, and immoral in the extreme. Thus Christ in his wonderful teaching uses words figuratively, and preaches forgiveness rather than revenge; love rather than hatred; self-sacrifice rather than legal severity. His teaching was aimed in reality against the existing practice of the Jews who, in the name of justice practised revenge and retaliation, and were ruled by a spirit of hatred and malice. Christ was not laying down a law of behaviour; he was inculcating, in poetic and figurative language, a spirit of love, forbearance and compassion. Understood thus, there is no conflict between the teaching of the Bible and the Qurʾān. Islam does not discourage retaliation in certain circumstances, but always stresses the aspect of mercy and forgiveness, thus:

> If ye retaliate, then retaliate to the same extent that you were injured. But if ye endure patiently, verily it is better for those that are patient. [16: 126–7.]
>
> The return for an evil act is an evil act, the like thereof; but he who pardons and thus mends matters, God will requite him. [42:40.]

The real difficulty is that man, as a rule, fails to distinguish between the sin and the sinner. Religion however makes a precise distinction between the gravity of the sin and the hatefulness of the sinner. All religions have attempted to teach mankind to hate sin; but no religion asks its followers to direct the shafts of hatred to the sinner. Both Christianity and Islam teach the doctrine that one must hate sin, but have consideration for sinners.

Thus there is in reality no difference between the teaching of Christ and Islam. The criterion of their injunctions is identical. The difference arises on account of the occasion and style of utterance. Christ stressed the need for spirituality and purification of the heart; the *laws* of Moses were in force, and he did not wish to alter any of them. He did however wish to change their *spirit* entirely. But the Qurʾān consists both of positive laws and ethical rules. It therefore had to use the language of precision so as not to leave matters in doubt. First of all, the Qurʾān stresses the importance and spiritual beauty of forgiveness and forbearance, and makes it part of virtue and piety. And secondly, it leaves the door open to just retaliation, if the occasion so demands and the necessity for it arises. At the same time, thirdly, it says, in the clearest and most unambiguous terms that neither in retaliation nor in punishment should there be any excess or injustice. And surely these three principles are taught by all the prophets and religions. [*Tar.*, I, 109–10.]

> And who, when a wrong is done them, redress themselves—yet let the

recompense of evil be only a like evil—but he who forgiveth and worketh reform in the wrong-doer, shall be rewarded by God himself; for he loveth not those who act unjustly.

And there shall be no way open against those who, after being wronged, retaliate. But there shall be a way open against those who unjustly wrong others, and act insolently on the earth in disregard of justice. A grievous punishment doth await them.

And whoso beareth wrong with patience, and forgiveth; this verily is high-mindedness. [Qur'ān, 42:39–43.]

The third and last tribute of God is justice. This follows from the third verse of the prayer wherein He is described as Master (or owner) of the Day of Judgment. A Being who is the final judge of men's actions on earth must necessarily be possessed of justice in the absolute sense of the term.

In a number of religions God was considered an arbitrary deity who would punish if he was angry, and bestow favours if he was propitiated. There was something absolute and arbitrary about God's acts. Sacrifices were to be made in order to propitiate him and induce him to be kind to man. The Jews and Christians undoubtedly had a better concept of the Supreme Being but still clung to certain ancient and incongruous beliefs. The Jews instead of believing in other deities stuck to the God of Israel, a family God, in a manner of speaking; but he too was an absolute and jealous God. If He was happy, He would shower blessings on Israel; if He was angry, He would wreak His vengeance upon them and bring ruination. The Christian belief was also somewhat primitive. The doctrine of "original sin" was derived from the wrongful act of Adam. And the entire human race became an object of displeasure because of the sin of Adam. Consequently Jesus Christ came as a Redeemer and took upon himself the whole of the burden of mankind.

The Qur'ān, however, places the problem of punishment on an altogether different footing. Every action has its own reward or punishment; the reward of a good act is the favour of God and the punishment of a bad act is this disfavour of God. There is nothing irrational or arbitrary about punishment and reward. The result of an act follows logically and is the consequence of Divine Justice. It is significant that the word employed for the reward of a good act or the punishment of an evil act is the same; it is *kasb* or "earning." Man either earns his reward or earns his punishment.

God will not burden any soul beyond its power of endurance. It shall enjoy the good that it has earned, and shall suffer the evil that it has earned. [2:286.]

He who doth right—it is for himself. And he who doth evil—it is for himself; and thy Lord will not deal unfairly with His servants. [41:46.]

An important point which requires mention is that after asserting the providence and the mercy of God, the Qurʾān does not call upon man to accept his power and majesty. Instead of declaring the majesty or strength of God, it proceeds to speak of His justice. "Justice" (*ʿadl*) is an Arabic word and means "to be equal, neither more nor less." In a court of justice the claims of the two parties must be considered evenly, without undue stress being laid upon one side or the other. Justice introduces the balance into life, and therefore it is often depicted in the form of scales that are evenly balanced. According to Azad, the principles of equality and proportion conduce to beauty in nature, and beauty in the affairs of everyday life.

What is justice but the avoiding of excess? There should be neither too much nor too little; hence the use of scales as the emblem of justice. What is existence but the coming together of certain elements in exactly the right proportions? What is body but physical matter in right proportions? Good health depends upon moderation in the sense that there is not too little nor too much of anything which contributes to the existence of the body; any slight deviation leads to sickness. Similarly, beauty is a state of moderation and correct proportion. It is this which makes the human form beautiful and a flower attractive, shapes a building into a Taj Mahal and transforms sound into music.[5]

After discussing the attribute of mercy Azad has a learned discussion on "the Qurʾān and its notion of Divine attributes" (*Tar.*, I, 123). It is to be observed that, in addition to Islamic authorities, he uses European, Greek, Hindu, and Buddhistic sources to fortify his conclusions. His wide reading and deep knowledge of modern thought contained in books written in the English language is a noticeable feature of his learning and acumen. I shall try to summarize his main arguments.

First, the transcendence of God. The Qurʾān gives us a complete picture of the transcendence of God. While other religions sought a certain type of anthropomorphism, Islam chose the middle course between extreme transcendentalism leading to a complete denial of attributes and a crude anthropomorphism likening God to man. It is a balanced transcendentalism that it teaches.

Second, as regards the attributes of God, the Jews emphasized the power and anger of God and the Christians laid great stress on love and compassion. But Islam restores the true balance by coupling justice with mercy.

Third, Islam teaches an absolute monotheism. It never allows any compromise in its monotheistic ideals either in describing the essence or the attributes of God.

Fourth, there were no varieties or gradations in the perception and worship of God. For instance, in India, three stages were clearly recognized: (*a*) for the ordinary run of mankind, the worship of idols and shrines; (*b*) for the elect, the direct worship of God without any intermediaries; and (*c*) for the highly spiritual, a contemplation of the absolute oneness of the soul of man with the Supreme Being. No such distinctions are recognized in Islam in regard to the modes of worship.

Fifth, the Qur'ān stresses the fact that man obtains a vision of the Divine Being only by an intuitive process, an all-embracing mystical experience, and not merely by some process of reasoning.

Sixth, among the adherents of Islam there are three grades of belief designated as (*a*) *islām*, (*b*) *īmān*, and (*c*) *ihsān*. *Islam*, the first stage, means acceptance of the dogma of religion and following the path laid down so far as its four basic requirements are concerned, namely, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and the poor-tax. In *īmān*, the spiritual side is more developed and man has a more perfect faith. And finally *ihsān* is the highest stage. A tradition of the Prophet describes "perfect faith" as follows:

> That you should pray as if you are in the very presence of God; and if you are unable to see Him, then He indeed is watching you.

Thus in spiritual gradation, the first stage is the stage of common belief and action; we have here a man who proclaims himself a Muslim and acts on Islamic injunctions. In the second stage (*īmān*), emphasis is laid on inner belief and strength of conviction rather than outward observance of forms. In the third stage (*ihsān*), neither belief nor action is of any consequence. It is the final perception of reality and a mystical vision of God which is indicated. Thus the religion of Islam has shown three ways of quenching the thirst of a seeker after truth; it describes three classes of faith within the religion itself.

In the first three verses of this chapter we have an invocation to God describing Him as a God of Providence, of Mercy, and of Justice. The next four verses teach man how to worship and adore Him. It may therefore be said that from here commences man's relationship to God as his humble follower and servant.

The fourth verse of this chapter is the core of the prayer. It has two parts, worship and asking for help. Man says, worship or adoration is

due to Thee alone, and we can ask help from no one else. The fundamental belief being in God, no one else is fit to be worshipped; and although we see that in many parts of the Muslim world saint worship takes place, it can be emphatically asserted that it is *not* permissible in Islam.

The conception of the unity of God to be found in the different religions may be classified into three kinds: (1) unity of *Being*—that is, God is one and unique; (2) unity of *worship*—God is entitled to be worshipped and we must all bow before him; (3) Unity of *attributes*—that is, in addition to the above two, the attributes belonging to God are unique to Him alone and none shares these attributes with Him. The greatest sin which a Muslim can perpetrate is to declare or to believe that any other deity can share with God his attributes.

The first two kinds of unities were to be found in some other religions, but the last one is peculiar to Islam and this verse lays emphasis on it. This view of God precludes the doctrine of intercession; and strictly speaking, there is no intercessor between man and God in Islam.

Thus God being the *only* source of providence, mercy, and justice, no one else can be asked for help, and Islam forbids prayers or importunities before different kinds of deities, or powers, or angels, or spirits. Man should worship, adore and love God alone, to the exclusion of all other beings or spirits accepted by other faiths.[6]

The fifth verse is a very important one, for it deals with (*a*) guidance and (*b*) the goal—"Guide us in the right path." It has already been seen that providence has in it the seed of guidance; we must now examine in some details the kinds of guidance which the Qurʾān mentions and describes. For this purpose one must go back to the Qurʾānic concept of creation, from which follows the idea of guidance.

The act of creation is classified into four aspects: (*a*) creation, (*b*) bestowing order and proportion, (*c*) fixing a measure, and finally (*d*) guidance.

The guidance which the Qurʾān mentions has three preliminary stages. The first is instinct; this is the characteristic of all animals. The second is that of the senses. The powers of hearing, seeing, testing, touching and smelling show us the way in which we can live our ordinary lives successfully. The third is the power of reasoning, and this is the special characteristic of the human species. No other member of the animal kingdom possesses the faculty of reasoning; man is distinguished from all other animals in the possession of this unique quality.

The faculty of reason, however, has one important limitation. It deals with science, and with material things, powers, laws, and modes of

thought. It has nothing to teach about matters of faith and concerning the life spiritual. Each of the three things mentioned by us carries us forward to a certain extent, but there is yet a further goal to be reached and that can only be achieved by Divine Guidance, designated as *hudā*. (*Tar.*, I, 180 ff.)

According to the Qu'rān God has sent His guidance to all people:

> And there is not a single people to whom a warner has *not* been sent. [35:24.]
>
> And for every nation there is a messenger. And when their messenger cometh [on the Day of Judgement] it will be judged between them fairly, and they will not be wronged. [10:48.]

All these messages being from God were true messages, and the religion they taught was essentially one. This may be termed the doctrine of the Unity of Revelation.

Although all the prophets taught the one true religion (designated *dīn*), their customs and ritual differed; these were designated as *shar'*, which may in this context be designated "ritual" or "legal forms." These differences are a test for men of good will, and they should realize that although God could have made them into one unified community, He did not do so; but His purpose in allowing differences to remain was to see which of His believers were imbued with sufficient tolerance to believe in their own faith and yet have regard for those who followed different paths. Thus the religion of Islam inculcates a firm belief in one's own faith, but a proper tolerance for all others:

> Revile not those unto whom they pray beside Allah lest they revile God wrongfully through ignorance. Thus unto every nation have we made their deed seem fair. Then unto their Lord is their return, and He will tell them what they used to do. [10:109.]

Azad says that salvation depends upon faith and action, not on the accident of belonging to a particular group. God's true religion is one, and the basis of faith is the belief in one God:

> Those who believe [in Islam] and those who are Jews, and Christians, and Sabaeans—whoever believeth in God and the Last Day and doeth good —surely their reward is with their Lord, and there shall no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve. [2:62.]

The real truth has come to all nations and all peoples, but they have lost it by their own evil actions. The true religion is based upon the belief in the unity of God and the brotherhood of man, and all tendencies towards separate groups and sects and castes and creeds are wrong and contrary to the religion of Islam.

An important factor which must be emphasized is that the Qur'ān declares all teachers and messengers as equally entitled to veneration.

> Say [O Muslims]: We believe in God and that which is revealed unto us and that which was revealed unto Abraham, and Ishmael and Isaac, and Jacob, and the tribes, and that which Moses and Jesus received, and that which the Prophets received from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them and unto Him have we surrendered. [2:136.]

This is laid down again, practically word for word, at another place—chapter 3, verse 84.

This then is the Right Guidance of God and the True Path to be followed by man. At the end of his commentary (*Tar.*, I, 212) Azad summarizes his main teaching as follows.

(1) When the Qur'ān was revealed, religion was regarded as a principle of group organization, in the same way as we conceive of social groups on the basis of races, classes, or families. Every religion believed that it had the monopoly of the truth; every adherent was assured of salvation, and every non-adherent was doomed to damnation.

(2) In every group religion came to be regarded as a bundle of practices and rituals. Salvation depended exclusively upon the strict observance of these forms and rituals.

(3) Since these forms and rituals differed from group to group, every group considered the religion of another group as devoid of truth.

(4) As every group considered its own religion to be true and the forms and practices of others as false, such an attitude naturally led to bigotry, strife, and bloodshed.

(5) The Qur'ān therefore placed the universal truth of religion before mankind. The principles may be succinctly formulated as follows. (*a*) Islam declares that all religions are in essence true, not merely that they contain some truth. Religion is a common gift of God to man and it cannot be asserted that any one religion or group possesses the monopoly of the truth. (*b*) Islam asserts that like the laws of nature, the law concerning spiritual enlightenment is one; and the greatest error into which mankind has fallen is to divide itself into mutually hostile groups. (*c*) It proclaims that religion was intended to create unity among men, and not disunity. (*d*) It makes a distinction between the essence of religion (*dīn*) and its ritual. While true religion is one and the same for all mankind, customs and rituals differ, from country to country and from time to time. Man forgets the essential unity of religion and gives importance to the varying customs and forms of religious practices. (*e*) Outward forms and the formation of social groups have no real

effect on man's spiritual salvation. True faith consists of correct belief and righteous action. (*f*) Islam maintains in the most unmistakable terms that all religions are true, but their followers have gone astray. The message of Islam is that they should all go back to the true faith which may be designated *dīn* (religion), or *islām* (submission to the will of God). It asserts that religion does not teach that man should hate man. The object of religion is to increase love and unity by the recognition that we are all the children of the one and only God.

The message of Islam is the unity of mankind under the fatherhood of God. It is opposed to all forms of grouping—racial, national, sectarian, or other. This then is the True Path, and for this we ask God's grace.

In analysing the first chapter of the Qurā'n, Azad offers a basically simple definition of the faith of Islam. Islam asserts that there is but one God, creator of the Universe. This God is a God of Providence, Mercy, and Justice. An important aspect of his providence is that He offers guidance to man through His messengers sent to all mankind; His mercy is shown by the fact that He gives opportunities even to sinful persons to correct themselves; and His justice extends to every human being. Worship and adoration are due to Him alone, and to no one else. All religions are equally true, but people differ in ritual and custom. All prophets and messengers of God are entitled to equal respect, and the best part of faith is to serve human beings, and practise tolerance. Such a simple and logical concept of the basis of Islam seems to be singularly appropriate at a time when humanity is grappling with the forces of fear, jealousy, greed, and hatred all over the world.

NOTES

1 Two editions of *Tarjumānu'l-Qur'ān*, I, were published. The first was published in Delhi, undated, but probably in 1931. The second was published at Lahore in 1947. I have used the second edition, as it is the revised one, and referred to it as *Tar.*, I.

2 I have generally referred to Pickthall's translation, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran* (London, 1930; reprinted), unless Maulana Azad's explanation necessitated a verbal change.

3 Ashfaque Husain, *Spirit of Islam* (Bombay, 1958), 25.

4 For a modern philological discussion see Arthur Jeffery, *Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'ān*, 140.

5 *Tar.*, I, 119, as rendered by Husain, *Spirit of Islam*, 54.

6 For this discussion, I am indebted to *ibid.*, 58–60.

ISLAM IN TURKEY • *A. J. A. Mango*

Overlooking the Atatürk boulevard in the new planned city of Ankara, the imposing Germanic façade of the Faculty of Language and History of the University of Ankara bears in bold letters the inscription "Science is the Truest Guide in Life. M. K. Atatürk." It would seem that nothing could be more uncompromisingly secularist. Where other and older institutions invoke divine illumination, the university founded by Atatürk seems to pin its hope on human science. Yet that university has also had since the war a Faculty of Theology and all the defenders of the Kemalist revolution are at one in proclaiming that secularism is not to be equated with atheism. They even go further and assert not only that it is compatible with the Islamic religion, but that it is almost the best environment in which that religion can flourish in its purest form. It is this contention which I propose to examine theoretically and practically.

Atatürk's maxim about science and life is a useful starting point, not because of any originality of thought or expression, but because it is learnt by every schoolchild in Turkey and, thereafter, becomes the most current *cliché* in any discussion of the subject, and also because its Turkish wording conceals ambiguities which, whether deliberate or accidental, enable the clerks of the enlightenment to misinterpret the religion they pretend to respect. The Turkish word used for science in the maxim is *ilim* (Arabic *ʿilm*). The meaning it conveys to an educated Turk today is indeed that of scientific knowledge in general, but this was not what it meant to past generations in an age of religion. *ʿIlm* is the Arabic equivalent of the Greek ἐπιστήμη (episteme), that is, non-mystical knowledge as distinguished from *maʿrifah*, mystical gnosis. But if *ʿilm* was non-mystical, it was not secular. It designated the hierarchical corpus of knowledge subordinated to theology which it included, a corpus available to the rational mind working in the light of divine revelation. *ʿIlm* was what the theologians of Islam, the *ʿulamā*, or men of learning, purveyed. It was based on the revelation of the Prophet

Muhammad, not on that of Auguste Comte. This wise knowledge was indeed highly prized in Islam. Most defenders of secularism in Turkey, ignorant as they are of their own religion, can quote the Koranic verse "Allah will exalt those of you who believe and those who are given *'ilm*," and the tradition which attributes to the Prophet Muhammad the words "Seek *'ilm* even if you have to go as far as China," but they forget that the word does not mean secular scientific knowledge as they would like to believe. This fundamental error vitiates the contention of Turkish secularists that Islam is a natural, rational religion, some would say a scientific religion, which, therefore, sanctions all that is done in the name of modern progress. This contention, which was constantly on the lips of Kemalist reformers as they destroyed what was left of the religious fabric of Turkish society, had already been popularized by Ahmet Riza, the ineffectual ideologue of the Young Turkish movement, in *Mechveret*, the newspaper which he published in Paris at the turn of the century. His assertion that Islam was the most rational religion was made to ward off charges of fanaticism and superstition levelled at the Turks by European progressives bent on dismembering the Ottoman Empire and in so doing placing large numbers of Turks under the rule of more rational nationalities. The defensive contentions of Ahmet Riza and others were later canonized by Atatürk. "The Islamic religion," he said, "is the most reasonable and natural religion, and for a religion to be natural it must agree with reason, science, knowledge and logic." The same reasoning is used today when secularism is under attack in Turkey in a controversy of which it is possible to follow clearly the arguments of only one side, for, while the criticisms rumble underground, secularist apologies are extensively published. I shall content myself with one example taken from *Zafer*, the organ of the Government Democratic Party. It is all the more significant for the fact that the party is, as will be argued later, widely believed to be an unconvinced and lukewarm supporter of secularism:

> Let us state the well-known fact that the last religion brought to our world by our Prophet is a light and an inspiration to human life on account of its liberal, social and economic principles. . . . The pure form of Islam as formulated by our Prophet has been the guide and the auxiliary of science, progress, virtue and good morals.[1]

A more comic instance of the same belief in the rational and natural character of Islam was furnished recently by the spokesman of a Turkish parliamentary committee which had drafted a bill providing for the

punishment of blasphemy. (The bill has, incidentally, been sent back to the committee for further study.) "They tell us," the spokesman said, "that if we pass the bill we shall render ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the world. Why should we? Our religion is, after all, a most excellent sport." The spokesman was no doubt thinking of the prostrations which are part of the ritual of a Muslim's five daily prayers and of the importance of sport in the progressive hierarchy of values. A similar remark is attributed to a convinced traditionalist, the late Imām Yahyā of the Yemen, who, when asked for permission to build a tennis court, replied that a Muslim had all the physical exercise he needed by practising his religion.

The change in the meaning of *ilim* was part of a general secularization of concepts which preceded the secularization of society. The same fate overtook the term *millet* (Ar. *millah*) which from "religious community" came to mean "nation" (in Arabic *millah* retained its original meaning while the largely synonymous *ummah* was secularized). Atatürk's statement that science was the truest guide in life furnishes yet another instance. The word used for guide, *mürshid* (Ar. *murshid*) designated the elders in *dervish* orders to whom neophytes used to attach themselves. These orders, or *tarikats* (Ar. *tarīqah*), were suppressed in 1925, and, in a speech delivered at the time, Atatürk said, "The best, the truest *tarikat* is the *tarikat* of civilization; to become a man it suffices to carry out the orders and requirements of civilization." This statement strikes a more uncompromisingly secularist note, for the word "civilization" (Turk. *medeniyet*, Ar. *tamaddun*) has no religious overtones, and it marked an advance not only away from religion but also inevitably against religion. The defenders of secularism today would not accept this interpretation. The article in *Zafer*, to which I have already referred, provides a good example of current apologies of secularization:

> When with the establishment of the republican régime social reforms were undertaken in our country, a number of measures were also taken against religious institutions and beliefs. The main source and motive of these measures was the intention to prevent a number of antiquated beliefs and of superstitions which enslaved the masses and which had for centuries blocked the progress of our national body from delaying our civilizing efforts. We were so backward that we had to make a long jump forward and to join as early as possible the camp of the great civilized nations. In this period in which radical means were used to separate religion from state and secular matters, the philosophy of *laïcisme* gave rise to mixed reactions among the people.

Religion, which had become a means of livelihood and profit for its votaries and which had been adulterated with superstition in the crucible of ignorance, was considered by some as the main factor of the backwardness and misfortunes of the country. These people thought these measures to be equivalent to state hostility to religion as such and considered *laïcisme* as tantamount to atheism.

On the other hand fanatics and backward elements considered this social purification as an insult to and a denial of the Muslim religion.

These various interpretations and views gave rise to a disorder which for years sapped the unity and integrity of our society.

The article in the Democratic Party newspaper adds that with the advent of a Democratic Party Government in 1950,

a clearer and more developed understanding of freedom of religion arose among the people. The mass enthusiasm shown in cities, towns and villages for the performance of religious duties has proved after a break in mentality that the Turkish nation is deeply attached to its religious beliefs.

Although allowance should, of course, be made for the journalistic oversimplification and partisanship of this commentary, there is no reason to dispute the conclusion that the mass of the Turkish people remains closely attached to its religion. But the masses have always been the object, often unwilling, and not the agent of secularization.

The movement of secularization in Turkey reached its extreme point in 1937 when the description of Turkey as a secular republic was written into the constitution. In the debates which took place in that connection in the one-party Assembly, the Minister of Interior, Shükrü Kaya, said:

By secularism (*laïcisme*) we mean to make certain that religion does not affect the country's affairs. . . . We say let religions stay in mosques and places of worship, let them not go out in the world. We are not allowing and we shall not allow them to go outside.[2]

By that time every effort had been made to put the Minister's words into practice: the Caliphate had been abolished (1924), the *dervish* orders suppressed and their meeting places as well as mausoleums closed down (1925), the wearing of the fez and turban forbidden (1925), a secular Civil Code enacted (1926), religious instruction in schools forbidden (1928), the mention of Islam as the State religion erased from the constitution and religious forms of oath abolished (1928), the Faculty of Theology of the University of Istanbul closed down (1933), the wearing of religious vestments outside places of worship and ceremonies and the use of religious titles in official documents forbidden (1934), and

religious societies forbidden (1938). But if religion was no longer allowed to venture forth from mosques, the state could interfere in religious matters. The Muslim religious organization which used to be subordinated to a religious official known as the Sheyhulislam (Ar. Shaykh al-Islām) and appointed by the Sultan was placed under the State Department of Religious Affairs (1924), which comes directly under the supervision of the Prime Minister's office. The state also decreed under threat of imprisonment that the call to prayer should be recited in Turkish instead of Arabic, the language used liturgically in Islam (circular 1933, law 1941).

The philosophy underlying this extreme form of secularism was expressed by the late Shükrü Kaya who, speaking as Minister of the Interior in 1937, said, "Considering that we believe in historical determinism, that we are materialists in our actions, we should then make our own laws uninhibited by any considerations relating to another world."[3] Turning to morals, Shükrü Kaya stated that it was sufficient to develop "the Turk's own pure morals" without reference to religions.[4]

Since World War II there has been a retreat from this extreme form of secularism, but before examining what is often called the postwar religious revival, it is useful to consider the changes that had in fact occurred in Turkish society as a result of the Kemalist revolution. As I have argued elsewhere,[5] by the beginning of World War I the Turkish ruling class had already been Westernized. The West is sometimes accused of limiting its exports to the rest of the world to technical knowledge, but in fact almost all the fashionable Western ideologies have also been exported. Secularism, *laïcisme*, was, for example, a French export to Turkey, while its more extreme anti-religious form was influenced by the example of the Marxian revolutionaries in Russia. Two stages should be distinguished in the development of Turkish secularist thought. Until World War I the main tendency was to argue that the Islamic religion was rational and, therefore, compatible with progress. This was argued with great force in Young Turkish *émigré* publications which, however, were influenced by Western ideologies, such as positivism and social-Darwinism,[6] which were potentially inimical to religion as such. The belief in the progressive character of Islam became the dominant ideology of the ruling class after the success of the Young Turkish revolution in 1908. But difficulties soon arose. The Istanbul mob rose on March 31, 1909 (Old Calendar), and demanded a return to the Islamic religious law, the *sharīʿah* (Turk, *sheriat*). One of the proximate causes of the rising was a military decree that in the army military duties should be

given precedence over religious duties.[7] In matters of military organization there was, it would seem, some incompatibility between progress and the Islamic requirement of praying five times a day at specified hours. The March 31 rising was, however, suppressed without much difficulty and some concessions made to popular Islamic feeling.

What happened after World War I was, however, more damaging to the belief in the compatibility of Islam and progress. In the Ottoman Empire attempts at reform and modernization had already been opposed by Muslim clerics. In the Turkish War of Independence, which followed World War I, most Muslim clerics ranged themselves on the wrong side of the fence. The Sultan, who bore the title of Defender of the Faithful, collaborated with the enemy. The Sheyhul-islam issued an edict proclaiming Mustafa Kemal a rebel. There were revolts by religious fanatics in the rear of the Kemalist troops and more followed after the proclamation of the republic. In 1925 one Sheyh Sait, Shaykh or "Elder" of an order of dervishes, led a rebellion in Eastern Turkey, rallying malcontents with the classic cry that the faith of Islam was in danger. In 1930 fanatics led by a dervish of the *nakshibendi* (Ar. *Naqshibandīyah*) order occupied the township of Menemen in Western Turkey and beheaded a young Turkish officer. The concept of Islamic solidarity had already suffered a serious blow in World War I with the failure of the Holy War (*Jihād*), which the Ottoman Sultan had declared against the Allies. The adoption of secularism as the official philosophy of the Turkish Republic was in fact helped by the tactical discomfiture of official Islam. The real reason why secularism was adopted, however, was that Islam in Turkey, unlike the natural, rational religion first invented by the European Enlightenment, was in opposition to the cause of rationalist Westernization. This concrete experience, coupled with the example of the Bolsheviks to which I have already referred, led to the second stage aimed at confining Islam to the mosques and the hearts of the faithful, as the more poetic secularists put it. Islam was in fact invited to survive as a spiritual value, as pure spirit, an invitation which betrays a fundamental misconception of the meaning of religion.

The impact of the measures of secularization was uneven. The small urban *élite* which carried through the reforms was in any case already schooled in Western secularism, and in the larger towns secularist legislation was fairly generally observed. It was in the countryside that the change was slower. This was recognized by the government, which relied mainly on education to speed up the process. To cope with adult

education People's Houses and People's Rooms were founded in 1932 as centres of the new secular Western culture. Immense sums were spent on school buildings and efforts were made to provide each village with an elementary school. Special village institutes were set up where general secondary education and scientific husbandry were taught to future village schoolmasters, recruited themselves from the output of village elementary schools. In practice, however, this campaign was not generally successful. Many villages remained, and remain to this day, without state schools. Elsewhere state elementary schools co-existed with illegal Koranic schools, the *öghretmen*, or teacher appointed by the state, with the *hoca* (*khojah*) or religious instructor. All the while, however, the new Western way of living was spreading in Turkey.

Culture and religion are perhaps, as Mr. T. S. Eliot suggests, but different aspects of the same thing; and culture, in Mr. Eliot's definition, includes all the characteristic activities and interests of a people. Mr. Eliot's celebrated list of the contents of English culture includes Derby Day, boiled cabbage cut in sections, the music of Elgar, and many other things. Culture then includes *a fortiori* such characteristics as the way people dress, the alphabet they use in writing their language, their laws, the place which they assign to their women, and the type of education they give to their children. There have been changes in all these aspects of life in Turkey, and when one term of the equation changes, a change is bound to occur in the other: people who have changed their culture can hardly retain their religion unchanged. This is particularly true of Islam, which prescribes a specific civil and penal code on the authority of divine revelation. This Islamic penal code had already become largely inoperative by the end of World War I. Atatürk swept the rest aside. Other Islamic duties, such as the obligation to pray five times a day and to fast in daytime during the lunar month of Ramazan (Ar. Ramadān), are also difficult, though not impossible, to carry out in the context of modern Western society. There was consequently a sharp fall in the number of practising Muslims in the years that followed the Kemalist revolution.

These cultural changes were almost universal among the Westernized urban upper and middle classes; and so long as these classes remained in control of state power, secularization proceeded smoothly. But democracy and economic development have altered the situation. The introduction of a considerable measure of parliamentary democracy since the end of World War II has raised the status of the non-Westernized section of the electorate. The religious vote has become important.

Economic development has also brought wealth, and consequently political power, to non-Westernized elements: to some farmers, for example, or to new recruits to the commercial middle class. In 1950 the Republican People's Party, founded by Atatürk, was turned out of office by a coalition of malcontents grouped in the Democratic Party; chief among their grievances was the discontent of the religiously minded at the imposition of a Western secular way of life. The new Government had to give some satisfaction to this section of its supporters. It re-introduced religious instruction in elementary and secondary schools,[8] re-opened the Faculty of Theology (transferring it from Istanbul to Ankara, where it could be more closely supervised), and allowed the use of Arabic in summoning the faithful to prayer.

The postwar religious revival in Turkey is, therefore, partly due to an increase of opportunities to express religious fervour, rather than to an increase in religious fervour itself. But there has also been, as I have argued, a retreat from the more extreme forms of secularism, even among the Westernized classes. These had convinced themselves that Islam and progress were compatible, but not many Turks were prepared to go as far as their leaders had done just before World War II and disregard Islam completely. With the lifting of official restraints the mass of the middle classes reverted, therefore, to their comfortable wishful thinking.

Another factor is also operative. Westernization and the imitation of the West are a continuing process, and while after World War I an educated Turk could be excused for thinking that modern Western man had finally abandoned religion and for behaving accordingly himself, this belief can no longer be entertained with the same certainty today. Evidence that civilized Western men in large numbers practised revealed religions was no doubt welcome to many middle-class Turks: it set the seal of approbation to their own inclinations. Further, while Westernization and progress remain sacred words, the national heritage and spiritual values have also been admitted to the sacred enclosure as forces blocking the path to atheistic communism. Thus while the younger generation of Westernized Turks model themselves on the heroes of the American film industry, their elders can without losing esteem join the movement for Moral Rearmament. Nevertheless there are still no educated Turks willing to justify their religion in intellectual terms beyond the reiteration of the belief that it is, or should be respectable in modern society. Whatever revival there may have been of a latitudinarian attitude to religion there has been no intellectual revival of Islam.

The moderates who are thus prepared to acknowledge spiritual values are none the less as determined as the surviving extreme secularists on their left to allow no opening to the dark forces of superstition inimical to progress. It is, however, often difficult to determine where religion ends and superstition begins, and the example of the West is studied for inspiration.[9] The Muslim clerics whose usefulness has now been admitted are judged as falling sadly below the standard of university-trained civilized Western clergymen. Schools have been set up for the training of Muslim clerics, but, according to the Westernized defenders of secularism, these have an unfortunate tendency to turn into hotbeds of reaction and obscurantism. Westernized Turks and particularly those supporting the Republican People's Party are often anti-clerical and their papers constantly bring news of *imāms* discovered in sordid scenes. They also deplore the government's policy of allowing foreign currency to Mecca pilgrims—currency is short, they say, while the Middle East is rife with communism, superstition, and infectious diseases which should be rigorously excluded. The Republican People's Party itself, however, is more careful not to offend religious feeling, as any party must be which hopes one day to form an alternative government. As for the Government Democratic Party, it proclaims its belief that progress and Islam are compatible and its intention of assisting the freest possible expression of genuine religious sentiments.

There is, however, one point on which most educated Turks are agreed: that *dervish* brotherhoods should remain rigorously proscribed. In this the Turkish ruling class is perpetuating the attitude of the old clerks and scholars. The latter, it is true, had never succeeded in eradicating *dervishes* from Turkey, as the Safavids had done in Persia, while the former, as I have tried to show, condemns the brotherhoods with reference to the canons of a new science, a secular *ʿilm*; but the new *ʿulamā* and the Sūfīs are ranged against each other now as they had been in the past. The survival of the *dervish* or Sūfī brotherhoods and their frequent reappearance are not surprising. As Sir Hamilton Gibb has argued,[10] they had given cohesion to Islamic society. Like monks in mediaeval Europe they were the channel through which religious fervour and charity reached the poor and informed the countryside. No new forms of social cohesion have been devised, nor can they be easily, for the West from which all innovations inevitably come has no valid secular remedy to offer. To hope for a specifically Islamic and local solution to a problem where all other solutions are imported from the West, and in the absence of any signs of creative thinking, is to hope for a miracle.

In the meantime the press reports periodically measures taken against *dervish* orders. Before the war the *nakshibendis* gave most trouble generally throughout Anatolia and particularly among the Kurds, where they provided the ruling aristocracy. Immediately after the war the *ticanis* (Ar. *tījānīyah*) attracted notoriety when they took to smashing busts of Atatürk. Lately the Nurcus (or followers of light, a classic religious designation) have been in the news. They seem to have some adherents among university students and to be more adroit in making use of party politics in that they claim to be supporters of the Government against a godless Opposition. Opposition writers have been warning the Government against making use of such self-styled supporters.

Thus a dissident Democrat, the former Foreign Minister Professor Fuad Koprülü, has said: "Both the Government and the Opposition must work together against reactionary manifestations which will cause disputes and hatred among the citizens and will drag the nation back into darkness and a morass of ignorance and fanaticism."[11] The Government must have been of the same opinion, for the leading Nurcus are reported to have been arrested. With the help of the spread of the Western way of life the authorities may well succeed one day in eradicating the orders at least in their present form, but in the absence of any alternative this will probably be a negative victory.

No study of religion or intellectual developments in Turkey, or in any country in the Middle East and perhaps in Eastern Europe, can suggest any conclusion for the future. For the past three centuries Turkey has been adopting Western ways and the process continues. The evolution of religion in Turkey would, therefore, seem to depend on the evolution of the intellectual climate in the West. The winds that bring change still blow from the West and it is the observer of the Western intellectual scene, rather than the specialist in Islamic history who is more likely to be accurate in forecasting the future of religion in Turkey.

NOTES

1 Ihsan Arif, "Devrimizde Ilim ve Din" ("Science and Religion in Our Time"), *Zafer* (Ankara), May 7, 1958.

2 Quoted in Dr. Bülent Daver, *Türkiye Cümhuriyetinde Laiklik* ("Secularism in the Turkish Republic") (Ankara, 1955), 88.

3 *Ibid.*, 97.

4 *Ibid.*, 135.

5 "Turkey and the Middle East," in *The Middle East in Transition* (London, 1958), 187.

6 As, for example, in an article in *Shûra-yi Ummet* (or *Shūrā-yi Ummah*), the Young Turkish newspaper published in Cairo, which argues that "whatever the moralists may say, might is always right, the strong survive and the weak perish" (Dec. 31, 1902).

7 See E. F. Knight, *Turkey's Awakening: A History of the Turkish Revolution* (London, 1909).

8 At first parents had to apply for religious instruction for their children; this was later changed and they now have to apply if they do not wish their children to receive it. According to statistics of the Turkish Ministry of Education (quoted by Daver, *Türkiye Cümhuriyetinde Laiklik*, 151) 99.3 per cent of the children in elementary schools attended religious lessons.

9 Dr. Daver in his study of secularism in Turkey summarizes legislation in foreign countries at the beginning of almost every chapter.

10 H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism* (Oxford, 1949, and reprinted several times there and elsewhere), chaps. VIII and IX.

11 Fuad Koprülü, "Nurculuk Hareketi" (The Nurcu Movement), in *Vatan*, May 9, 1958.

TURKEY • *C. F. Beckingham*

The Western political observer surveying the countries of the Near East or the Islamic world, turns with relief to Turkey, which has preserved its independence without xenophobia, rejected Communism without becoming Fascist, accepted industrialization without Marxism, and maintained an exemplary stability in its internal affairs since the foundation of the Republic. Twenty years ago, writers on Turkey were impressed above all by the seeming miracle of Westernization, by the abolition of the veil and the fez, the Sultanate and the Caliphate, the Arabic script and the dervishes. Today it is rather the stability of Turkish political institutions and the continuity of Turkish foreign policy that excite the admiration of commentators.

The Turkish Revolution, which swept away so many ancient institutions, was in fact much more than a movement for Westernization. Atatürk was not merely a luckier or more clever Amanullah. The task he undertook was not so much to Westernize as to save Turkey. The acceptance of Western methods was necessary to save the country, and the revolution was essentially patriotic and nationalist. There is indeed an ironic contrast between the Russian and Turkish revolutions, both born of World War I. In Russia national collapse enabled a group of expatriates to seize power and to impose on their countrymen a system excogitated in London by a cosmopolitan German Jew. It was the repudiation of this system by the masses of the workers in Western Europe that forced upon the Soviet Union isolation behind the *cordon sanitaire* and the choice of socialism in one country or no socialism at all. Because the West would not accept what the Bolsheviks believed it must, they were compelled to retreat to some of the positions of the Slavophils of the nineteenth century. In Turkey a movement that began in bitter hostility to the West ended by adopting Western ideas and methods because it found that the West could not be defeated without being imitated.

In some ways the figure of Atatürk, on any showing one of the most

remarkable men of his time, has obscured the fact that the Turkish Revolution was a complex movement of very long standing. Nor was Atatürk in any sense a cosmopolitan. His education was Turkish and military. He read French, fought in Libya, served as military attaché in Sofia, and visited the German armies during World War I in the suite of the future Sultan Vahdettin, but he never spent years of exile in Paris like many of the Turkish intellectual leaders of the earlier generation, nor was his admiration for the West focused upon any one country. Indeed one has the impression that much as he wanted Turkey to imitate the West it was the common factors of Western civilization that he admired and that he was not greatly attracted by any one country. Certainly no single country had for him the fascination that British institutions had for many Indian and Japanese leaders or that French culture had for many Turks, Persians, and Arabs. Throughout his life he was above all a patriotic Turk, concerned to preserve and to safeguard the survival of Turkey, to force upon her by whatever methods might be necessary the form of government, the laws, the economy, and the social customs that would most conduce to her independence, prosperity, and prestige in the world. Herein, rather than in any liking for formal democracy, lay the fundamental difference between him and the Bolsheviks with whom he was for a while on friendly terms. The alliance served its turn, enabling him to direct his attention to the Allies and the Greeks in Western Anatolia, but it could never have been more than a *mariage de convenance*. It is not that he was not on occasion as authoritarian and as ruthless as Lenin. It was rather that he was concerned only with the independence and well-being of his own country. The rest of the world, provided its attitude remained friendly, might take care of itself. He had no panacea that he wished to force upon mankind at large.

In fact the problem of Westernization, however formidable, was not the major difficulty that confronted the Turkish reformers. In some ways their task was harder than that of similar statesmen in other parts of Asia. Japan, for example, so much acclaimed at one time as the Britain of the Far East, as the oriental nation that had really made good, was at least one nation, with no considerable minority either racial or religious to modify its homogeneity. The Ottoman Empire on the other hand was a multi-racial state, divided primarily on religious not racial grounds. The taxes a man paid and the laws that controlled his personal life, that determined his obligations to his wife, that limited his testamentary dispositions, that defined his status in regard to his relatives, all these

were determined by the religious community to which he belonged. Roughly speaking, a man who was not a Moslem paid higher taxes but was exempt from military service. There was not equality before the law but each recognized religious group or *millet* enjoyed a degree of freedom unthinkable in any modern state however liberal, and at times approaching political autonomy. The members of these communities were scattered over the whole empire. There were in Anatolia villages of Turkish-speaking Moslems, of Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians, of Armenian-speaking Armenian Christians, of Turkish-speaking Armenians, of Greek-speaking Orthodox, of Greek-speaking Moslems, as well as smaller groups of Moslem and Christian heretics of various kinds and, in the cities, of Jews. The consequence was a racial, linguistic, religious, and administrative mosaic of great complexity. It was easy enough to become a member of the Moslem *millet*; conversion to Islam at once conferred the status of an Osmanli with all its privileges and obligations, without regard to the language a man spoke or the religion he had formerly professed. What in fact has happened is that what was once the Moslem religious community in the empire has come to be identified with the Turkish nation, but the change was not easy and was accompanied by much hardship and bloodshed. Under the old system, whose origins are lost in antiquity but which the Ottoman Sultans brought to the highest elaboration ever known, the Turks were as much submerged as the other races and in some ways it was harder for them to assert themselves. A Moslem subject was an Osmanli, whether he were a Turk, an Arab, an Albanian, a Bosniak, or a converted Greek. The very word "Turk" was impolite. There is a story in the collection known as the Tales of the Forty Viziers, which cannot in its present form have been written later than the middle years of the fifteenth century, which illustrates this clearly. A prince is ill and his illness defeats all the palace doctors. Then a strange doctor comes and examines him. He demands to speak to the prince's mother alone. The request, outrageous as it is to court etiquette, is granted seeing that so much is at stake. The physician, alone with the lady, promises the deepest secrecy and asks to know who was the prince's father. For a time the lady protests that it was the Sultan her husband, but at last is driven to admit that it was not; it was a *Turk*, who had been at the palace one day. The physician is satisfied. He knows at once what is wrong. The prince is pining for the lack of a Turk's food, curds and yogurt. The word "Turk," in fact, suggested a dirty, thievish person, at best an illiterate and superstitious peasant, at worst a mere nomad, a Yürük, wandering with his herds from the high

plateau in summer to the lowlands in winter, suspected of stealing from other people's gardens and always a nuisance to the authorities. This state of affairs began to change in the course of the nineteenth century. The other races of the empire gradually asserted themselves, the Greeks, then the Serbs, the Rumanians, the Bulgars, the Arabs, and the Armenians. Naturally the Turks, the Turkish-speaking Moslems, began to be conscious of their own existence as a national entity, to take a pride in the name Turk, to exalt and cultivate the Turkish rather than the merely Islamic elements in their language and culture. But the empire was subject to constant pressure from the great powers of Europe, above all from Russia with her self-declared protectorate over the Balkan Slavs, and her ambition to hold the Straits commanding the entrance to the Black Sea. Losing war after war in spite of the gallantry of the Ottoman troops, the Sultan sought support where he could find it and 'Abd al-Hamīd II ("Abdul the Damned" to English Liberals) fostered the claim of his house to the Caliphate, hoping thereby to gain the sympathy of orthodox Moslems throughout the world, and so of a large element in the population of both the Russian and the British Empires, to say nothing of the French. The British indeed were aware of this and often showed a certain nervousness about the effects in the Indian Empire of their relations with the Turks.

Religion, apart from any opposition which the religious leaders might make to the adoption of such features of Western life as the emancipation of women or the introduction of Western legal codes, was an essential feature of the Ottoman Empire. Its multi-national character was based upon the significance of religious distinctions. Its rule was acceptable because it accorded to religious minorities a freedom of personal law and worship which in the great days of the empire they valued far more highly than political rights. The clash between the new national Turkey, the national state of the Turks, and the old religion was therefore inevitable and profound.

Ottoman Islam was not however homogeneous. Much has been written about the way in which the Turkish nomads from Central Asia turned naturally to Islam, the obvious religion for the soldier, with its few simple dogmas, its straightforward prescriptions and its manly code of behaviour, so easy to understand compared with the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity. This is all nonsense. The Islam of the early Ottomans was mystical and eclectic. It was only gradually that the lucid, unsuperstitious, dogmatic teaching of the doctors of theology came to be accepted at the Ottoman court. In the villages of Anatolia

and in the humbler ranks of society it never was accepted. The peasant remained attached to the cult of holy men, to a host of strange and very ancient beliefs some of them handed down from the shamanism of his own nomad ancestors, some rooted in Anatolia since the days of the Lydians and Phrygians, some carried over into Islam by converted Christians. Between the two the gulf had always been wide and deep and, as we should expect, the effect of the republic's laicization and modernism has been far greater on the citizen than on the rustic. Popular Islam in Turkey owed its coherence and its organization largely to the orders of dervishes to which great numbers of people were affiliated. They were numerous and their ritual practices varied greatly. In intellectual and official circles the Mevlevi order, the so-called Dancing Dervishes, was generally the favourite. In the villages it was rather the Bektashis who predominated. Their original ideas owed much to Christian influence and their attitude to women and to wine-drinking can only be called liberal. Yet in many parts of Anatolia the faith of the peasantry, despite all the mysticism and eclecticism and even the liberalism of the dervish orders to which they were affiliated, was superstitious and fanatical. We may be sure that the subtle concepts of the mystical theologians remained beyond their comprehension; it was not the philosophical profundity of the orders that attracted them so much as the legends of the miraculous powers of their founders and, sometimes, of their descendants, the ritual and the sense of fraternity, the mutual help and comfort of association. In these small isolated communities with their hard struggle to survive the long fierce Anatolian winters and their dependence on other villagers, xenophobia and intense conservatism were natural enough.

The history of the republic's religious policy is complex. Broadly speaking it has passed through two phases, first one of strong laicism, then one of cautious encouragement. The first is commonly associated with Atatürk's own personality and is often assumed to have ended with his death in November 1938. It is obvious that Atatürk was not a religious man and the available evidence suggests that in his later years at least he was a materialist. But it must be remembered that, whatever his personal views and the morals of his private life, about which much lurid gossip has always circulated, he was not publicly critical of the religious leaders in his earlier years, not indeed until he was compelled to be in order to carry out his policy. He was in no sense a philosophical materialist, a man convinced that the doctrines of religion were untrue and ought to be discredited for that reason. Had he been such he could hardly have collaborated as he did with so many pious Moslems. Ismet

Inönü, his Prime Minister for twelve years and his successor in the presidency of the republic, has always been known as a strict Moslem. Atatürk never sponsored anything like the anti-God movement of Russia. His position was nearer to that of such French champions of laicism as Emile Combes. He abolished the Caliphate in 1924 because it was an obvious rallying point for opposition to the republic and to his reforms. Moreover its pretensions might have involved Turkey in foreign complications. Mere prestige of that kind did not interest him, and he obviously thought that the Turkish nation had in the past paid far too high a price for it. So far as the intelligentsia—the higher civil servants, judges, and politicians—were concerned his policy may be said to have succeeded. Many of them are still practising Moslems; very few of them are fanatics, or feel any real regret for polygamy or the sacred law of Islam. Their attitude strikes a Western observer as something rather like what in England is known as Broad Churchmanship, vague in dogma and strong in its emphasis on ethics. It was with the end of the war in 1945 rather than with the death of Atatürk that a slightly more favourable attitude towards religion began to be discernible on the part of the Government. A theological faculty was established at Ankara University in 1949. This tendency was probably due not so much to the personal views of Inönü as to a feeling that Islam might be of use against Communism and that materialism might too readily become dialectical materialism. There was also some concern at the lack of any moral teaching in schools. The electoral victory of the Democrat Party in 1950 owed much to the support of religious elements, in particular of the village *hocas* whose preaching is very influential in determining the direction of the peasant vote. It was followed by a marked relaxation of policy, and indeed some Democrat leaders have felt that forces have been released which will not be easy to control and that the brake was taken off much too soon. It was immediately obvious that the faith and practice of the Anatolian villager were still much as they had always been. The dervish orders, though formally prohibited are still powerful and from time to time arrests are made and evidence is produced that one or other of them still numbers its adherents in thousands in Turkey. In 1951 serious alarm was caused by a series of outrages on statues of Atatürk, and a special law was enacted making such offences punishable with up to five years' imprisonment; they were due to the activities of an order of African origin called the Tījānīya. Today the mosques are crowded for special occasions and there is plenty of evidence of piety to be seen. Charms or Koranic texts written in the Arabic script hang from taxi

windows and in shops; the great mosques of Istanbul are rarely wholly deserted; the return of the Prime Minister from London after his recovery from the injuries received when his aeroplane crashed was celebrated by the sacrifice of rams in the streets. Real fanaticism among educated Turks has become very rare and was probably never common. The religion of the village has as yet been little affected but economic change will probably prove more powerful in modifying it than theoretical adjurations.

Few events have done more to enhance the prestige of Turkey in the West than the parliamentary victory of the Democrats in 1950. This was not because of any dissatisfaction or lack of confidence in the Republican People's Party which had governed the country since the proclamation of the republic, but because it was felt to be evidence that Turkey was really a democracy, that here people were not afraid to vote against their rulers and that their rulers were honest enough to admit it and to abide by the decision. Since then there have been fears that the Democrat Party may be adopting, with less excuse, methods as authoritarian as its predecessor. But the real differences between the two parties are not considerable. Both claim to follow the precepts of Atatürk. They have an identical foreign policy. The principal distinction has been in economic matters, the C.U.P., the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or Republican People's Party, favouring state control, and their opponents a more liberal economic régime. The Democrats have been accused by their opponents of muzzling the opposition, of encouraging dangerous reactionary religious elements in order to win the support of the *hocas* and thereby of the peasantry, and of spending too much money on the upkeep of mosques. In 1953, when the quincentenary of the capture of Constantinople by Mehmet the Conqueror was celebrated, it was suggested in some quarters that this Sultan was being deliberately exalted as an indirect way of denigrating Atatürk. No one has maintained however that the real aims of the party in power have been reactionary.

When democracy in Turkey is under discussion it must be remembered that whatever the state of politics, however much pressure may be put by the authorities on newspapers to suppress inconvenient facts, however much the radio may have been reserved for the dominant party, the Turks are socially a very democratic people. Turkey has had great families, families in which public service has been something of a tradition. The family to which the former Foreign Minister, Fuad Mehmet Köprülü belongs, produced five Grand Viziers in earlier days, but the

Ottoman Empire never had a feudal aristocracy of the Western European pattern. The highest offices of the state were open to the humblest because administrative and military commands were all held by men who were legally only the Sultan's slaves. Their property was his to take whenever he wished. He might, he often did, reward them richly with grants of land and estates but these he could resume at any time as a penalty for his displeasure and he was always free to resume them when the original grantee died. There are in Turkey distinctions of wealth and of education and of religion, but there has never been to the same extent as in Western Europe a feeling that either trade or manual work was degrading. Even the differences of wealth are far less important than in Persia or the Arab countries, for a great deal of land in Turkey is held by peasant freeholders. Differences of education still mean a great deal but far less than they did before the republic. It is not merely the attempt of the government to eliminate illiteracy or the fact that the introduction of the Latin alphabet in 1928 made it easier to learn to read Turkish. Language reform, which has been in progress for a long time, in spite of excesses of different kinds has succeeded in making modern literary Turkish closer to the language of the people, to the Turkish of the illiterate peasant, than was the literary official language of Ottoman times which could be as hard for them to understand as a foreign language. An enormous number of Arabic and Persian words have been discarded and replaced by words of Turkish origin in common use. Abstract and technical terms of Arabic or Persian derivation have often been replaced either by words derived from genuine Turkish roots, or by words borrowed from other languages closely related to Turkish such as Özbek (Uzbek), or from Western languages, usually French.

Only in respect of religion may it be said that there is still discrimination of a kind that is unknown in the West. During World War II the incidence of the notorious capital tax was far more severe upon Christians and Jews than upon Moslems and there can be no doubt that in most professions and careers a Turk who is not a Moslem is at a disadvantage; he will generally be felt by his superiors to be rather less a Turk than his Moslem rivals. This is not a matter of official policy so much as of a widespread feeling which only time will eradicate. The Istanbul riots of 1956 showed to what extent popular animosity towards the Greeks, that is to say towards the Greek-speaking, Orthodox Christian, Turkish subjects living in Istanbul, could be stimulated.

With these qualifications however it can be said that the basic reaction

of the Turk is to regard all men as equal. Wealth and prosperity he has been taught by his religion are given by God and may be taken away by Him at any time. To the stranger he will behave with a grave courtesy not because he respects him as a superior but because he regards him as an equal from whom he expects the same treatment.

Turkey's foreign relations have for long been dominated by the need to protect her territory from aggressive neighbours. In modern times these were principally two, the Russians and the Habsburgs. With the renunciation by the new republic of its claims to territories where the Turks were not in a majority and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary in 1918 the only great power left that entertained ambitions seriously hostile to Turkey was Russia. That is still true and it has been the dominant factor in Turkish foreign policy for a long while. The reason is simple. Russia, to whom the Black Sea ports are of such value, is inevitably concerned about the control of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In 1945 a proposal was submitted to the Turkish government by Mr. Molotov that would have given the Black Sea powers, including Russia, a share in the fortification of the Straits. The suggestion was categorically repudiated by the Turks and their attitude has not changed. Beside this the claims urged in Moscow on behalf of the Armenians and Georgians to territory in Eastern Turkey at one time held by the mediaeval kingdoms appear as mere bluff, a propaganda threat never officially advanced and no more than a manœuvre in a war of nerves. It must be remembered, however, that from 1878 to 1918 the Russians held an area in Turkey, including the fortress towns of Kars and Ardahan, which reverted to the Turks only at the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, under German dictation.

In this connection, it is relevant to consider what is the real strength of the Communist Party in Turkey. It is of course illegal, but there can be no doubt that it exists. The Communists can and do emphasize the fact that the Soviet Union enjoyed friendly relations with Atatürk and that this friendship was proffered at a time when Britain, France, Italy, and to a great extent the United States were all hostile and that it proved very valuable. Yet Atatürk was never willing to join in the anti-Western crusade of the Communists. There have been some well-known Turkish Communists; the poet Nazim Hikmet who fled to Russia in 1951 is an example. The extent of the underground organization is not of course known; that it is a movement with widespread popular support is unthinkable. It may be added that the Russians have an

asset in the great number of people of cognate language and Turkish race living within their own borders who can be used as spies. Russia, however, has serious disadvantages in the war of propaganda. For two centuries Czarist Russia was the most dangerous and persistent enemy of the Turks. Her absorption of the Crimea in 1783 involved the downfall of a dynasty which was popularly regarded as the heir presumptive should the House of Osman fail, though there was no formal legal justification for this view. The Crimean Turks spoke virtually the same language and had fought with the Ottomans in many of their European campaigns. Their expulsion and dispersal by the Soviet authorities after the reconquest of the Crimea in 1944 is known and deeply resented in Turkey.

As in other parts of Asia threatened primarily by the Russians, sympathy for Germany has been engendered and there is little doubt that among the Turkish public generally Germany is the most popular European country. This is not so true of the more educated circles who have always tended to look rather to France for culture and to Britain for political ideas, and today the influence of the United States is very great in all directions. Many Turks remember that the Germans once fought as their allies. Turkey has never suffered aggression at German hands and many Turks received some military training with the German armies. German scholars too have made greater contributions to the study of Turkish history and literature than have the English or French. In 1939 a German victory was widely expected in Turkey.

Nowadays, however, no educated Turk doubts that his main defence against Soviet aggression is the American alliance. American military and economic help has been lavish and responsible Turks are well aware of its importance. The American attitude to the Soviet Union is one which the Turks understand and which they sometimes compare favourably with what they feel to be British half-heartedness and desire to compromise. A Turkish contingent was sent to Korea where it gave distinguished service; it suffered casualties and its deeds were given great publicity in the United States. On the other hand there have been causes of friction. Financial support was not forthcoming in 1954 to anything like the extent the Turkish government hoped. It asked for a loan of $300 million and received a grant of $30 million. Robert College in Istanbul was founded in 1863, and many Turks have benefited from the teaching they have received there. On the other hand, American sympathy for the Armenians in 1918, when it was widely expected that

there might be an American mandate over an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia was greatly resented. More recently the American attitude towards the Cyprus dispute has been felt to be unsatisfactory. The Turks have no doubt that they are more valuable and more reliable allies than the Greeks, and the American habit of speaking carefully as though both countries were equally friends of the United States has not been appreciated. The extensive popular sympathy with the Cypriot Greeks and such incidents as the invitation extended by Mr. Harriman to Archbishop Makarios, above all the suspicion that the American Embassy in Ankara might have put pressure on the Turks to abandon the demand for the partition of the island, have caused appreciable ill feeling.

Turkey's relations with Britain are of long standing and have gone through varied phases, more often than not friendly, but the Turks have suffered much vilification in the British press; perhaps the effects of Gladstone's oratory at the time of the Bulgarian atrocities took a long time to wear off. In general in the nineteenth century the British government tended to support the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire against Russia. The British had no desire to see Russia become a power in the eastern Mediterranean threatening their own communications with the Indian Empire. British and Turks fought together in the Crimean War and it was at this time that the English language borrowed the word *bosh*, which is the Turkish for "empty." The Turkish alliance with the Germans in 1914 was neither inevitable nor wholly popular in Turkey. There were pro-German elements in the Cabinet, notably the flamboyant Enver Pasha, who had been military attaché in Berlin, but there were others, such as Tal'at Pasha, Minister of the Interior, Cavid Pasha, Minister of Finance, and Cemal, Minister of the Navy, whose feelings were, because of their appreciation of sea power or their French cultural traditions, on the Allied side. It has been plausibly argued that the British government played into the hands of the Germans by its seizure of the two warships that had been built in Britain for the Turkish government and paid for by public subscription raised in Turkey, and that a concession over the Capitulations might easily have kept Turkey neutral. An ally on the same side as Russia she could hardly have become and it soon came to be suspected that Turkish territory would be promised to Russia as her reward at the end of the war, as in fact was done by the tripartite agreements of 1915. But except at the time of some Turkish and German victories over the Russians the war

was not particularly popular in Turkey and some of the Turkish leaders, notably Mustafa Kemal himself, became very anti-German. If Russia with her designs on Constantinople was on one side, Austria-Hungary with her designs of Balkan expansion was on the other. The real cause of such anti-British feeling as there is in Turkey lies in the attitude of the Lloyd George Government towards the Greeks. It was under British naval protection that the Greeks landed at Smyrna and the British were the mainstay of the Allied occupation of Constantinople. The British associated themselves with the helpless government of the last Sultan, Mehmet Vahdettin, who had accepted the abortive Treaty of Sèvres providing as it did for the dismemberment of the greater part of Turkey. They were slower than Italy or France to recognize the Nationalist Government in Ankara. It is of course true that the British prevented the Greeks from attacking the Turks at the time when their attack would have been most likely to succeed but this is neither generally known nor regarded as due to any sympathy with Turks as against Greeks. Armed conflict was only narrowly averted when the Nationalist armies approached Istanbul. Ever since then, Turks have tended to suspect the British of an uncritical philhellenism and this suspicion was much in evidence during the Enosis agitation in Cyprus. The Turks no doubt overestimate the extent to which the British now read ancient Greek literature. There must be many politicians and civil servants to whom Ottoman poetry is not much more unfamiliar than the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, but the Turks are always conscious that an Englishman, and to some extent any Westerner, is likely to regard them as barbarians when compared with the Greeks. It is a feeling not always unjustified and one which Greek propaganda has sometimes exploited with success. Apart from this the Turk is well enough disposed to the British. His own long experience of ruling other races, far longer than the British, makes him sympathetic to what may be called the administrator's point of view. British officials have usually found Turkish officials easier to work with than those of most other nations of the Near East, because of a greater sense of method and discipline. Respect for each other's military qualities is of long standing. It was Sir Garnet Wolseley who said that the perfect army would have German officers, British N.C.O.'s, and Turkish troops.

With the Persians and Arabs their relations are of very long standing. Persia was for some centuries a traditional enemy, and one peculiarly dangerous because of the religious appeal exercised in many parts of

Anatolia by Shī'ite Islam, the official religion of Persia since the beginning of the sixteenth century. In more recent times the two countries have had similar problems, have had much to learn from each other, and have generally been on friendly terms. Reza Shah Pahlevi imitated Atatürk. Both countries had cause to fear Russia and had a certain friendliness for Germany in consequence. But among Turks generally there is a tendency to speak contemptuously of Persians, much in the way that nineteenth-century Englishmen and Germans spoke of the Latin peoples, as charming, cultivated, and unstable. The Persian sometimes thinks of the Turk as a barbarian and an oaf; the Turk of the Persian as a clever but untrustworthy degenerate.

With the Arabs as a race, feelings are much the same. The Turks consider the Arab states politically unstable. Their armies cannot be trusted; they behaved badly in Word War I, abandoning the Turks. They are obsessed by questions of prestige, they may be betrayed by vanity into Communism, their performance against Israel was ludicrous, they are no good at administration, and their governments are preposterously corrupt. To all this must be added the question of the Hatay, the small area including the ancient city of Antioch and the strategically important port of Alexandretta. This region was part of the French mandated territory of Syria when it had a population of which a little less than half was Turkish. In 1938–9 France, eager for Turkish friendship, made it an independent state which then held a dubious plebiscite and was incorporated into Turkey. This incident caused great bitterness in Syria against both the Turks and the French and the Turks are aware that the Syrians would not miss a chance to regain it. Hitler made much use of similar grievances and in certain circumstances Moscow might do so too.

Another Arab grievance against the Turks is the attitude of the latter towards Israel, which has always been far more friendly than the Arabs feel it ought to be. The Jewish communities of the old Ottoman Empire were never as large as the great congregations of Eastern Europe, though Turkey provided a refuge for a considerable number of Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal. On the whole they became a prosperous and respected community and many of them rose to positions of great influence. Selim II (1566–74) made a Jewish favourite, Joseph Nasi, Duke of Naxos and was alleged to have promised to make him King of Cyprus which he conquered from the Venetians partly at Joseph's instigation. Turkey regards Israel as a country somewhat like herself, Western not Oriental in culture, and in her political

sympathies, stable and progressive. This attitude has been a profound disappointment to the Arab states where it is felt that the Turks are after all Moslems and should have shown Islamic solidarity.

One country whose relations with Turkey are of special importance is Greece. A great deal has been written about the ineradicable heritage of centuries of Graeco-Turkish conflict. Most of this is absurd. For nearly four centuries the vast majority of Greeks lived under Ottoman rule without showing consistent distaste for it. Racially both Greeks and Turks are mixed; there can be no doubt that many Greeks are really Turks, many Turks really Greeks, and many of both really neither. Even before the fall of the Byzantine Empire, Greek princesses married into the House of Osman, some famous Greeks went over to the Ottoman service, and it was said by one that he had rather see the turban of the Turk in his city than the tiara of the Pope. Even now it may be remarked that names with the Turkish patronymic ending *oglou* are not uncommon in Greece and that the two languages have borrowed not a few words from each other. There was of course considerable bitterness at the time of the Greek occupation of Smyrna. But again much of the trouble arose from the Greek acceptance of the Ottoman tradition, the so-called *megale idea*, the hope that as the Ottomans had inherited Byzantium so the new Greece would inherit the Ottoman Empire. This was certainly in the mind of some of the leaders of the Greek War of Independence and the aspiration was slow to die. Athens was not regarded as the real, the natural capital of Greece by most of her leaders; it was a temporary substitute for Constantinople. The new Greece looked back not to the republic of Pericles as the English and French philhellenes supposed, but to the empire of Constantine whose traditions were still kept alive by the church. When a new King ascended the Greek throne in 1913 with the significant name of Constantine, he took the number XII, the first eleven Constantines having been Byzantine emperors. All this was resented by the Turks, and the demand for Cyprus has been regarded as springing ultimately from this imperial idea.

The Cyprus dispute has aroused deep feelings among the Turkish public. The island was conquered by the Ottomans in 1570–1 and ruled by them until it was handed to the British to administer in 1878. In the first fifty or so years after the conquest, numbers of Turks emigrated, more or less under compulsion and settled there. Their strength in relation to that of the Greeks has declined in the course of the last two centuries and the Turkish minority now accounts for a little less than a fifth of the population. These Turks have very close ties with the

republic. In many settlements they remember from which district of Anatolia their ancestors came. Some thirty years ago there was a small but important emigration of Turks from Cyprus to the republic. Those who left were mostly young men who were willing to co-operate in the construction of the new state and to take advantage of the offers of higher education that they received. By now many of them have risen to positions of responsibility in Turkey, for their experience of British rule made them very acceptable to Atatürk. Among those who now fill posts of some importance in Turkey may be mentioned the press attaché at the London Embassy and the sociologist Dr. Arin Engin who has recently published a Turkish translation of the *Iliad*. These men are still conscious of their Cypriot birth; they have relatives living in Cyprus and they are not likely to allow the Turkish public to forget the island. In any event there would be little likelihood of this. Geographically Cyprus closely resembles southern Turkey, to which in previous geological ages it was sometime joined physically, and which is at the nearest point only some forty miles away. To the Greek contention that her own government is as fervently anti-Communist as the Turkish and is her ally in NATO, the Turks reply that Greece has a very powerful Communist Party which is kept in check only by American money. It is easy enough, they will contend, for the British to keep a check on the Cypriot Communists but the Athens government could not hope to do so. If Cyprus were to pass under Communist control, or if the activities of the local Communists were to prove beyond the power of the authorities to control, then Turkey's position would be extremely dangerous. It is an easy matter for a small boat to cross from Cyprus to Turkey and to land an agent, a spy, or a saboteur on the southern coast, and in the event of war it is the ports of that coast, Alexandretta and Mersin above all, through which American aid and supplies must be expected. The reaction of Turkish public opinion to the present settlement will depend on developments. There is in Turkey no liking for Archbishop Makarios but at least he is not a Communist. It is possible that if the Cypriot Greek Nationalists loyally observe the provisions concerning British bases, remain as firmly opposed to Communism as the Greek and Turkish governments, and scrupulously respect the rights of the Turkish minority, the agreement will prove acceptable.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Turkish attitude to Canada is one of enthusiastic friendship. Britain has often been Turkey's ally and is widely admired; the United States is unquestionably her most important ally now; Canada is regarded as a link between the two. The

celebrated Turkish journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote as follows with reference to his activities at the time of the San Francisco Conference (*Turkey in My Time*, 1956, p. 212): "I felt myself impelled to a sort of missionary work, explaining to both English and American friends each other's virtues, and how they could complement each other to the great benefit of humanity. I held up, as an example, Canada, which can be considered their common offspring, and which is far superior to either of them in many respects."

LITERARY DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN TURKEY

Niyazi Berkes

One has yet to find even a general survey in English of modern Turkish literature, although English scholarship can boast of having produced the best account of the pre-modern or classical Turkish literature in any language. Unsurpassed for the period it covers, E. J. W. Gibb's six-volume *A History of Ottoman Poetry* (London, 1900–1909) deals almost exclusively with literature before the nineteenth century and, as the title indicates, only with the poetic form. And in fact, poetry was the *genre* in which the men of literature expressed the Turkish literary art best until the middle of the nineteenth century. Only then did prose, particularly the play, short story, novel, and essay, begin to depose classical poetry. In doing so it revolutionized the language and literary standards, took pre-eminence in artistic expression and social influence, and, eventually, gave rise to an entirely new poetry.

The rise and development of modern Turkish literature can be exemplified best by a survey of the evolution of the Turkish novel and short story in particular. These deserve the close attention of English readers because they represent the main forward drifts in the literary course of modern Turkey. Furthermore, they have reflected various aspects of the social and cultural transformation taking place in the Turkish society and have influenced that transformation to some degree. Therefore, some Turkish novels and short stories deserve translation as characteristic products of modern Turkish literature.

The present account does not presume to be a full or exhaustive exposition of the history of modern Turkish literature. It is a descriptive analysis with primary reference to the social origin and rôle of the Turkish novel and short story over the past century.

I

Pre-modern Turkish literature, like the literatures of other Muslim countries, did not contain the literary species known as the "novel." It

is true that there was the tradition of the epic story, popular romances, and folk stories and tales in addition to the so-called classical literary forms patterned after basically Persian and Arabic models. Though these influenced the Turkish novel in its infancy, as we shall illustrate later, none of these forms can be said to have fallen within the category of the novel.

The Turkish novel, like a few other new literary forms such as journalism and the drama, was born when noticeable changes began to occur in the Turkish society. Then, new means were sought to express the new ideas. The event that did most for the coming of the novel was the opening of the age of reforms known among the Turks as the Tanzimat. Officially proclaimed in 1838, it was characterized by a drive towards modernization with Western civilization serving as the model. This was the beginning of a trend oriented towards the West in both politics and culture. It was claimed that the modernization desired would be on the basis of the traditional heritage and that it would result in a synthesis of the old and the new. Inevitably, however, a series of changes or, at least, a series of maladjustments ensued once the political and cultural gates enclosing the traditional society were opened. In fact, a series of just such changes took place in the economic, military, governmental, legal, and educational sectors of the social life between 1839 and 1870.

The innovations and their natural outcome—culture conflicts—were reflected very quickly in intellectual and literary life. New ideas and new literary experiences began to develop alongside and even in competition with the traditional ones. This is apparent even from the mid-century.

The appearance of the newspaper was, perhaps, the most important factor in the rise and development of the new intellectual and literary trends. It is true that printing in Turkish had been started much earlier, in 1727, and that the first Turkish newspaper had made its appearance before the coming of the Tanzimat era, in 1831. Nevertheless, neither had had an immediate effect upon the rise of a modern literature, although both contributed to it by influencing the rise of a secular intellectual class and by inducing changes in the highly formal and artificial Ottoman Turkish. A real press, in the sense of its being a vehicle and formulator of public opinion, appeared only after 1856. It postdated the rise of the first political movement in the modern sense of the term. The first Turkish newspaper to be an organ of public opinion began appearing in 1860. It was followed by a number of newspapers and magazines throughout the remainder of the century.

The consequences of a "press" were: the formation of a political public opinion, the rise of a reading public interested in new literary forms, the simplification of the language, and the translation into Turkish of popular and, later, literary Western writings. The net result was that a new literary generation intensely interested in the political and social problems of the country arose. Its members began to drop, as men of literature, the previous preoccupation with the *gazel*, the *kaside*,[1] and the rest of the traditional literary forms and subjects. They picked up and tried to penetrate "social" themes. This forced them to create a new language and to seek new media of literary expression.

Of course the pioneers of this movement were attacked for their ideas and ridiculed for their "ignorance" of the classical forms, language, and techniques. It is not mere coincidence that the first target of criticism, Ibrāhīm Shinasi (1826–71), was both the first modern journalist and the first literary and linguistic innovator. Shinasi advocated the use of short sentences and simple Turkish and the elimination of artificial ornamentation in style—all necessary for a journalist. He also introduced new forms in both poetry and prose. His model was French literature. He made still another innovation: he introduced new concepts and new ideas. We shall not dwell further on this great but unfortunate innovator, as he never became a novelist, except to point out that he pioneered another completely new literary form, one that played a greater rôle in terms both of form and of content than the novel in the nineteenth century: the modern play. Shināsī wrote the first play written in any Muslim country with the possible exception of Azerbaijan (Fath ʿAli Akhundov wrote his play there either in the same or in the preceding one or two years). It was entitled *The Marriage of the Poet* (1859). Besides venturing into a new literary form and utilizing simple language for conversational purposes, this play had a social theme. It satirized marriages arranged without consideration for the feelings of the couple concerned. Thus, it was the first document to deal with a topic that was to appear time and again in the course of the novel's development.

Producing the earliest novels fell to two intellectual disciples of Shinasi who were ideological rivals. One of these was Namik Kemal (1840–88), a far more versatile writer than even Shinasi. His literary preoccupation with social and political problems dwarfed that of Shinasi. From among his voluminous works ranging from journalistic articles to several plays, two novels remain to us. The first, entitled *Awakening*, was written during 1873–5. We find in it the story of a sentimental young man reared in a traditional family who fell in love with a half-emanci-

pated young woman of the new age. The story is a continuous depiction of the young man's lack of personal stability, failures in the face of the new conditions, and inevitable final tragedy—presumably as a consequence of the incongruity between his upbringing and the new challenges of a changing society. Basically a romanticist, Namik Kemal displayed here his utter incapacity to approach his characters and events in a realistic spirit. Still, he portrayed recognizably the man left adrift between the old and the new worlds. Technically much better than the first, Namik Kemal's second novel, *Cezmi* (1880), was somehow closer to his romantic temperament. A historical novel, it was an exposition of Kemal's ideology of Islamic patriotism, a theme reiterated in his plays and essays. The idealism shown in Cezmi's heroic deeds amid the decadence and corruption of the traditional social order was an expression of Kemal's creed and what he sought to inculcate as a new patriotic morality. Needless to say, this novel was far from depicting the social realities; it did not serve its author's ideological purposes noticeably.

While Namik Kemal was incomparably more influential in Turkey's intellectual life through other types of literature, his ideological opponent, the conservative Ahmet Midhat (1844–1912), can rightly be called the father of the Turkish realist school of short story and novel. Ahmet Midhat was a prolific writer of short stories and novels. His works were the first to develop a taste for fiction among the reading public. All his works were immensely popular and he amassed a fortune from them. Several factors account for his success. Above all, Midhat saw his people without any interference from a utopian latticework. His style was very informal; he sometimes used quite vulgar Turkish. His novels, unlike those of Kemal, were not patterned on any European models, and on this account they lacked a degree of technical perfection. Moreover, since Midhat's short stories and novels were modernized versions of traditional stories, they exhibited the shortcomings of such story telling judged by the standards of the modern novel. On the other hand, they appeared more attractive and genuine to their readers simply because Midhat knew how to adapt the style and techniques of the traditional story-tellers to his new medium. Thus, at the cost of technical excellence, these novels appealed to the newly forming reading public. Finally, Midhat's stories and novels possessed two cardinal virtues—high entertainment value and educative value—and they exercised important social functions through both. Midhat was the first Turkish novelist to reflect the problems of the Turkish society appeal-

ingly and realistically; through their appeal, his works brought those problems to the consciousness of the reading public.

Midhat began writing stories and novels in 1870. By the end of the century they were numbered in hundreds. Realistically and without the bias of a revolutionary ideology (or, more surprisingly, the author's well-known ideological conservatism and obscurantism), they dealt with the problems of the status of women, the life of the new generation affected by Western influence, the incongruities in the conduct of this generation and the traditional institutions, and even such matters as slavery and prostitution.

Subsequent generations gradually overcame the deficiencies in Midhat's technique, but they adhered closely to his pattern of introducing social themes and, especially, highlighting the struggle between the new and the old. This will be illustrated with reference to Midhat's direct successor Hüseyin Rahmi. As a novelist the latter had perhaps the greatest influence over Turkish thinking about the social questions of the country. We shall treat his literary career a little later as there were a few intervening novelists of note.

The Turkish novel somehow managed to survive throughout ʿAbd al-Hamīd II's reign. (It was rather the drama that was the principal victim of the Hamidian censors.) Working within the narrow framework allowed, writers developed a type of novel dripping with sentimentality. The constant themes of the major novels written until 1908 were the tragedies of slave girls, consumptive young women, and their husbands or lovers, and all the agonies of disillusioned people. Sentimentalizing "suffering" became almost a fashion. Even the works of the two best novelists, Sami Pasha-zade Sezai (1859–1936) and Nabi-zade Nazim (1862–93), both of whom strove towards realism and even naturalism, suffered from over-sentimentality. For example, the former wrote of a slave girl in *Adventure* (Istanbul, 1887). Slavery, it must be remembered, had been abolished formally in Turkey a few years after the middle of the nineteenth century; hence the problem of realizing its prohibition was no longer an important issue. Nevertheless there continued to be harsh criticism of the institution and great lamentation over its victims. Nazim dealt with more or less the same subject in his stories and novels. Both writers lacked humour and satirical skill, and their pages, like those of their contemporaries, are full of stodgy moralizations.

The only exception to all this was the novel *Love in the Carriage* (1896). Written by Recai-zade Ekrem (1846–1913), who was primarily

a poet rather than a novelist, it was distinctive for its humorous and satirical treatment of the new generation.

The paramount handicap of these novelists as writers was their attempt to pattern their writings upon the standards of the European novel. This was a consequence of their increasing familiarity with French literature. As they began to realize, the attempt could be successful only to the extent that the language—the instrument of their expression—and the society—the object of their expression—changed.

As A. H. Tanpinar, the Turkish historian of nineteenth-century Turkish literature has pointed out, there is a degree of interrelatedness among the various branches of the fine arts in every civilization. Indeed, there had been a relationship between literature and such arts as miniature painting, calligraphy, and tile work in the classical Turkish art, as also in the art of other Muslim countries. In the nineteenth century, however, the Turkish language, only just freed from the conceptions and the conventions of the *dīvān* (classical) literature, was ill equipped for realism in novel writing. For instance, the descriptions of men and nature in Namik Kemal's novels were lifeless, abstract, and artificial in terms of the novel form, and the family scene described in Sezai's novel reminds one of the posed pictures in old primary school books, in which each member of the family is shown doing something worth-while such as reading, knitting, playing quietly. To this insufficiency of the language, add the facts that the visual arts could offer no aid in expressing external reality and that a full social life shared by men and women did not exist (not even in the form of picturesque love affairs carried on through smuggled correspondence and trysts), and it is easy to imagine the blinds through which the Turkish novelists had to grope at reality. Only at the cost of ignoring the moulds and technical standards of the European novel did Ahmet Midhat succeed beyond his more Westernized contemporaries. The alternate part of his success came from his having freed himself from the conventions of the so-called classical literature and having turned to the folk narrative for his model. Thus while his works were imperfect from the point of view of Western standards, they were far less artificial than those of the imitators of Western literature.

II

Despite the Hamidian autocracy and censor, Turkish literature showed glimmerings of turning in a more realistic direction in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. French realist and naturalist writers

began to gain vogue among the Turkish writers between 1880 and 1895. A literary critic, Beshir Fuad, was the herald of the new orientation. A new generation of novelists had been conceived, but when it was born in a new literary school, the product was far from what have been expected. If the theme of the novelist in the previous generation had been the sufferings of women in their unfortunate social position, that of the new was the sufferings of men and women in their search for love.

The school of the New Literature (a literal translation of the title by which the group was known) flourished between 1896 and 1901. The Turkish novel reached the technical perfection of the modern novel in the hands of the novelists of this school. Thus, they have exercised the greatest influence even down to today. The group's most prominent representative, Halit Ziya, is still believed to have been the master of the Turkish novel. This is true only in so far as techniques and form are concerned. Otherwise, the novels of the school bore a stamp that can be understood only by appreciating the oppressive conditions under the Hamidian régime.

The most distinguishing mark of the New Literature group was a deep sense of despair, pessimism, and loss of orientation. The writer felt himself in a cultural void. He was in revolt against the traditional values of his society but afraid to express rebelliousness. Frustrated, he resorted to a one-sided portrayal of his characters and events. Both then appeared imaginary. This reflected the conditions of the time. The Tanzimat had been characterized by its optimism, by a belief, either rationalistic or romantic, in progress. Believing either in the revitalization of the "good old days" or in the coming of a new life purged from the ills and superstitions of the old society, writers had manifested confidence in something. By contrast, those of the New Literature had confidence in nothing. They were haunted by real or imaginary censors, *agents provocateurs*, and informers. Thinking and learning were to be done surreptitiously and under a disguise. Neither nature nor man looked real to the writers. The good and the beautiful existed for them, therefore, in an imaginary world. They aspired to the distant civilization of the West in which freedom and prosperity flourished. They saw nothing in their own environment but fear, backwardness, and ugliness. They sought to escape these and their characters took refuge in dreams.

The best example of this type is probably Hüseyin Cahit's *In the Dream* (1898). The main character, a young man, believes himself destined to a life of despair and hopelessness; in fact, it is an unrelieved procession of uneventful sadness, deprivation from the joys and experiences of life, and dreams. The young man's only support is his love for

a girl whom he has met and does not know by name. Discovering this love, he believes he has an object for his heart to keep his imagination alive. When he can no longer observe the girl from afar, no sense or meaning remain in life. This novel, like the others to be mentioned, was a "realistic" depiction of the men in the void of this time.

The best-known novelist of this literary school was Halit Ziya (1867–1945). He is known as the first Turkish novelist in the Western sense. Best known among his major novels are *The Blue and the Black* (1897), *The Forbidden Love* (1900), and *Broken Lives* (published in book form in 1924), all having melancholy plots. The first is the story of a dreamy young man in whose life bright hopes and black realities clashed until total disillusionment set in. The second focused on a doomed love affair. It was a masterly constructed, complicated story with many characters, and set a landmark in the history of the Turkish novel. The third was panoramic, scanning a number of loosely connected, unfortunate lives.

A third prominent novelist of the group was Mehmet Rauf (1875–1931). His best-known novel, *September* (1900), was the story of a sad love affair, as were the works of the several minor novelists produced by the school.

Underlying the lives and dreams portrayed in these novels were the struggle between social conventions and aspirations for freedom from those conventions and the reflections of this struggle in the souls of the people concerned. Because of their preoccupation with inner conflicts and sad experiences, the novelists of the school introduced the psychological dimension into the Turkish novel. This element had been lacking entirely or dealt with most inadequately before, especially in the novels of Namik Kemal, whose characters behaved according to the ideological abstracts in the mind of the author, and in those of Ahmet Midhat whose characters were pragmatic behaviorists acting either according to the conventions or according to the new fashions. The novels of the New Literature, especially those of Halit Ziya, enjoyed timely popularity, particularly among the intellectuals, because of their "psychological" quality and because the readers, finding there reflections of their own psychological frustrations, identified themselves closely with the characters. The personalities in these novels appear to many present-day Turkish readers, if they so much as pick them up, as odd and boring. But the truth is that the living men of that time were just that. The most serious criticism turned against the novelists of this school by the later literary critics was that they lacked the power of criticism and portrayed mor-

bidity as natural, even as an ideal. This was the result of the intellectual and political atmosphere of the time rather than of shortcomings in the skill of the novelists.

III

A contemporary of the New Literature presents us with a complete contrast. Alone, he weighed heavier than all the rest in popularity and as a portrayer of the social problems. This novelist was Hüseyin Rahmi (1864–1944). He constituted a school unto himself. He was the only Turkish writer to write almost exclusively novels (he wrote some stories and a few plays none of which compare with his novels) and to earn his livelihood through their sale. He was a well-to-do intellectual aristocrat who remained single and lived in solitude throughout his life. Yet he knew his society intimately. He knew especially the women and the maladjusted, both very remote from his personal life. He possessed a photographic eye and phonographic ear. In addition, he was probably the most cultured of the Turkish novelists; he exceeded by far the intellectual horizons of the dreamy aesthetes of the New Literature. Finally, he had an extraordinary gift for hilarious humour and satire. For half a century Hüseyin Rahmi's novels were a mirror in which the Turkish readers saw themselves with all their frailties and nonsense so reflected that they could not but howl with laughter. Hüseyin Rahmi did not hesitate to photograph the most ugly, obscene, and ridiculous aspects of their lives. Still, he always made his readers laugh—at themselves! It is perhaps the highest tribute to his skill to say that readers of his novels today, of which there are not a few, still laugh *with* his earlier readers.

No Turkish writer has succeeded as Hüseyin Rahmi in educating his readers and giving them the capacity of self-criticism, personal as well as cultural. No Turkish novelist has given greater release or been such an elixir. Without exception, his novels were a curious combination of unusual entertainment and rational and moral satire. Memoirs of the period show how his publications were awaited with bated breath, how families were brought together to hear his novels being read aloud, how they were almost memorized at the first hearing to be told and retold among the women, and how they influenced even in childhood the writers of the next generation. Still, even such an adored writer had his troubles with his society. Twice he was dragged into court on charges of immorality and deriding religion and convention. He defended him-

self courageously and brilliantly on both occasions and was twice acquitted. His literary doctrine was naturalism. "To the extent that the artist reproduces nature authentically and clearly," he said, "he will give life to his work. In creativity, no imagination can be as rich or as colourful as nature."

Hüseyin Rahmi wrote his first short story when he was twelve and his first novel, *The Chic*, when he was eighteen. His thirty-sixth and last novel appeared in 1949. *The Chic* won him Ahmet Midhat's patronage immediately. Ahmet Midhat had everlasting influence over him, particularly with respect to technique. Like Midhat's, Rahmi's novels, though far more advanced and sophisticated, were technically far below the standards achieved by the novelists of the New Literature. It may be claimed, however, that this defect was an asset rather than a liability in making his works popular and influential. The average Turkish reader found them more congenial to his taste because they blended the style and techniques of the three traditional folk arts—*karagöz* (shadow play), *ortaoyunu* (open-air folk play), and *meddah* (coffee-house storyteller)—with those of the modern novel and also the improvised slapstick comedy of the nineteenth-century popular stage.

Under the attractive cover of this popular combination, Hüseyin Rahmi turned the blowtorch of his humour and satire upon almost every character in Turkish life—the religious fanatic, the brainless imitator of everything European, the confused intellectual, the hypocrite, the tyrant and patriarch, the Levantine and European rogue, the ignorant and superstitious old women, the misers and usurers, the prostitutes, pimps and degenerates. He recorded accurately the mentality, manners, and slang of each type. The composite of his thirty-six novels is a picture of a "madhouse at full moon." His most outstanding novels were *Sip Sevdi* (1911), *Cehennemlik* (1924), *Ben Deli Miyim?* (1925), and *Utanmaz Adam* (1934), none of which titles can bear literal translation. It was the last two that enmeshed him in court action.

There are a few recurrent themes in Rahmi's novels, although his events were varied and his characters many: the struggle between the old and the new; the breakdown of the traditional institutions; the mentality of the fanatic, superstitious, and "Europeanized"; the hypocrisy of the "moralist"; the destructiveness of the "immoral"; the sufferings of womankind in its struggle for freedom and emancipation; and the exploitation of the naïve and simple by religious, political, economic, and intellectual crooks. While the novelists of the New Literature unwittingly portrayed the morbidity of life under the Hamidian régime as

ideal, Hüseyin Rahmi showed things such as sentimentalism, sufferings from imaginary love affairs, and longing for a utopian life of freedom and light as something quite different when looked at in terms of the social environment. Modernization and progress had come to mean only the mechanical imitation of externalities under the Hamidian suppression. When changing the minds was taboo, the urge for the new was transformed into an impulsive following of the fashions. The ban on freedom of thinking resulted in thoughtless imitation. While the Hamidian régime thought itself aloof and independent of modern civilization, in fact it was being invaded and conquered by it. It was these two peculiarities of the time, the two sides of the same coin, which Hüseyin Rahmi attacked constantly in his novels. While his contemporaries focused upon the sufferings of sentimental dreamers, Hüseyin Rahmi focused upon the social habitat of that type. Rather than appearing as ideal characters, they showed up in his novels as funny rascals. Only women appeared as serious and sentimental in his novels, and even they revolted against the taboos of the ossified conventions and tried to achieve freedom and sanity in his later works. Most of them fell victim to the irrationality of their social habitat. With this dangerous understanding of the situation, Hüseyin Rahmi as a writer never fell into the position of a reactionary moralist or of a pornographer. He was a rationalist in search of a secular morality. The Turkish awakening against the shackles of mediaevalism owes much to this man of "enlightenment."

IV

The nationalist ideology under the leadership of Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924)[2] began to exercise an influence over the short story and novel after the revolution of 1908. Three names stand out in particular in the literary generation influenced by nationalism—Omer Seyfeddin (1884–1920), Halide Edib (1884–), and Yakup Kadri (1888–). There were more prolific and popular writers than these, such as Refik Halid and Aka Gündüz, but these three may represent the fate of nationalist literature as regards the issues faced by the writers when dealing with the Turkish social problems. All three abandoned literary nationalism in the course of their careers, but ended in different camps.

Probably Ömer Seyfeddin would have become the most able realistic writer of the republican régime, but he died too soon. His literary career was short (1913–20). He left only a large number of short stories, over a hundred, and one longer work that cannot really be called a novel. Two novels remained unfinished at his death and several

of his stories were lost. His undisputed contribution was his use of simple Turkish in literature. He not only became the champion of the style purged of all artificialities, Arabic and Persian words and grammatical constructions that had never been assimilated by the Turkish of the common people, but also actually used an unadorned Turkish of undeniable literary quality. Literary Turkish has so changed in recent decades as to make the works written before and even after 1908 quite unreadable; yet Seyfeddin's writings remain as fresh and sound today as though they had been penned by one of the latest writers. His stories attracted interest abroad and a number of them have been translated into German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian.

Seyfeddin's early stories were intensely nationalistic and largely historical. Either because of his temperament or through having become disillusioned with the nationalist ideology during World War I, he turned eventually to satire. It is a great loss to Turkish literature that he died before producing more substantial works in this *genre*; yet the stories remaining from this phase of his career will remain unforgettably in the history of Turkish literature. His episodic stories about an imaginary character called Efruz Bey are gems. They were published together under the same title in 1919 and portray the characteristics of the confused, rootless, half-delirious intellectuals of the time. Another theme that he developed delightfully was that of the "Europeanized" Turk. His *Von Sadristein* and *Von Sadristein's Wife,* ridiculing a Germanophile Turk named Sadri, evoked a great deal of laughter and almost as much anger. His third favourite target was the Europeans' search for the exotic in Turkish life. His short and only extant "novel," entitled *Our Seven Sleepers* (published in 1917), is the diary of an Armenian nationalist who makes hilarious fun of the Turks' lack of national consciousness. For his humour and satire Seyfeddin holds a rightful place beside Hüseyin Rahmi.

The second writer, Halide Edib, is perhaps the only Turkish novelist known in English-speaking countries. A number of her works have been translated into English and a few were written in English originally. Like Seyfeddin, she began as an intensely nationalistic writer. Her best-known novel of that period was *New Turan.* She soon turned to the socio-psychological and philosophical novel. It is difficult to generalize about her voluminous novels. One may say, perhaps, that a search for the mystic experiences of the soul runs through her novels of the second period. Probably the *Clown and His Daughter* is the most interesting and readable of those available in English. However, Halide Edib may

be viewed as a writer abroad, she has not been influential as a novelist in Turkey.

One can make the same generalization about the thread running through the works of the third novelist, Yakup Kadri. He began as a mystic writer, turned to nationalism, and finally came to realism. He is another of the few Turkish novelists whose works have been translated into other languages. Some have appeared in German, Russian, French, Italian, Dutch, Indonesian, and Ukrainian editions. The probable reason for his wider popularity abroad is that he brings his readers into far closer contact with the Turkish social, political, and intellectual realities than did Halide Edib, for example. Nonetheless, he too always stands between the reader and the social reality. With him, however, there is less distortion, for Yakup Kadri was far more typical of the Turkish intellectual.

Together Yakup Kadri's novels constitute almost a social history of Turkey from the Tanzimat. His first novel, *The House for Rent* (written in 1920 and published in 1922), is a study of the disintegration of the traditional upper-class household of the nineteenth century. A generation that has lost its cultural and moral orientation and is dragged easily into strange adventures is the product of this process of disintegration. Only the hero finds a solution—in patriotism—but, like all of Kadri's heroes, he is the least convincing and most frail character in the novel. The second novel, *Nur Baba* (1922), was a study of a Bektashi *shaikh* and life in the *dergah*.[3] It was a critical exposition and severe indictment of the moral degeneracy within this originally heterodox sect—to which Yakup Kadri belonged—and created a controversy as such. While some accused him of having distorted the facts, others accused him of having betrayed secrets entrusted to him on becoming a member of the sect. In fact, it was probably his most realistic novel and was instrumental in the eventual closing down of all the mystic orders. *The Night of Judgment* (1927) tells of the political and intellectual struggles in the years following the Constitutional Revolution of 1908; *Sodom and Gomorrah* (1928) is a bitter satire of the moral degradation of the cosmopolitan Turks during the Armistice period when Istanbul was under occupation. The characters in this novel are reminiscent of Hüseyin Rahmi's Europeanized dandies.

Yakup Kadri's, indeed Turkey's, most controversial novel, *The Stranger*, appeared in 1932. It was the story of an embittered and disillusioned intellectual who sought to end his days peacefully among the peasants of what he thought would be an idyllic Anatolian village. The

initial theme was quite in line with the picture of the Turkish peasantry conjured up in the imaginations of the intellectuals and propagated by the romantic nationalist literature until then. The hero was typical of the intellectual species. He had lost not only an arm but also all his hope in World War I. He yearned only to be among the "real" folk and was prepared to meet the peasants half-way. The frightful gap between himself and the common people is hammered home to him from the moment of his arrival in the village of his former orderly. Neither hero nor peasants understand each other; the antipathy is mutual. Both realize that they belonged to worlds strange to each other. *The Stranger* exploded the nationalistic idealization of the peasant and his life. It showed the hard realities around which the intellectuals had woven illusions from their ivory towers. The peasant was shown as backward, hostile to new ideas, and totally lacking in nationalistic patriotism. The portrayal caused the author to be attacked by the romantic nationalists immediately and recurrently thereafter. "But what of the hero, the intellectual himself?" others asked. The question was the basis for another set of attacks against the author. Indeed, while the novel was harshly realistic in its portrayal of the peasantry, the hero was a wraith devoid of social reality. Yakup Kadri never bothered to turn his spotlight upon his hero's social and psychological make-up. In reality, he was only the eyes of the author. As many asked, "Did the hero or the writer himself have the capacity to understand and approach the people? Was he not prejudiced from the beginning by his false romantic expectations and his ignorance and snobbishness about the real?" Whatever the answers, the novel was a challenge to the Turkish intellectual. It paved the way for a greater awareness on the part of writers to the need for a more genuinely realistic approach to man and society. It became almost a fashion for the subsequent writers to go to the people and also to probe the morbidity in the outlook of the intellectuals which made them hostile to reality and enemies of the people.

Yakup Kadri himself subsequently strove to depict the political and ideological bankruptcy of the "intellectual." He attempted in *Ankara* (1934) to describe the transition of the Ankara of the idealists into the Ankara of the opportunists, moneymakers, bureaucrats, and hypocrites. Unfortunately, the more he tried to approach and discuss frankly the realities, the more he lost even his one-sided realism. The novel led nowhere despite its quite revealing passages. The reader remained confused and unsatisfied at the end. The same was even more true of Yakup Kadri's most recent attempts to satirize the Turkish intelligentsia

and *bourgeoisie*, *Panorama I* (1950) and *Panorama II* (1952). Kadri's increasing failure to penetrate his subject was certainly not due to a lack of sincerity or keen interest in the welfare of his nation. The fact that ill health has forced him to spend a number of years abroad, largely in Switzerland, probably accounts for his difficulty.

Before we leave Yakup Kadri mention must be made of his very interesting novel *The Exile* (1938), which deals with the life of the Young Turks in exile in Paris before 1908. The Young Turks, as well as the European *milieu* in which they passed their time, with the selfish interests, materialism, and ignorant and unsympathetic snobbishness, are well depicted through the eyes of a Dr. Hikmet. But, as usual with Kadri's heroes, Dr. Hikmet is so morbidly subjective that the reader is unable to understand whether he has been shown the realities or merely their reflection in an abnormal mind.

Another novelist of the same generation, less ambitious but more successful in his realism, was Reshat Nuri Güntekin (1892–1957). He enjoyed great popularity, more than the others mentioned, throughout the 1920's and 1930's. Two of his early novels, *The Adventures of a Turkish Girl* (1922; this was not the original title) and *Afternoon Sun* (1926), have appeared in English translation. Not at all a profound writer, Güntekin had humour, charm, and understanding. His style and technique were unblemished. His novels *Stamp* (1924), *The Green Night* (1927), and *Pity* (1927) dealt with specific social issues. The first was the story of a man who was unjustly stigmatized by gossip; the second dealt with the conflict between the traditional and modern with reference to an idealistic teacher's struggles in Anatolia just before and after World War I, and the third with the disillusioning experiences of a modern administrator in the more remote corners of the country.

V

The Turkish short story and novel reached their most promising and, simultaneously, most difficult and critical days in the late thirties and forties. The translation of Western works, a process that had begun in the mid nineteenth century, reached a climax, especially with respect to the novel, in these two decades. Previously, translations had been made largely from French literature. Now translations from Italian, Hungarian, Finnish, Czech, and English literature appeared. The real flood was of American and Russian novels. The "greats" such as Balzac, Flaubert, Tolstoy, Dostoievsky, Turgenev, Steinbeck, and Hemingway became the favourites of the younger generations. The works of the indigenous

writers were eclipsed. However, this contributed greatly to the widening of the novel-reading public; it raised the standards of literary appreciation; and it influenced the writers themselves. The writers were forced to cultivate a realistic approach to the life of the people in whom they had been interested only traditionally.

As a result of the challenge and their own broadened literary horizons, Turkish writers showed an increasing capacity to develop a realistic line with stronger emphasis upon social problems. They manifested interest in the lives of the poor and the peasantry in particular. There was, meanwhile, a strong consciousness of questions arising out of class differentiation.

With the possible exception of the last few years, Turkish writers scored higher in the short story than in the novel, both in quality and popularity. Even in the non-realist school the best works in the new development have been in the short story. This is exemplified by the best of them, Sait Faik (1907–55). As a whole, Turkish literature can boast of its short-story writers of the thirties and forties both in number and in quality. They were too many to be dealt with even briefly here. As for the novels, it is this writer's opinion that the level was far below that achieved in the short story. This can be exemplified by the best known and most successful writer of the period, Sabahaddin Ali (1907–48).

While Sabahaddin Ali wrote numerous excellent short stories, he fell well short of his standards in all three of his novels, although novel writing was his real ambition. Each was somehow technically deficient although each attracted great attention and aroused widespread controversy because of its social and political criticism. Had a tragic death not cut short his literary career, it is likely that he would have overcome his difficulties and become the greatest novelist of his time and a rightful successor to Hüseyin Rahmi, Ömer Seyfeddin, and Reshat Nuri, with whom he had close literary affinity.

Several contemporary Turkish novelists have caught hold of very promising themes. Reshat Enis' *Smell of the Earth* (1944), which deals with usury, is a good example. Almost invariably, however, the reader has been left adrift and the novels have been technical failures. Turkish novelists are still trying to achieve standards capable of recapturing and satisfying the Turkish readers who have tasted of the world masterpieces.

Despite the intellectual and ideological confusion reigning in Turkey since 1945 and its adverse effects upon the enthusiasm and freedom of Turkish writers, the signs in recent years are promising. But again, better

work has been done by more writers in the short-story form. Orhan Kemal, perhaps the best short-story writer of the time, has written some short novels, among which *Father's Home* (1950) and *The Auspicious Bird* (1958) may be mentioned. The former is less a novel than a succession of episodic stories of an autobiographical nature. The latter, dealing penetratingly with the life and marital problems of Turkish working girls, is the best work of this period we have seen. The recent novels of Kemal Tahir, unfortunately unavailable to this writer yet, such as *Lake Swamp*, *Rains Blocked the Road*, and *The Hill Pasture of the Seven Maples*, are said by the literary critics to be the best novels ever produced in Turkey. Finally mention must be made of the novels of Cevdet Kudret who turned to this form after writing poetry and plays. He has published two of a projected series of connected novels, *The Classmates* and *No Clouds Aloft*; the third is ready for publication. By all standards, *No Clouds Aloft* will occupy an important place in the history of the Turkish novel. It gives the reader the impression that the Turkish novelist is still full of vigour but more bitter in his social criticism. It shows that the Turkish novelist is still focusing upon the questions arising out of the economic, political, social, and cultural transformation of Turkey—a tradition coming down from his prototype and reflecting, as it always has, the novel's main *raison d'être*.

VI

Very briefly, modern Turkish poetry has more or less followed prose in the development of form and content. Some of the authors mentioned above, such as Shinasi and Namik Kemal, were regarded as the best poets of their times. The more outstanding poets of later times, such as Tevfik Fikret (1870–1915), Mehmet Akif (1873–1936), Mehmet Emin (1869–1944), Nazim Hikmet (1901–), and Orhan Veli (1914–50), representing the major schools—Westernist, traditionalist, nationalist, socialist, and existentialist respectively—were poets only. All, despite their ideological differences, represented the same kind of technical and contextual transformation observed with regard to the developing novel and short story. There was a breaking away from the classical forms, simplification of the literary language and style, introduction of new ideas, a coping with social and cultural problems, and increasing freedom from formalism with an eventual richness of form and content unthinkable in the classical poetry. The zenith of Turkish poetry has been reached today by Orhan Veli and his followers; this poetry can boast of being among the most advanced anywhere today.

NOTES

1 *Gazel* (Arabic *ghazal*) and *kaside* (Ar. *qasīda*) were two classical forms of poetry used in Arabic and Persian and by the Turkish poets. The first was usually a lyrical ode, the second usually a long poem in praise of a person or object.

2 Ziya Gökalp was the most influential thinker in modern Turkey. He was also a pioneer in the literary and linguistic renaissance. See *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, translated and edited by Niyazi Berkes (London, 1959).

3 The *dergah* was the cloister of the initiates of the esoteric sect called Bektashism which originated in the thirteenth century in Anatolia. Readers will find John K. Birge's *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London, 1937), a scholarly study of this interesting sect.

PERSIA SINCE THE CONSTITUTION

R. M. Savory

The history of Persia in the nineteenth century is in the main the history of British and Russian political and economic rivalry in the area. During this period the Russian objective, unchanged since the time of Peter the Great, was access to the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf and the securing of an invasion route to India. The underlying theme of British policy in Persia, and indeed in the whole of the Middle East, was the defence of India. Militarily, the nineteenth century is notable for the annexation by Russia of Persia's rich Caucasian provinces and for the completion of Russia's programme of expansion into Central Asia. The boundaries between Russia and Persia were established on the Aras river in the northwest, and on the Atrek river in the northeast. Persia, encircled territorially as the result of these Russian conquests, was subjected to the strongest political and economic pressure by the Russians. Economically, the nineteenth century is notable for the imposition of "capitulations" by the Russians (the Russian example was followed by Britain and other countries), that is to say, extra-territorial rights for foreign officials in Persia, and for the way in which the weak Qajar monarchs, in return for relatively small sums of money which satisfied their immediate needs, made wholesale grants of economic concessions to foreign concessionaires. By the end of the nineteenth century most of Persia's resources were exploited or directed by foreign interests.

In 1906, a movement supported principally by merchants and members of the religious classes succeeded in obtaining from Mozaffar od-Dīn Shāh the grant of a constitution. Persia, from time immemorial a despotism, became in theory a constitutional monarchy. Mozaffar od-Dīn's successor, Mohammad ʿAlī, used every means in his power to overthrow the 1906 Constitution. In this design he was actively aided by the Russians. Although forced to abdicate temporarily in 1909, he returned to Persia in 1911, backed by Russian troops, and in December

1911 closed the Majles or Lower House which had been inaugurated only five years previously. (An Upper House, termed the Senate, had also been envisaged under the 1906 Constitution, but it was not in fact convened until 1948.)

During World War I Persia, though officially neutral, was emotionally pro-German. This orientation was largely the result of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, which provided for the division of Persia into British and Russian "spheres of influence" and a neutral zone. The Persians turned to Germany, a strong power with no previous history of interference in Persian affairs, as a possible bulwark against Anglo-Russian pressure.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the subsequent withdrawal of Russia from the war, caused the collapse of the Eastern Front, 450 miles of which ran through Persian territory, and Persia emerged from the war in a state of administrative and financial chaos. To remedy this, the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919 provided for the appointment of British officials and military officers as advisers to the Persian government, but the treaty was not ratified by the latter. In 1921, by the terms of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty, the Soviet Government renounced the imperialist policies of the former Czarist régime. This treaty contained the controversial article 6, by which Russia reserved the right to move troops onto Persian territory if Persian territory were used as a base for hostile operations against the Soviet Union. The Russians still invoke this clause in their diplomatic exchanges with the Persians, but in fact the application of this clause was limited by a subsequent exchange of notes between the Soviet and Persian governments to "cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia . . . by the partisans of the régime which has been overthrown";[1] it applied, therefore, only to counter-revolutionary activity by supporters of the former Czarist régime.

Five days before the signing of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty, a military *coup d'état* had brought to power in Persia Rezā Khān, the 43-year-old commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade (formed in 1882 by Nāser od-Dīn Shāh). At first Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and Minister of War, Rezā Khān became in 1923 Prime Minister, and a few months later the youthful Ahmad Shāh, the last ruler of the Qajar dynasty, left Persia. In the spring of 1926 Rezā Khān was crowned as the first ruler of the new Pahlavī dynasty, with the title of Rezā Shāh.

The accession of Rezā Shāh marked not only the end of a dynasty but the end of an epoch. Rezā Shāh determined to embark on a course of

Westernization and modernization, and this involved a major upheaval in the age-old social order, and the abolition or modification of many existing social and economic institutions, which were Islamic institutions. His first step was to build up a large army, in order to enforce the authority of the central government in all parts of the country. He then proceeded to attack the powerful conservative forces in the existing social order which, he considered, would be opposed to any attempt at modernization along Western lines, namely, the landowning nobility, the merchants, the religious classes, and the tribes. He curbed the power of the nobles and forbade the use of their old honorific titles, such as "Sword of the State." The freedom of action of the merchants was drastically curtailed by the establishment of a state monopoly of foreign trade and by the increasing interference of the state in internal commerce. Rezā Shāh's measures to restrict the influence of the clergy implied an even more decisive break with the past. Other Persian rulers had taken steps to reduce the power of the religious classes, but such attempts had always been made within the Islamic framework of society. No previous ruler had questioned the authority of the *sharī'a*, the religious law of Islam. Rezā Shāh replaced it to a large extent by the Civil Code and the Criminal Code, and struck further severe blows at the power of the religious classes by depriving them of direct control of much of their *awqāf* (endowments) and by introducing state education to replace the teaching of the religious schools. Licences were required for the wearing of religious robes; civil marriage and divorce registers were introduced; non-Muslim foreigners were allowed to visit mosques; dervishes were forbidden to appear in towns; and the *ta'ziyas* (religious passion-plays) were suppressed.[2] Finally, Rezā Shāh determined to make the writ of the central government run in the tribal areas of south and southwestern Persia. For centuries these semi-nomadic tribes had followed the same pattern of life, moving in the spring from their winter quarters in the lowlands around the Persian Gulf to their summer quarters in the valleys of the Zagros mountains, and returning in the autumn to the lower and warmer regions. This twice-yearly migration was dictated by the necessity of finding grass for the numerous flocks of sheep, goats, and cattle on which they depended for their livelihood.[3] To Rezā Shāh, the tribes were detrimental to the internal security of the country; moreover, it was difficult to collect taxes in the tribal areas. Accordingly, Rezā Shāh embarked on a policy of forcible settlement of the tribes, and many of the principal tribal chiefs were either executed or imprisoned.

Although Rezā Shāh's policies of centralization, modernization, and industrialization did a great deal to raise the country from the political, administrative, and financial chaos which existed at the end of World War I, the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the Shah himself, the suppression of any newspaper which dared to criticize the government, the abolition of the trade unions, and the reduction of the Majles, by the suppression of political parties, to the status of a rubber-stamp produced a feeling first of frustration and then of resignation and helplessness among all those who had hoped that the nascent democratic institutions set up under the Fundamental Law of 1906 might be allowed to develop and grow to maturity. The training of the administrators and public leaders essential to the proper functioning of such institutions was neglected.

In the political and economic fields Rezā Shāh strove to rid Iran of the incubus of foreign domination, the legacy of the reckless economic policies of the Qajars and of the military aggressions by Russia during the nineteenth century. His efforts in these directions were attended by a considerable measure of success. The hated system of "capitulations" was abolished. Persia regained control of the customs, the administration of which had been a Belgian monopoly since 1901. The Bank-e Mellī, the National Bank, was created, and the issue of bank-notes, formerly a monopoly of the British-owned Imperial Bank of Iran, was transferred to the Bank-e Mellī. The British financial mission was withdrawn, and in its place Rezā Shāh appointed American and German financial advisers. The American financial expert, Millspaugh, left the country in 1927, and after 1930 the powers of foreign advisers and specialists in general were severely restricted. Rezā Shāh was dissatisfied with the terms of the existing agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,[4] and in 1933 he negotiated with the company an agreement much more favourable to Persia. Rezā Shāh was realistic enough to see the advantage of maintaining economic ties with the Soviet Union, and from 1927 onwards trade between the two countries was regulated by numerous trade agreements.[5] At the same time Rezā Shāh tried to lessen Persia's dependence on Russian trade by creating new industries of various kinds in Persia. In textiles, for example, he was remarkably successful, and the value of Russian cotton goods exported to Persia fell from 21 million roubles in 1930 to 8½ million in 1932. Russia's share of Persia's foreign trade continued to be about one-third until 1938–9; it then fell abruptly to 11½ per cent, and there was a corresponding rise in the German share from 27 to 41 per cent.

In the period between the two World Wars, British influence in Persia was directed in the main to the protection of British oil interests in southwestern Persia, where the size of the oil installations was constantly growing as new oilfields were discovered and brought into operation. Russian influence, both direct and indirect, continued to be strong, and there was a marked increase in German influence.

The Communist Party of Iran originated in a Bolshevik group called ʿAdālat ("Justice") which was formed in 1917 among Iranian workers in the Baku oilfields, and which founded local Communist groups in Tabriz, Tehran, and the Caspian provinces. In 1920 Soviet support of a local nationalist and reformist movement in Gilan, the westernmost of the Caspian provinces, led to the proclamation of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, which existed until the autumn of 1921; Persian troops under Rezā Shāh then re-established the authority of the central government in Gilan. After the abolition of all political parties by Rezā Shāh, the Communist Party continued to work underground, exploiting the grievances of minority groups such as the Armenians and Kurds. Before the ban on political parties, the Persian Communist Party's programme as outlined in the press was of a liberal and deliberately non-extremist nature,[6] and was designed to attract the liberal and intellectual elements to whom Rezā Shāh's increasing suppression of the freedom of speech and of the immature democratic institutions meant the negation of all the hopes they had held during the period which led up to the granting of the Persian Constitution in 1906.

Simultaneously, the intelligentsia and the merchant classes were wooed by the Germans. In the Middle East, the Weimar Republic regained much of the ground lost by Imperial Germany as a result of its defeat in World War I, and prepared the way for further expansion under the Nazis, whose "master plan" was to be effected in three stages: economic supremacy, political domination, and, finally, military occupation. Persia in the 1920's and 1930's was still psychologically prepared to accept the friendship of a third power which was sufficiently distant not to endanger her territorial integrity. Putting into effect the first phase of their "master plan," the Germans obtained an exclusive concession to run Persia's internal airlines (1927), built the Bandar Shah-Shahi stretch of the Trans-Iranian Railway (1928), and inaugurated an air service from Berlin to Tehran (1937). German architects designed the imposing government offices and public buildings required by Rezā Shāh. Germany supplied the machinery and equipment for most of the factories which were built as part of Rezā Shāh's industrialization programme,

which reached its peak between the years 1930 and 1941. These included a plant for cement works, textile factories, a paper factory, an ice factory, and a tea drying and packing plant. The German firm of Siemens had a monopoly of all electrical installations. Germany supplied coal-mining machinery and a coking plant. The Czechoslovak firm of Skoda entered the Persian market in 1932, and was responsible for the construction of roads, bridges, and factories. From the time of the German occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938), up to the time of the occupation of Persia by British and Russian forces (1941), the activities of the Skoda firm formed part of the German programme of economic expansion in Persia. The striking success of the German economic effort is reflected in the trade returns of the period. In 1932–3 German trade with Persia represented 8 per cent of Persia's total foreign trade, in 1938–9 41½ per cent, and in 1940–1 45½ per cent. Germany purchased large quantities of Persian cotton and wool and exported finished products to Persia. In 1939–40, for instance, Germany bought more than 90 per cent of Persia's exported wool.

As their economic grip on Persia tightened, the Germans brought into operation phase two of their "master plan": political domination. One of the means by which they hoped to achieve this was cultural penetration. Organizations such as the Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft issued publications, arranged lecture tours, and generally promoted cultural relations between the two countries. From 1933 onwards German universities introduced a considerable number of courses devoted to the East. In their propaganda, the Germans laid great stress on the "Aryan myth" and the spiritual community of Iran and Germany. By a special decree (1936) the Reich expressly exempted Persians, as "pure Aryans," from the provisions of the Nuremburg Racial Laws. The Germans also stressed the point, which the Persians readily believed, that in contrast to Britain and Russia, Germany had no imperialist designs in the Middle East, and that therefore whereas it was right that Persia should reject the help of British and Russian advisers, she need have no hesitation as to the propriety of engaging German experts. Beguiled by these arguments, the Persians allowed German advisers to infiltrate into the National Bank and various government departments, including the Ministry of Education.[7]

In addition to their efforts to gain political influence through their cultural activities, the Germans used the fifth-column technique which had stood them in such good stead in other countries which they had later occupied. There was an increased flow of German "tourists" to

Persia, many of whom stayed in the country. By 1941 there were 2,000 Germans resident in Persia, and members of this fifth column occupied prominent positions in the Persian communications system and in a number of vital industries. In July and August 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Britain and Russia sent notes to Rezā Shāh demanding that he should expel from Persia a large number of these Germans. As they did not receive a satisfactory reply to their request, British and Russian forces invaded Persia on August 25, 1941, and occupied the country within a few days. Persia was once again divided into three zones, a British, a Russian, and a nominally neutral zone. In justification of their action the Allies pleaded military necessity: Persia was of the utmost importance as a safe route for the supply of war materials to the Soviet Union; a German drive through the Caucasus into Persia would be a threat to the Soviet rear; and, thirdly, the British Navy was dependent on the supply of Persian oil, which might well be cut off if the German fifth column were allowed to continue its activities unchecked. Immediately after their occupation of the country, the Allies attempted to intern all German citizens in Iran. This operation was not entirely successful, and some of the leading German agents escaped the net and for a time continued their activities in central and southern Persia, as well as paying flying visits to sympathizers in Tehran.

Rezā Shāh abdicated on September 16, 1941, and his son Mohammad Rezā Pahlavī succeeded to the throne. In January 1942 the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance was signed by Persia, Russia, and Britain; the most important clauses were articles 4 and 5, which stated respectively that the presence of British and Russian forces on Iranian territory did not constitute a military occupation, and that all Allied forces would be withdrawn from Iran not later than six months after the suspension of hostilities with Germany and her associates.[8] The new Shah appointed Mohammad ʿAlī Forūghī Prime Minister, and the latter devoted himself to the unenviable task of carrying on the government of Persia in the face of all the difficulties presented by the Allied occupation of his country. The Tehran Declaration of November 1943, signed by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, offered some comfort to the Persians by recognizing the value of the assistance rendered by Persia to the Allied war effort, by reaffirming Persia's independence, sovereignty, and integrity, and by promising the continuance of economic aid. Nevertheless the Allied occupation of Persia caused severe hardship. There was a shortage of food and goods of every type, and the cessation of normal economic life, together with the issue of large amounts of currency to

meet the needs of the Allied forces, caused the cost of living to rise by 1,000 per cent, a figure surpassed only in China.

Difficulties of finance and supply were not the only problems which faced the new ruler and his government. The sudden removal of Rezā Shāh's dictatorial hand made it possible to revive democratic institutions which had barely come into being before they were suppressed, first by the Qajars with Russian support, and then by Rezā Shāh. On the other hand, Rezā Shāh's dictatorship had left Persia without leaders, and the occupation of Persia by the Allied forces made it more difficult for the Persians to introduce a more liberal system of government. Paradoxically, the liberalizing of internal conditions released forces of an anti-liberal character—either of the right, such as the Shī'ī religious classes which sought to regain the power and prestige lost under Rezā Shāh, or of the left, such as the Tūdeh Party, which was officially created in January 1942. Many Communists and others of leftish sympathies who had been jailed by Rezā Shāh were released in 1941 under a general amnesty for political prisoners and joined the Tūdeh Party. As had been the case with the 'Adālat Party which had operated in Persia after World War I and before the accession of Rezā Shāh, the Tūdeh Party at first minimized the revolutionary aspect of its programme. In this way it attracted members not only of the artisan class but also of the frustrated intelligentsia. In July 1943 the pro-Soviet "Freedom Front" was formed. This was a coalition of 14 newspapers; by 1945 the number had risen to 40. By 1944, however, the Freedom Front had been purged of most of its liberal elements and had become the tool of the Tūdeh, unswervingly following the party line.

Although Persia had nominally been a constitutional monarchy since 1906, the political climate of the country had been so far from democratic that political parties in the Western sense of the term had never existed. Such attempts as had been made in the Majles to form groups of deputies who would be willing to be loyal to a particular leader, subscribe to a specific programme, and cast a united vote on specific issues, had been unsuccessful. As a result, until the return of Seyyed Ziā od-Dīn from exile in 1943[9] there was no organized political party to oppose the Tūdeh. Seyyed Ziā od-Dīn, who was hailed on his return as a "Ray of Hope in the Darkness," formed a new political party called Vatan ("Fatherland"), the name of which was changed a year later to Erāde-ye Mellī ("National Will"). For the first time a Persian political party (apart from the Communist Party) had been formed with a definite organization and a definite programme.[10] Although to begin with

Seyyed Ziā od-Dīn, for fear of Russian reprisals, strove to maintain a theoretical distinction between the activities and policies of the Russians and those of the Tūdeh party, from 1944 the tone of his pronouncements in the press became anti-Russian, and even violently so. In December 1944 the newspaper *Raʿd-e Emrūz*, the organ of the Erāde-ye Mellī party, made its famous attack on the behaviour of Vice-Commissar Kavtaradze, who had been sent to Persia with the object of obtaining an oil concession for the Russians in northern Persia. From the time of the conclusion of hostilities in Europe in 1945, Seyyed Ziā od-Dīn started to campaign for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Persia. The coalition of newspapers which supported him and his policies was termed first the "National Front" and later the "Independence Front." Seyyed Ziā od-Dīn derived his support in the main from the conservative and liberal elements in Persia—namely, the religious classes, the merchants, the landowners, and the tribes. It should be emphasized that only the last two groups can justly be described as wholly conservative, inasmuch as they do not at any time wish to see any change in the established order. It should not be forgotten that whereas in some respects the religious classes are a reactionary force, they frequently come forward as champions of the people against tyrannical government. The principal support for the constitutionalist movement in 1906 came from the religious and merchant classes, and, later, the new constitution was defended by the tribes, which in times of crisis often constitute the strongest element of national defence. The tribes, which had been subjected to punitive action by Rezā Shāh, re-emerged as a powerful force on the Persian political scene in 1941; the collapse of the Persian army in face of the Allied invasion enabled the tribes to replenish their supplies of weapons, which had become depleted during Rezā Shāh's reign. In 1943 the Qashqāʾī tribe rebelled in support of its demand for the restitution of lands confiscated by Rezā Shāh.

The British government, which from the start had made it clear that it regarded the presence of British troops in Persia as a temporary expedient necessary to the successful prosecution of the war, naturally desired the maintenance of law and order which would permit the smooth passage of war materials to Russia and the uninterrupted flow of oil from the oilfields in southwest Persia. Politically, this meant that the British supported the conservative elements which were interested in preserving the *status quo*. In so far as this resulted in Britain's being identified with elements such as the landowning class, which is on the whole opposed to reform of any kind, it had the unfortunate effect of

driving the progressive elements to support the Tūdeh Party in the belief that no worth-while reform could be effected except by revolutionary means.

From 1941 onwards, America replaced Germany as the "Third Force" in the Persian political scene, but her efforts were not uniformly successful. Millspaugh, who had acted as Financial Adviser to the Persian Government from 1922 to 1927, was reappointed in a similar capacity in 1942. A Majles Bill of May 4, 1943, granted him the necessary economic and financial powers and permission to engage sixty American economic experts. His proposed measures (income tax, price controls, cuts to eliminate waste in Government spending, etc.) aroused massive opposition from the vested interests concerned; the Soviet authorities prevented his personnel from operating within the Soviet zone (i.e., at Meshed, Resht, Rezaiyyeh, etc.); his relations with the Persian government grew more and more strained, and finally a head-on clash resulted in Millspaugh's resignation in February 1945. Other American missions achieved a greater measure of success, for example, the Ridley military mission (1942), and in particular the Schwarzkopf gendarmerie mission (1943). During 1942–3, 30,000 American troops arrived in Persia and constituted the Persian Gulf Command. Harbours were built on the Persian Gulf, and road, railway, and air transport facilities were developed. As a result, nearly 150,000 vehicles and 3,500 aircraft were delivered to the Red Army between 1942 and 1944 by the Persian route.

From November 1944 the Persian Gulf Command virtually ceased its supply operations to Russia, as the Black Sea was by then open to the Allied fleets. All American troops were withdrawn from Persia by January 1, 1946, and all British troops by March 2, thus honouring article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of January 1942. There was, however, no sign that the Russians intended to follow suit; on the contrary, it became clear that they intended to put into operation their plan to separate the northern and western provinces of Persia from the rest of the country permanently. In August 1945 the Tūdeh Party held a "rehearsal" coup in Tabriz, and in October, far from beginning to withdraw their troops, the Russians sent fresh units into Azarbayjan. In November, the Tūdeh Party of Azarbayjan, now renamed the "Democrat" Party, staged a revolt, demanding complete provincial autonomy and the replacement of the Persian language by the local form of Turkish in schools. Red Army units prevented Persian troops from entering Azarbayjan to suppress the revolt. "Elections" were carried out in an

atmosphere of intimidation, and on December 12 the provincial National Assembly, consisting of 101 deputies, met at Tabriz. The Assembly, however, was soon disbanded, and its functions transferred to a praesidium. On December 13 the Autonomous Republic of Azarbayjan was proclaimed, and two days later a similar uprising in Kurdistan was followed by the proclamation of the Kurdish People's Republic at Mahabad. The Foreign Ministers' Conference at Tehran on December 15, 1945, between Byrnes, Bevin, and Molotov failed to reach agreement on Persia, and in January 1946 Taqīzādeh submitted Persia's case to the Security Council, which referred the matter to "direct negotiation." In compliance with this recommendation, the then Prime Minister, Qavām os-Saltaneh, visited Moscow to negotiate with Stalin and Molotov, but without success. The Russians continued to demand recognition of the Azarbayjan Republic.

The Persian government was able to resolve the situation and restore its authority over the rebels by making skilful use of the Russian desire for an oil concession in the north. The Russians had pressed strongly for the grant of such a concession in 1944, but in December of that year Dr. Mosaddeq had secured the passage of a Bill which banned all further oil negotiations with any foreign power without the express consent of the Majles. After the successful installation of their puppet governments in Azarbayjan and Kurdistan, the Russians reiterated their demand for an oil concession, and in April 1946 it was announced that a Soviet-Iranian Oil Co. would be formed. Qavām os-Saltaneh explained, however, that he would have to obtain the consent of the Majles before this agreement could be put into effect, and that he refused to hold elections (the term of the fourteenth Majles had conveniently come to an end on March 11, 1946) while foreign troops still remained on Persian soil. The upshot of this was that Russian troops left Persia in May 1946.

In June 1946 Qavām os-Saltaneh who, in the absence of a Majles, was ruling with quasi-dictatorial powers, formed a new political party, which he called the Democrat Party (not to be confused with the homonymous "Democrat" party of Azarbayjan mentioned above). At the same time he arrested Seyyed Ziā od-Dīn, and the latter's Erāde-ye Mellī party disappeared from the scene. In August Qavām os-Saltaneh reshuffled his Cabinet to admit three Tūdeh members. In September the complaisant attitude of Qavām os-Saltaneh towards the Tūdeh and the Azarbayjan rebels provoked a counter-rising among the southern tribes, which demanded *inter alia* the expulsion of the Tūdeh members from the Cabinet. After a show of resistance, Qavām os-Saltaneh agreed to most

of the tribes' demands, and the following month, encouraged perhaps by this evidence of anti-Communist feeling in the country, arrested leading Tūdeh members in Tehran and ordered the Persian army to march into Azarbayjan. The puppet régime collapsed within three weeks, and simultaneously another force of Persian troops put an end to the autonomous régime in Kurdistan. Short of direct military intervention, the Russians had no means of saving their puppet régimes. Taking advantage of the widespread support he had acquired by his success in re-uniting Persia, Qavām os-Saltaneh proceeded to hold the elections for the fifteenth Majles, which was convened in July 1947. Qavām os-Saltaneh's party held a substantial majority, but Dr. Mosaddeq's opposition group comprised 25 deputies. The Bill proposing the grant of an oil concession in the north to the Russians was rejected on October 22, 1947, by 102 votes to 2, the latter being the votes of the two Communist deputies. The arrest of 300 members of the Tūdeh Party in Mazandaran in April 1948 thwarted another Russian attempt to subvert the authority of the central government. Persia purchased a consignment of American surplus war material, and the term of the United States military and gendarmerie missions was extended until March 1949. The statement by the American Ambassador on September 11, 1947, that the United States would support Persia if the latter rejected the Soviet oil demands was an undoubted source of encouragement to Qavām os-Saltaneh. The more realistic policy towards Persia followed by the United States from then on was a direct outcome of the declaration of the Truman doctrine, which advocated the containment of Communism and aid to Greece, Turkey, and Persia.

With the country free of foreign troops for the first time for six years, with the Tūdeh Party temporarily in eclipse and with a substantial majority in the Majles, the way seemed open for Qavām os-Saltaneh to take steps to promote sound, stable internal government on a reasonably liberal basis. Instead, the fifteenth Majles wasted a lot of time in chauvinistic speeches. Qavām os-Saltaneh himself steadily lost popularity, and in December 1947 he was replaced as Prime Minister by Hakīmī. Forces of an anti-liberal or extremist nature were still strong: the Tūdeh Party was steadily building up its power again after its defeat in Azarbayjan, and in the pronouncements of the religious leader Kāshānī a note of fanatical nationalism and religious bigotry could increasingly be heard. The Shah meanwhile attempted to steer a middle course, to increase his own authority, and to press for reforms. In 1948 the Upper House of the Persian Parliament, known as the Senate, which had been

provided for by the 1906 Constitution but never convened, was formed. As the Shah was entitled to appoint 30 out of the 60 Senators, this move gave him greater influence in parliamentary affairs. The prevailing climate, however, continued to be one of political and economic unrest. Russia alleged that Persia was being transformed into an American military base, and the "Free Azarbayjan" radio maintained a steady attack on the Persian government from inside Soviet territory. In February 1949 an attempt was made on the life of the Shah, and as a result the Tūdeh Party was outlawed. Relations between Persia and Russia grew steadily worse. On March 23, 1949, Dean Acheson denied Soviet charges that Persia was being transformed into an American military base, and affirmed American interest in the security of the Middle East.

Since the end of World War II, the event which has given most hope for the future has been the inauguration of the First Seven-Year Plan for economic development, which became law on February 15, 1949. The plan provided for the expenditure of $650,000,000; it was intended to find the bulk of this sum from oil revenue, but additional loans would be needed, and in the hopes of obtaining these the Shah visited Washington in November 1949. As a goodwill tour the visit was a success, but from the financial point of view it was a failure; the American government made it clear to the Shah that no loan would be forthcoming unless he took steps to check administrative corruption in Persia and showed a genuine intention of carrying out economic and social reforms. In 1950 the Shah made a start by transferring royal estates to a body called the Imperial Organization for Social Welfare with the object of distributing the estates to the peasants.[11] Wholesale administrative changes at a high level were made in Azarbayjan, and in June 1950 the Shah appointed as Prime Minister General ʿAlī Razmārā, an honest and energetic man. Plans were drawn up for the decentralization of the administration by the introduction of a measure of local government. In the autumn of 1950, 400 officials were dismissed for corruption or incompetence, and a "black list" of a large number of other officials who were considered unfit for public office was drawn up by the Imperial Anti-Corruption Commission. Despite a threatened Cabinet crisis and lack of support from Parliament, the Shah and Razmārā pursued their course with determination.

The announcement of an American loan of a mere $25,000,000 in October 1950 angered the Shah and provoked a wave of anti-American feeling in Persia. The Seven-Year Plan was held up for lack of funds, and Dr. Mosaddeq's "National Front" took advantage of the prevailing poli-

tical climate to clamour for the nationalization of the oil industry. As early as 1944 Mosaddeq had advocated a policy of "negative balance" (i.e., that neither Britain nor Russia should hold an oil concession in Persia) rather than "positive balance" (i.e., a policy of granting an oil concession to the Russians to counterbalance the A.I.O.C. concession). Razmārā opposed oil nationalization on the grounds that it was impracticable. On March 7, 1951, he was assassinated by a member of the fanatically nationalist Fedā'īyān-e Eslām brotherhood led by Kāshānī. On May 2 the Bill nationalizing the Persian oil industry was signed by the Shah, and Mosaddeq became Prime Minister.

With the exception of a short period in July 1952 (he resigned on July 5, but popular support brought him back to power on July 22 and enabled him to obtain the extraordinary powers he was seeking) Mosaddeq remained Prime Minister for over two years, until August 1953, and for half of this period he wielded extraordinary powers and ruled as virtual dictator without reference to Parliament. Financially, economically, politically, and socially his period of office was nothing short of disastrous for Persia. From the first he refused all requests for negotiations or arbitration, and, having once taken his stand on the principle of no compromise over the question of oil nationalization, the nationalist hysteria of his supporters prevented him from modifying his attitude, even when it became apparent to the Persians themselves that Mosaddeq's policies had resulted in national bankruptcy. Between 1951 and 1953 the Americans gave Persia $133,000,000 solely in order to enable the government to balance its budget. (Mosaddeq made full and effective use of the threat that if American aid were not forthcoming, Persia would fall into Communist hands.) The fact that Mosaddeq had no positive policy except oil nationalization, and that this policy had proved a complete failure, did not prevent his enjoying a greater measure of popular support than perhaps any other Persian Prime Minister. Mosaddeq was sustained by the emotional desire on the part of the intellectual and middle classes that Persia should have complete political and economic independence whatever the cost. This desire had been frustrated ever since the introduction of a democratic system of government in 1906, first by the reactionary attempts of the superseded Qajar régime to reinstate itself with Russian support, and then by the use of Persian territory as a theatre of war during World War I. The accession of Rezā Shāh in 1926 had seemed to promise the fulfilment of their hopes and Rezā Shāh did in fact restrict both British and Russian influence in Persia to a very considerable degree; but in doing so he opened the way

to German economic supremacy in Persia. Moreover, in his efforts to make Persia strong, he stifled the progressive and liberal elements in the country and abolished the nascent democratic institutions. The occupation of Persia by Allied forces in 1941 was just another chapter in the economic and political subjection of Persia. After the war, Persia struck a resounding blow at Russian influence in 1946–7. Mosaddeq offered Persians the chance to destroy the symbols of British influence as well. Britain had confronted Russia in Persia for a century and a half, and Anglo-Russian rivalry was held to be the sole cause of all Persia's ills. Each success of Mosaddeq—the expulsion of British newspaper correspondents, the closing of British consulates (January 1952), the banning of all cultural institutions outside Tehran, and finally the breaking off of diplomatic relations (this was the first occasion during modern times on which diplomatic relations between Britain and Persia had been severed) and the evacuation of Persia by the British Embassy staff (October 1952)—increased nationalist fervour to such a pitch that it became clear that no rational appraisal of the situation would be possible until this force had spent itself.

During the year that he ruled with full powers, Mosaddeq had the chance to effect a social revolution. Such measures as he introduced, however, were ineffective, if not positively reactionary or oppressive. He made ineffectual attempts to reduce the landlord's share of agricultural produce and to abolish certain dues and services. On the other hand, he stopped the distribution of Crown lands to the peasants, and he introduced many restrictive and arbitrary practices.[12] Despite the imposition of martial law, there was a steady deterioration in internal security. Political terrorism flourished, and the Tūdeh Party, although still officially outlawed, in fact carried on its activities with impunity, and clashes between National Front and Tūdeh members were frequent. Disappointed because the promised rewards had not been forthcoming, many of Mosaddeq's supporters deserted him; he was opposed not only by the Tūdeh but also by the extreme right-wing elements, including Kāshānī's Fedā'īyān-e Eslām group.

In the course of extending his own powers and removing sources of opposition to his policies, Mosaddeq had dissolved the Senate (July 1952). In July 1953 he took the fatal step of dissolving the Majles as well, after a referendum had resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of dissolution. A month later the Shah dismissed Mosaddeq and appointed General Zāhedī Prime Minister. The only constitutional means by which Mosaddeq could oppose this appointment was by preventing

Zāhedī from obtaining a vote of confidence in the Majles. Since the Majles had been dissolved, Mosaddeq had either to accept or reject the Shah's imperial edict (*farmān*); he refused to recognize the *farmān*, an action which was tantamount to treason. Zāhedī at first failed to establish his position as Prime Minister, and the Shah left the country. A week later, on August 19, 1953, a rising took place in Tehran in favour of the Shah; the insurgents were joined by units of the army and the police, and after a day of street fighting Mosaddeq's supporters were defeated. The Shah returned on August 22. Mosaddeq was sentenced to three years' confinement; his Foreign Minister, Hosain Fātemī, went into hiding, but was eventually captured and executed in November 1955 on a charge of treason.

Zāhedī's government set to work to restore the country to normal. Elections were held, and the eighteenth Majles was convened in March 1954. It included no known supporter of the National Front. Zāhedī had inherited an empty Treasury, and he worked hard to restore the flow of oil from Abadan. An eventual solution was found in the form of a Consortium of eight companies to run the oil industry within the framework of the Oil Nationalization Law (the agreement was ratified by the Majles in October 1954).

The fall of Mosaddeq brought no relaxation of controls, such as martial law, which were necessary for the maintenance of internal security. The discovery of widespread Tūdeh infiltration into the ranks of the army, and the anti-Bahā'ī riots of May 1955 instigated by fanatical religious elements, were but two manifestations of the dangerous and illiberal forces which still carried on subversive activity. In April 1955 Zāhedī, who had failed to grapple with the problem of social reform, resigned, and was succeeded by a moderate, Hosain 'Alā. An attempt on 'Alā's life in November 1955 brought swift reprisals against the Fedā'īyān-e Eslām. About the same time Persia abandoned her traditional policy of neutrality and joined the Baghdad Pact.

In February 1956 the Second Seven-Year Plan Law was passed. It provided for the expenditure of $850,000,000 on communications, agriculture and irrigation, industry, mines, dams, and public amenities such as piped water supplies, electric power plants, and deep wells. Oil revenue again proved inadequate to meet this huge expenditure, and Persia continued to receive money under the Point Four programme and loans from the International Bank. In April 1957 Manūchehr Eqbāl replaced Hosain 'Alā as Prime Minister, and is still in office at the

present time. ʿAlā's promises to combat corruption had produced no more tangible results than had those of his predecessors. With the appointment of Dr. Eqbāl there was a noticeable lifting of controls. Martial law, which had been in force since 1951, was lifted, and it was announced that political parties could once again be formed without restriction. There was at once a spate of new parties, the most important of which were two government-sponsored parties which were intended to play the role of majority and minority parties in the government. The majority party was termed the "Social Democrat" party, and the "authorized" opposition Mardom, or "People's Party." The problem of the Government was clearly how to allow the free operation of political parties and yet ensure that the Tūdeh Party should not again be in a position to threaten the existence of the state. The Government's answer has been the formation of the "National Iranian Security Organization," charged with centralizing the functions of political security and counter-espionage. This organization is unpopular with some Persians, who profess to see in it a device to suppress genuine criticism and to label all those who favour reforms as "Communists."

With regard to the future, it may be said that the position, though fraught with difficulties, is not unhopeful. Persia's main hope lies in the successful implementation of the Second Seven-Year Plan and any future plans for economic development. The results of the First Seven-Year Plan were disappointing. Much money was wasted through inexperience, and many projects remained unrealized for lack of funds. This time, although progress is slow, it is undeniable, and once the man in the street can see for himself the concrete achievements of the Plan, he will perhaps not begrudge quite so much the large sums spent on necessary, but to him apparently fruitless, initial surveys. Agriculturally, Persia has immense potentialities, and, according to the authors of the Tennessee Valley scheme, Khuzestan has the makings of another Tennessee Valley. One of the major projects of the current plan is the construction of a huge dam across the river Dez in Khuzestan at an estimated cost of £21,102,000; when completed, this dam will not only irrigate a large area, but will also supply electricity to much of northern and central Khuzestan.

To be set against a certain air of cautious optimism in regard to the Seven-Year Plan is the feeling of despondency which is provoked by a consideration of the likelihood of social reform in Persia. To be effective, such a programme of reform would amount to a social revolu-

tion. The industrial development which took place under Rezā Shāh, and which has taken place since, has produced a new class of city merchant-business men largely concerned with profits on commercial and industrial transactions. The influence of three of the traditionally most powerful economic and political forces in Persia—the big landowners, the religious classes, and the tribes—has tended to decrease since World War II, while, in the absence of leadership from the Majles, that of the court and the army has tended to increase. The position of the peasants, however, who still constitute some 90 per cent of the population, has changed but little. The question is, from whom will effective leadership come? Certainly not from the landowners, to whom reform spells only a reduction in wealth and privileges. Nor, on the basis of past history, will it come from the government. The attitude of the peasants is one of political apathy; seldom can Marxist teaching have fallen on such stony ground. What is certain is that unless effective leadership does emerge to deal with the social, financial, and political problems of the country, the achievements of the Seven-Year Plan will have taken place in a vacuum, and will to a large extent have been vitiated.

NOTES

1 For the full text of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty, and the subsequent correspondence, see N. S. Fatemi, *Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917–1923* (New York, 1952), 317–24, 329–31.

2 D. N. Wilber, *Iran* (4th ed., Princeton, 1958), 99.

3 F. C. Mason, *Iran* ("Overseas Economic Surveys") (London, 1957), 45, states: "It is impossible to give accurate statistics, but there are probably about 18 million sheep, 12 million goats, and 4 million cattle."

4 The Anglo-Persian Oil Company had been formed in 1909 as the result of the discovery of oil at Masjed-e Solaimān in southwest Persia by William Knox D'Arcy, to whom Mozaffar od-Dīn Shāh had granted an oil concession in 1901; the name was changed to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935.

5 See Wilber, *Iran*, 98.

6 See G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1949), 101–2. The actual aims of the Persian Communist Party were quite different; cf. *ibid.*, 98–100.

7 Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, 158 ff.

8 For the full text of the Tripartite Treaty, see A. H. Hamzavi, *Persia and the Powers* (London, n.d.), 65 ff.

9 Seyyed Ziā od-Dīn Tabātabā'ī had been the political leader of the *coup d'état* which had brought Rezā Khān to power in 1921. Only a few months afterwards, however, differences between him and Rezā Khān led to his leaving the country and taking up residence in Palestine. He remained in exile until 1943.

10 For details on the Erāde-ye Mellī see Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, 243–4.

11 On the failure of earlier schemes for the distribution of Crown lands, see A. K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London, 1953), chap. XII.

12 For details of Mosaddeq's restrictions see Wilber, *Iran*, 120.

POETRY IN MODERN PERSIA

G. M. Wickens

This article is restricted to a consideration of poetry rather than of literary developments in general, in modern Persia, for two very convenient reasons: my last article in the *Quarterly*[1] said as much about these general developments as might be immediately useful to a non-specialist reader, and it attempted, at the same time, to display in particular some representative samples of modern prose. The situation would seem well suited, therefore, to a closer study of poetry. Nor is this judgment invalidated, I believe, by the opinion expressed in that article (p. 117) that modern Persian writers have been more successful in prose than in poetry; for there is in the West a general, if only partially justified, impression that poetry, until recently, was the very essence of Persian literature, and it is accordingly assumed, with considerable logic and creditable curiosity, that—even in these times, and even allowing for the instability of literary taste and impulse—there must be some poetry of value uttered (Persians do not "write" poetry) by the modern descendants of Firdausī, Saʿdī and Hāfiz, Rūmī, Jāmī and Nizāmī. It is to confirm (or possibly confound) such logic, and also to satisfy (or possibly stimulate) such curiosity, that the present article is written and takes the form it does.

For various reasons, more or less self-evident, I will limit general discussion to a (necessarily substantial) minimum, presenting as large offerings as possible or "raw material"—if Persian verse transmuted into English prose, without necessary benefit of magic, may be so described with any colour of justice whatsoever. My selection will, in a broad sense, reflect indigenous taste as much as my own, since it is drawn principally from a modern anthology, published in Persia in 1954.[2] If my purpose were to make a wide and thorough survey of modern Persian poetry, there would clearly be a danger in so going to work, especially with such a land as modern Persia, where divisions of feeling and opinion on literature cut still deeper than the

cleavages on politics with which they so often coincide. However, in the moderate confidence gained by my own general reading in this field, I judge the varied output of the 35 poets included in this anthology to be more than adequate to my purpose of giving an impression of modern Persian poetry, its themes, and techniques. Some poets of merit are not mentioned in the article, others are represented more than once. The omissions are often the anthologist's, the multiplications are partly my own: in neither case do they necessarily reflect the poet's relative merit as viewed either by myself or by his countrymen at large. Yet, selected as the items are principally for the purpose of demonstration, they will not, I believe, strike the initiated as bizarre or deceptive, whatever impression they leave on the layman now encountering modern Persian poetry for the first time. Nothing I here present will demolish established reputations or create new ones; nothing I say will, I hope, make modern Persian poetry appear to be something other than it really is, however far short it may fall of showing it in its fullness and subtlety.

Since modern Persian poetry is less susceptible than prose to imitation of the West, and either models itself on, or reacts more or less violently against, the classical themes and forms, it is probably necessary to recall briefly the characteristics of these latter.[3] The classical poetry of Persia (*ca.* A.D. 1000–*ca.* 1850) can usually be classified as epic, mystical (using this term in a very generous sense), or belletristic, though there are many examples of poems that could only by violence be placed in one category to the exclusion of another. The epics are of immense length, usually stern and stereotyped (but often containing passages of lyrical beauty and originality); normally, but not always, they recount the Persian National Legend, the *gesta* of mythical heroes such as Sohrab and Rustum (to use the Arnoldian spelling), as well as of Cyrus and Darius, of Persia's adopted son Alexander, and of such scourges of the West as the first Ardashīr and his son Shāpūr I. The mystical and quasi-mystical poetry is sometimes epic in size and sweep and ruggedness, like Rūmī's *Mathnavī*; more often it is lyrical, polished, of perfect proportion and delicacy, like the *ghazals* (or "odes") of Hāfiz. The belletristic poems, as I have designated them, are of all lengths and styles and thematic material; but usually their primary purpose is obviously to please—to entertain by wit or artifice or shrewdness of observation, to delight by beauty and accomplishment and praise. It is not, as it is explicitly in most of the epic and mystical poems, to teach the profoundest wisdom and virtue with reference to both this

world and the next, not even with the varying respective emphases visible in these two other *genres*.

Virtually all the classical poetry had complicated metres, impossible to reproduce and difficult even to suggest in terms of Western reference. Length of syllable was a basic criterion, even to the point of distorting natural stress, but syllables were frequently shortened, lengthened, deleted, or added according to rules so involved as to approach arbitrariness. There is often a startling difference between reading a given line of Persian as poetry and as prose respectively: it is evident that such a feature must have a vital bearing on the worth of translation into another language, where such a distinction cannot be reproduced. The lines were usually long, even unwieldy, by our standards, and were set out in hemistichs or couplets; the rhyme, which to Western eyes would appear polysyllabic (see p. 267), was often fixed throughout the poem in hemistichs 1*a*, 1*b*, 2*b*, 3*b*, 4*b*, and so on, though the longest poems fortunately rhymed each pair of hemistichs separately. It will, perhaps, be apparent from this how lucky we are that Fitzgerald decided to reproduce poems which, though called "Quatrains" (*Rubā'īyāt*), were really two-line fragments of two hemistichs to the line: the rhyme-scheme and length of line, so perfect for his purpose, would have proved a wearisome burden in English if carried on for twenty, fifty, and more lines at a time![4]

Most of the classical poems except the epics (and even they in places) employ a vocabulary of peculiar richness and subtlety, full of allusions and puns that are often woven into intricate schemes carried easily over ten or twenty lines. It is this tendency to euphuism and artificiality that at its most extreme inevitably offends Western taste, and in consequence much modern Oriental taste as well. One of the more endearing, if somewhat naïve, traits of our times is a passionate concern with "sincerity," if only in support of the thesis that most men at most times are not, and cannot be, sincere: at any rate, it is impossible for us to believe for long in the sincerity of a poet as concerned as was the classical Persian with technique, particularly where he was so manifestly and explicitly saying, merely in a new way, what hundreds had said before him. A related source of failure to "correspond" is the Persian's tendency to develop his poem radially around one concept or figure, rather than in linear progression from one idea to another.[5] It is a commonplace of textual collation that the lines of Persian poems are frequently "shuffled" about in various permutations: but while a Persian reader has no sense of harm done in consequence, Western students have until recently been sorely exercised on this score, outraged in both scholarship

and aesthetic sensibility. One virtue, however, such poetry will obviously have in Western eyes: it quotes admirably in excerpt, virtually each line being a complete epigram in its own right.

How does the modern poetry compare with the classical? We may dismiss, for present purposes, the still not inconsiderable amount of modern poetry that is modern in date alone. The Ancients *versus* Moderns quarrel, to which I referred in my last article (pp. 116–17), is nowhere more steadily and evenly fought than in the arena of poetry, though the outcome has been doubted by no one for many years past. What, then, of the poetry that represents a rupture, more or less complete and deliberate, with classical tradition? Much of what I said in the previous article (pp. 116–17, 132) immediately applies in broad terms: there are the strains of nationalism and revolution, the tendency to atavistic racialism, the preoccupation with journalistic methods and effects; there is, to some extent, the imitation, often crude and naïve, of Western ideas and fashions, though this is perhaps less obvious than in the more impersonal prose; there is the same simplification of language, the stripping of it to the barest functional forms and associations—yet here again the tendency is usually less marked than in prose, and one is constantly brought up short by outwardly incongruous archaisms and artificialities; once again, brutality and sentimentality are inevitable partners, matched with such other pairs (predestined in social and personal unease to long association) as sophistication and naïveté, stoicism and self-pity, compassion and egotism, supreme skill and abysmal clumsiness.

It goes, perhaps, without saying that the true epic is virtually dead; but the mystical, especially that Persian paradox the pessimistically mystical, poem is more alive than might have been guessed; while the belletristic has become the major category. This is to say that no categories really exist any more in the old sense. The new categories (so to call them) might conveniently be defined as follows (and the list will look strangely bare and prosaic, even irrelevant, to Western eyes): poems of national defiance; poems of personal despair; poems on set topics (not necessarily commissioned); poems of farce and horror (if the two are normally never far apart for many of us, they are, in the Persian mind, integrally associated); and narrative poems, especially of a didactic character. As in the classical period, there are still poems that bestride two or more of the categories, often with more skill than appropriateness. Not surprisingly, there are more poems than in classical times, though still not many, that will not easily fit into any category at all.

Most poems remain long, though Firdausī's reputed 60,000 couplets

have no modern rival; I have been able to quote scarcely any in full. The lines are often more ponderous than in the classical period, the rhymes flat, rigid, less essential. Perhaps the most marked differences, however, are the comparative scarcity of pun and allusion; the apparent want of high polish; the conviction of tense, personal utterance, however trivial and ungifted one must often feel it to be. With an increased proportion of narrative poetry, the "radial" is being steadily displaced by the "linear," and it is this that places the modern Persian poet under a restraint his predecessors never knew.

I have, I hope wisely, rendered the excerpts I have chosen into prose, with no attempt at either rhythm or rhyme. On the other hand, I have striven to reproduce the feel of the language, using a plain or a "hard" word, an artificial or a "soft" one, a normal or a *recherché*, as the original usage suggested. Where specially important, I have drawn attention to these, as also to any overtones or allusions that deserve explanation. In each case, I have given the total number of lines in the poem and numbered the lines I have selected, since the disparity involved appears to me not without significance. Some biographical details, especially where they were at probable variance with Western preconceptions, seemed not out of place.

I

Rose without a Thorn, by AMĪRĪ FĪRŪZKŪHĪ, p. 15 (8 double lines)

1. To the free-born heaven's injustice comes most:
   Trouble comes first to the provident.
2. Of no creature have I complaint,
   Whatever comes to me comes from my own.
3. Like the tulip, a goblet of blood is my daily fare,
   And that too comes to me from the scar on my heart.
7. Today, likewise, tomorrow's trial is my daily fare,
   I am the servant whose wages come in advance.
8. Nothing comes to you without heart's blood, Amīr,
   Even your soul will come to your lips in commotion.

While this poem will easily be recognized as one of personal despair, it may not be so readily apparent to a Western reader that both the theme and its expression are in the purest Persian tradition. I do not mean that it could be mistaken for a classical poem: despite the almost classical neutrality of the language, it is too direct, too flat and heavy, for that. But the preoccupation with the injustice of fate, or of the Deity (it will be noted that the poet absolves only the "creature" from blame),

and with the pivoting of that injustice on the fulcrum of self—this is the very stuff of all the great mystical and pessimistic poetry of mediaeval Persia. Even the one fully developed image the poet allows himself comes whole from such poetry: the calyx of the red tulip is compared to a cup of blood, the mark at its centre to an unhealed scar on the heart, from which the blood derives. The poem is, moreover, an excellent, and somewhat rare, modern example of what I have called the radial form: the only suggestion of development is in the last hemistich, and that is achieved by introducing the finality of death, in the poet's foreboding that he will not be vouchsafed even to die easily. By ancient convention, incidentally, the position of the last line is often fixed, and the poem's authorship secured, as here, by the incorporation of the poet's pen-name. (The latter is not always as close to his ordinary name as in this poem.) Despite the necessary brevity of this commentary, it may be of interest to a Western reader to see how even the restrained word-play of a modern Persian poem such as this can help in the task of textual emendation, still almost as urgent (as I pointed out in my previous article, p. 118) in dealing with modern printed texts as with their manuscript and lithograph predecessors. The rendering "provident," in hemistich 1*b*, is based on my reading *ʿāqibat-andīsh* ("outcome-considering"), but the text in fact has (with a displacement of only one dot) *ʿāfiyat-andīsh* ("salvation-considering," if it is really possible to give it a sense at all). My choice of reading was based partly on obvious (albeit paradoxical) sense, but equally on instinctive awareness of the deliberate contrast of the words *avval* ("first," "beginning") and *ʿāqibat* ("outcome," "end").

The poem rhymes in the syllable *-īsh*, whose incorporation in any particular word varies from line to line; in addition, the true rhyme is followed by a "rider" (*radīf*), the unchanging word *mī-rasad* ("comes"), making, to Western ears and eyes, a fixed rhyme of four syllables.

Fīrūzkūhī is about fifty years of age, and comes of a family distinguished in public and social work. His thorough classical education includes a (for these days) particularly scholarly training in Arabic, and this often reveals itself in his sensitive handling of the Arabic elements in Persian.

II

Patriotic Ode, by MALIK ASH-SHUʿARA BAHAR, p. 30 (37 double lines)

1. Whoever has no love of his native-land in his heart is an infidel:
The idea of *amor patriae* is enjoined by the Prophet.

2. Iran is your mother, Iran's history your father;
   Show some life, if you have any inheritance of father or mother.
3. Princes, before your forebears, bowed the knee:
   My witnesses are Shāpūr's daïs and Caesar's inscriptions.
4. Give thanks if the Lord has given you a just king;
   A king, when just, is the feast-day of his land;
5. Never empty your heart of recollection of the Emperor,
   Especially in the field, for the Emperor is the army's heart.

Once again, a Western reader will immediately apprehend the poem's obvious general sense. He will notice, too, that modern Persian chauvinism sometimes takes a royalist and a retrospective turn. What will, however, be less evocative for him is the fourfold association, in a modern re-casting of the epic manner of Firdausī, of the several elements of patriotism and the Muslim faith, veneration of pre-Islamic Persian heroes, and devotion to the Iranian royal aura (*farr*). The revolution here, as against the classical period, is one of style alone, and only a knowledge of Persian will show how subtly and skilfully the mutation has been effected.

A few minor points deserve comment. The Latin phrase in hemistich 1*b* is used to render the equally classical, and equally remote, Arabic *hubb al-watan*. The few, somewhat simple, word-plays will be obvious, even in translation, save the one in hemistich 4*a*: "if . . . has given," in Persian, is *gar dād*, "just" is *dādgar*. If the query "So what?" should rise to any lips, I would have no answer, save that such things have always semed to give genuine pleasure to the Persian ear and mind. The reference in hemistich 3*b* to historical evidence is an allusion to Shāpūr I's capture of Valerian, in A.D. 260, and his subsequent employment of Roman prisoners on the construction of a huge dam, at Shushtar, in Southern Persia. It is this that has prompted me to render *sufa* ("bench," the probable origin of our "sofa") by "daïs," that is, a fanciful reference to the dam. It may, however, just conceivably refer to the great rock-relief at Naqsh-i Rustam, showing Valerian humbling himself before Shāpūr; but although the word is used for stone slabs, I know of no case where it refers to such a slab in other than a horizontal position, intended for human repose and recreation.

Bahār, who died in 1951, at the age of 65, was designated Poet Laureate (the meaning of the other part of his name as given above) while still in his youth. He was a prominent figure in political and public life, and a considerable scholar and antiquarian. His courage and extreme individualism, resulting in what often looked to outsiders like

an inexplicable confusion of othodoxy and radicalism, might justify his being compared to Chesterton, though superficially they are very differing figures. As a poet, Bahār's reputation is perhaps based as much on his technical skill and versatility as on depth and power.

III

Saga of the Fleas, also by BAHĀR, p. 33 (27 double lines)

1. When the stars drew black sackcloth over their heads,
   The fleas marshalled hosts to raid my body;
2. Two by two, and three by three, ten and twenty at a time,
   Like camels making for the water-hole.

Here we see the great man off duty, relaxing, somewhat ponderously. It may be that only the unhygienic coarseness of the theme, or the little incidental evidences of local colour, will strike a Western reader as possibly Oriental; but the style is in fact a brilliant parody of the classical epic. Moreover, this vein of urchin satire, this humorous and good-humoured delineation of the World's minor miseries, has for centuries been well established in Persian literature, albeit overshadowed by other more striking aspects.

IV

Poetry and Verse, also by BAHĀR, p. 44 (quoted in entirety)

1. Do you know what poetry is? Pearls from the intellect's sea;
   A poet is one who threads such rare pearls.
2. Technique, *sajʿ*, and rhymes make verse, not poetry:
   O the versifiers, whose verses are but idle sound!
3. Poetry is that which rises from the heart and boils from the lip,
   Then settles again in hearts, wherever an ear hearkens.
4. Many's the poet who in his life never made a verse,
   And many's the versifier who never uttered a poem in his life.

Apart from being a Persian affirmation of the need for inspiration, this poem serves to underline Bahār's view of the intellectual derivation of poetry. It might, too, be thought to lend support for Sir William Jones's long-revered judgment of Persian poetry as "Orient Pearls at Random Strung," were it not for the fact that the critical words "at random" have no place here; they are, as I have suggested above (p. 264), based on a fundamental misconception of the form of poetry in Persian. *Sajʿ* (in hemistich 2*a*) is a special form of rhymed prose, often felt to have quasi-magical force.

V

Oil!, also by BAHĀR, p. 62 (6 double lines)

1. He who has placed upon his head the diadem of resolution,
   Gives into no one's hands his country's free-will;
2. Tell the rabble not to put into a foreign hand
   One who has eaten his father's bread at his mother's hand.
5. The dues of oil in north and south are our peculiar;
   Tell the foe to burn his face in oil!
6. From me, Bahār, tell my envious brothers
   No one should sell his brother for nothing.

The most interesting comment on this poem, from the standpoint of topicality, is the footnote given in the anthology: "These lines were uttered at the time when North Persian oil was being given to America, and when attacks were being made by internal and external enemies. They were sung at a big concert in Tehran (for the late Darvīsh Khān) by the late Tāhirzādé, some time in the year 1301 solar [i.e., A.D. 1922]." One may, in addition, draw attention to the idealistic association of both ruler and rabble in patriotic exhortation; to the poetic refinement of a rather coarse imprecation, consigning one's enemies to hell (there is nothing here of the farcical English reference to "boiling one's head in oil"); and, finally, to the casual use, in the last line, of an allusion to the story of Joseph in the Old Testament, a staple theme in classical Persian literature.

VI

Evening Shadows, by FARĪDŪN TAVALLULĪ, p. 102 (84 single lines)

1. The owl calls, and the nightmare in its wildness
2. Fixes its eyes on the flame of a lightless candle;
3. The wind roars, coming softly to the ear,
4. The howl of a hungry beast from a distant forest.
5. The sky, dull, heavy, like a bit of lead,
6. Crushes the dread-casting, fright-compounding night.
7. Dark night touches the wall of the world,
8. In the hope of opening the casement of "morrow."
9. Anon a dried branch touches another,
10. And in that darkness of night the bond of silence severs.
11. Death, mayhap, is breaking the bones of life,
12. Or a dead body trembles in the coffin.

81. Suddenly, from the sun's torch a scarlet spark
82. Flies in undulation to the black-blue mountain's top;
83. A partridge calls, and night, disturbed, goes on its way;
84. Morning laughs and a group goes slowly to the river.

This poem is dated at Shūsh (near where Shāpūr built the dam referred to in II above), in January 1947, and was probably written in the course of archaeological work (see below). It owes little or nothing to the classical tradition, where lengthy and evocative description is rarely encountered. The macabre introduction and the body of the poem, with their somewhat forced and mechanical paradoxes, are more likely a late offspring of the European Romantics; the same is probably true of the Richter-like jest involved in the use of so conventional and "cosy" a title, for "shadow" is normally always a protective symbol in Persian, with none of the occasional menace of English usage. Certain poetic *clichés* have been reproduced and will be immediately noticed in English. Of those features that cannot be easily rendered in translation, I draw attention to only one example: in line 11, the word I have given as "branch" could on one occasion (and possibly even on both) be translated as "horn." The suggestion of the rustling of dead antlers is not inappropriate here. The ending, qua ending, is unusually optimistic for this type of poetry in Persian: one might reasonably have expected Tavallulī to follow the chronology (if nothing else) of Gray's "Elegy," letting a "normal" daytime *precede* his macabre night. This last verse, in economy of expression and boldness of stroke, has in it something we of the West have come to associate with the Far East, if only in such translations as Arthur Waley's: it is unfortunately something of a rarity in Persian, where language and literature are two of the few things hardly touched by Chinese influence.

The poem is deliberately arranged in verses, in simple quatrains (i.e., without division into hemistichs), with the rhyme-scheme *abcb*; this form is something of a favourite with Tavallulī, who clearly prefers it to the more epigrammatic form of the classical quatrain.

Tavallulī is in his early forties, an archaeologist by training and profession, who has worked on the important sites of South Persia. In poetry, he is a resolute individualist, inflicting severe and authoritative criticism on both Ancients and Moderns.

VII

The Pickpocket's Repentance?, by ABŪ AL-QĀSIM HĀLAT, p. 122 (quoted in entirety)

1. In a street, one night, I saw two pickpockets;
   At mere sight of them, the hair stood up on my body.
2. One, *en route*, was complaining to the other:
   "I vow a thousand times never again to touch a person's pocket,

3. "Because one evening a smart young fellow
"'Induced' me to pick his pocket, and
4. "When I got his wallet out and opened it up,
"Nothing was to be found in it but my wife's picture."

As if the question-mark in the title were not enough, or already too much, the humorous intent of this poem is underlined by subtitling it *fukāhī*, "funny story"! As I remarked in my last article (p. 122), "over-emphasis of the point is an ancient failing of Persian narrative." We have here a fairly common, though fortunately by no means completely typical, vein of Persian humour: it is a sort of versified rendering of a caption fit to accompany the crude and overdrawn cartoons often appearing in Persian, and Arabic, newspapers and magazines.

Hālat is in his mid forties, a journalist, and a writer in the fields of sociology and criticism. He is best known, however—and he has not hesitated to seek popularity—for his humorous poems, which make an easy appeal to the man in the street. A possible paradox, as it may seem to Western eyes, is that he writes in a markedly classical style. In reading my translation, this fact should be borne in mind, for I have not been able to do the remotest justice to his manner, a manner which will put even the least literary of his admirers comfortably at home among the things they know. In a sense, though the comparison will obviously be unfair to Hālat in many ways, there is an element of similarity here with the reassurance felt by many people at the traditional language of verses on Christmas and birthday cards.

VIII

Alburz Mountains, by DĀNISH BUZURG-NIYĀ, p. 167 (21 double lines)

1. Alburz Mountains, ah! how pretty and pleasant,
Looking down on you thus from the air:
2. Anemones' cradle you are, and hyacinth-market,
Violets' parade-ground, and mine of basil.
20. You are the witness of Cyrus' lordship, and Darius',
The remembrancer of Farīdūn's and Rustam's glory;
21. You should give us a lesson in patriotism;
Blow on us the spirit of greatness!

The poem has a footnote, to the effect that "it was composed during an air-journey." The Alburz range is the huge and omnipresent barrier (never entirely snow-free) that cuts Tehran off from the Caspian Sea; these mountains are part of the several chains running from the Caucasus and Turkey, across Persia and Afghanistan, to Tibet and Northern India, but to a Persian they will always have a particular and national signifi-

cance. The somewhat "chocolate-boxy" opening is undoubtedly deliberate, an attempt to express the striking contrast between the appearance of the range, in all its mildness, from the air and its seeming ferocity when viewed from the Tehran plain. The general spirit of the poem differs sharply from that of, say, II above, though the theme is basically the same: the brusque chauvinism of the latter gives way here to a mild, nostalgic dignity that is far more typical of classical utterance.

Dānish (to use what is really his pen-name) is in his late fifties, a Khorāsāni, from the far northeast. He is, in characteristic Persian style, a multiple personality of a type not often encountered nowadays in the West among poets: a merchant, a journalist, a member of Parliament, and an Academician; but it would be a serious misunderstanding to describe his poetry as a hobby. His education was classical in the strictest sense of the word, and this is fully reflected in his poetry: with only those subtle differences which suggest that no modern Persian (even if so inclined) can really write in the classical style, his poetry could often pass for that of a millennium earlier.

IX

Two Quatrains, by Ra'dī Ādharkhushī, p. 200 (quoted in entirety)

HOUSE OF LOVE

1. Every pomp has its instability,
   Every possession holds the source of beggary;
2. From pomp and possession flee, into Love,
   For that house has a door to Light.

FREETHINKERS

1. Shackled to our past and our own age,
   To thought-in-pawn and earlier utterance,
2. More worthy than any of prisoner's title:
   Let us assume the name of "freethinkers"!

These two poems, which are apparently to be regarded as parts of one work, are arranged in the classic pattern of two double lines apiece. The rhyme-scheme of the former is the one familiar in the West from Fitzgerald's rendering: *aaba*; that of the second is the somewhat less usual *aaaa*. (Compare these remarks on form with those on VI above.)

The first poem is a simple, straightforward expression of the mediaeval mystical position in Islam: a call to renounce material possessions and worldly prestige for the solider advantages of God's love and the beatific vision. The second formulates almost as clearly the scepticism of the mystic—and it became a very general (and since often regretted) scepticism in mediaeval Islam—about the power of reason to possess

any worth-while knowledge, far less to advance towards new conquests. The impressive contrast with the classic mediaeval formulation lies, perhaps, in the irony of the introductory three lines: the superficial assumption would be that the break with the bonds of tradition can be made only by the rationalist, and that that is what the poet is leading up to say; those who have not cut their dialectical teeth on the Chesterbelloc may be at some loss to grasp the paradoxical dictum that the self-styled rationalists are often themselves the most hidebound of men.

It may come as something of a surprise, too, to a Western reader to learn that Ra'dī, a man of fifty years of age, is a lifelong civil servant, a high official of the Ministry of Education, and a Persian delegate to UNESCO. He is a doctoral graduate of a Swiss university, and is much interested in comparative literature. Of late years his output has been limited; it is mostly classical, though he can handle a modern style with skill. One of his cleverest poems is an adaptation of a celebrated Russian fable, best known in Ivan Krilov's telling as *The Swan, the Pike, and the Crayfish*; unfortunately, though included in the present anthology, the adaptation is vastly longer than the original and is, by its narrative nature, unsuited to partial quotation here.

X

Life, by KĀZIM RAJAVĪ, p. 206 (22 double lines)

1. Life is only trial and pain,
   Comfort and joy are but fancies;
2. What they call comfort and joy
   Is merely the soothing of grief and pain.
3. Alas! Save the draught of hurt and trouble,
   There's nothing left in this black bowl;
4. And if with heart's eye you look therein,
   This bowl holds only the colocynth of death.
5. Death is gradual, its name "life":
   The distinction of the two is only in the name.
6. From such a goblet, lees-full, no one
   In the world is content or sweet-palated.

This otherwise fairly commonplace piece of Persian Housmanism contains some significant word-plays and allusions that were greatly favoured by the classical poets. It may be worth drawing attention to some of them here both as an indication of classical technique and also as instances of the peculiar survival *cum laude* of what would almost certainly be regarded in English as stale tricks. For example, "hurt" (in hemistich 3*a*) and "lees-" (in hemistich 6*a*) are never distinguished

in the traditional unvocalized script; "sweet-palated" (in hemistich 6*b*) can also be read, and with obvious appropriateness, as "desire-sweetened"; the "black bowl" (in hemistich 3*b*), into which one is said to "look" in line 4, is a double reference: initially, to the inverted bowl of the sky, with its connotations of destiny and disaster; and secondarily, to the magic cup of the legendary hero Jamshīd (alias Solomon alias Alexander), in which the world's doings were beheld—this according to an Islamic belief that, though often denounced as apocryphal, has been kept alive by the splendid settings it has been given, in Persian poetry in particular. (The cup is sometimes replaced by a mirror, and in such cases there is thought to be a relationship with the Pharos at Alexandria.)

Rajavī, who is in his late forties, was something of a youthful prodigy in mathematics, and he has always remained a prolific and polymath writer. In private life he has been a teacher and an inspector for the Ministry of Education (this theme recurs often enough in the recent history of Persian literature to make one wonder less, perhaps, at what is often regarded as the anomaly of Arnold's position!). He is a linguist, with attainments in Arabic, Turkish, French, and Old and Middle Persian. His "modernism" lies usually (though not particularly here) in content; his sense of language and rhythm remains firmly classical.

XI

The Moon and the Chain, by MAS'ŪD FARZĀD, p. 326 (10 double lines)

1. The chain of loneliness weighs heavy on the foot of my soul,
   Alas! With such a foot walking is not possible.
6. Since, at the world's board, king and beggar have their portion,
   Why is there nothing for us, save the portion of onlooking?
7. Why will one atom of joy not fit in my narrow heart,
   When in every corner of it there is room for a hundred mountains of grief?
8. How long can one see wisdom trampled by folly?
   Come, blindness, and release me from the evil of sight!
9. The night of hope is void: a barrier has come between the road and me;
   Rise, O moon of new hope, maybe you will show the road.
10. The mind was distraught, and distraught poetry was born of it:
    A distraught-bearing mind is more to my liking than barrenness.

The poem is divided into uneven stanzas containing the following numbers of double lines respectively: 2, 3, 2, 2, 1; I have thus quoted here half of the first stanza, none of the second, and the whole of the last three. With these indications, other eyes than mine may be able to recreate a more perfect whole to which I have done violence.

Of living poets, Farzād is in almost every way the most original. In the first place, his technical skill and his creative power are outstanding; but, over and above these, there is his complete mastery of a foreign language and literature, and the fact, too, that that language and literature are English, not Arabic, or Turkish, or French, or Russian. Farzād, while still in his early fifties, has spent many years in England: he was there first as a student of economics and literature; then, from the outbreak of war onwards, he was a full-time Persian-language broadcaster for the B.B.C.—an appointment in holding which, at that time, he displayed as much courage and independence vis-à-vis his own countrymen as he did some years later, towards his British hosts and friends, when he resigned at the time of the oil-nationalization controversy; lastly, he has been working as a translator and interpreter at the Persian Embassy in London. He has Persianized *Hamlet* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and written on Shakespeare generally; and he has also made translations from Persian literature into English, and written original articles in English on literary topics. For many years a great friend of Sādeq Hedāyat (see my previous article, pp. 117–18, 122–3), Farzād—though in his own life a "normal" enough person—has something of Hedāyat's tortured and haunted attitude towards existence in his writings: "loneliness," "grief," and "pain" are key-words in his poetry. His style seems to be nearly always classical, though at times it might almost be regarded as quasi-European: on both counts, he sets himself distinctly aside from the Persian Moderns as a whole. As he has revealed in his researches on Hāfiz, he has in him much of the scholar; he once gave up writing poetry altogether for other activities, a renunciation he characteristically marked by the publication of a sort of manifesto, "When I was a Poet."

XII

Thus Spoke the Madman, also by FARZĀD, p. 327 (11 double lines)

1. O you who ask of us why we
   Have put our hand to madness' skirt;
2. Withdrawn our foot from outside's world,
   Pitched our tent in the world of inside:
3. "How much?" and "how?" of us ask not, for we
   Have set a lock upon the lip of "how much?" and "how?".
4. So much suffice, that we from all commotion
   Have escaped, and lean upon tranquillity.

This poem is dated at Tehran, in 1309 solar, when Farzād was about twenty-five years old. It is prefaced by a typical quotation from Rūmī, Persia's greatest mystical poet and reputed founder of the order of so-called Dancing Dervishes; the quotation, which is in itself worthy of translation, runs, "I have essayed far-contemplating reason; hereafter I will myself make mad. The madman is he who never went mad, who saw the watchman and entered not the house." I take this to be very close to number IX above (particularly the first poem), with the added element of pity for those worldly-wise souls who feared to abandon themselves to the transports of unreason.[6]

XIII

The Pauper, by NUSRATULLĀH KASĪMĪ, p. 343 (quoted in entirety)

1. Lately I passed along the road and saw, in a corner,
   Folk a-standing and a hubbub afoot.
2. I said: "Why this gathering and tumult?"
   They said it was because an aged beggar had died.
3. I said: "What name does he bear, and whose son is he?"
   They said he was Pauper Pauperson.
4. A tear came to my eye, and I said: "I knew him,
   "This Pauper was my penniless brother."

Not much, perhaps, needs to be said about this poem. Dr. Kāsimī is a medical man, with strong psychiatric interests and humanitarian sympathies. He comes, not altogether expectedly, from an old court and ministerial family. In style, he is at his most felicitous with the classical modes. Still only in his late forties, he is an Academician and prominent in politics and in medical organizations.

XIV

Snow, by MU'AIYAD THĀBITĪ, p. 371 (21 double lines)

1. Snow has come and capped every woman and every mountain,
   This year its coming is very precious.
2. The world in whiteness has become like a royal falcon's breast,
   The welkin in blackness like the wing of a swallow.
3. People have all fled from lane and market,
   Hiding in their houses like bees in the hive.

This type of laconic descriptive poetry, though of ancient and honourable ancestry in Persian literature, has attained in recent years a

popularity without precedent. The imagery is often newly minted, albeit from second-hand materials: for example, "royal falcons" abound in classical poetry, but in other associations than the whiteness of their breasts. The reference in the first line to "capping" women derives its point from the fact that, until fairly recently, Persian women wore no real headgear as distinct from the veil; moreover, there is probably a sly thrust at women's traditional foolishness (as viewed generally in Islamic literature) in that the expression I have rendered by "capped" means literally "headed," "put a head on." The reason why the snow is described as "precious" (hemistich 1*b*) may also need explanation: it is the source of a great part of Persia's water supply.

Muʾaiyad Thābitī is in his late fifties. He is another poet to pursue active careers in politics and scholarship.

XV

I'll Tell You Who I Am, also by MUʾAIYAD THĀBITĪ, p. 373 (8 double lines)

1. Broken-minded, soul-oppressed and spent in body,
   May none be so sore and afflicted as I!
2. From the first day, they laid on my heart
   A grief that till death's instant will not leave my body.
3. My soul's affliction is this prudent intellect,
   Bring wine and make me heedless of myself!
8. I'll be a zephyr and slip one night into your bosom, like a flower,
   I'll kiss your lips, then tell you who I am.

Comment here may be confined to lines 3 and 8. In the former, adequate elucidation has probably already been given under numbers I, IX, and XII, though this is the first instance of the very common figure of "the wine of unreason"; it is this sort of ambiguous figurative language which has made the classical poems of Hāfiz and others a pleasurable battleground for Western scholars with strong views, one way or the other, on the fittingness of even comparing alcoholic intoxication to mystical ecstasy. All views have had their champions: that the wine is real, that it is mystical, that it is both, that it is sometimes one and sometimes the other, and finally that it is neither, being a mere poetic *cliché*. It is at least permissible to assume that the last is the case in the present instance. The figures in line 8 are certainly as stereotyped as one could wish. Markedly unclassical, however, is the development

of this poem, through a partial transition in the lines I have omitted, to the abrupt turn of the last line.

XVI

Extract from *The Hidden*,[7] by MAJD AD-DĪN MĪR-FAKHRĀ'Ī, p. 10

For a ray of eternity, in deceit of hope,
Ever I burn with the stars and the sun . . .
To read those vanished *dicta*,
The register is ever open but the eye sightless.
God's tongue beats ever in my heart,
Ever, yes . . . but "ever" is without meaning.

XVII

Extract from the same, p. 46, first three lines

The flowers of our garden are all mortal;
In the sun of our knowledge there is no light;
Even hope is but the shadow of long-suffering.

I feel I may have kept some of the most absorbing, baffling, even repellent, of my selection of modern Persian poetry till the last. I know next to nothing of Mīr-Fakhrā'ī himself; the poems were apparently written in London in 1947, and published there, in a small edition, in 1948. They run to about 70 pages, with an average of 8 single lines (usually divided into two equal verses) to a page. There is no reliable indication as to whether, or where, larger divisions should be made, one verse often seeming to have more completeness in itself than several others taken together. Mīr-Fakhrā'ī has struck out for himself a most original path in form, rhythm, rhyme, and vocabulary, and his work seems to me to bear the mark of greater polish than that of any living poet except Tavallulī (see VI above). It is not easy to be so sure about his significance.

I have not seen fit to include in this very brief review any poems on set topics. There seemed no point, and there would certainly have been no pleasure, in rendering equivalent Persian samples of Mr. John Masefield at his least inspired, though the present anthology contains several: poems in recurrent celebration of the births or deaths of Firdausī, Sa'dī, and the philosopher-scientist of the Middle Ages, Avicenna (*alias* Ibn Sīnā); poems on Bahār's death (see II–V), on the Shah's return from a journey, or from exile, or on his generosity in distributing

Crown land to the peasants. The great exponent of this *genre* is Sādiq Sarmad (1907–), but this is not to say that he is in general an indifferent poet, or that his set poems are not greatly admired by many of his countrymen.

In conclusion, I would emphasize that my purpose in this article has been to demonstrate the sort of things modern poets in Persia are saying, and how they are saying them; to give the Western reader a privileged oversight of what he cannot normally hope to see, a glimpse of what was after all never meant for his eyes. Herein lies one great attraction of this field: the speeches and actions of public figures in the East are often ostentatiously paraded for the Western man's benefit, and he feels accordingly the more justified in judging them, even when aware of all the hazards of possible distortion, both from without and also within his own field of apprehension; but literary creation, and particularly poetry, is private to a culture, if not to an individual. Conscious that such privacy may be suspended only on terms of hospitality, the interested Western man will rightly approach the East's poetry, given the chance, with more awareness of the risks involved but less suspicion and fear.

NOTES

1 "Bozorg Alavi's *Portmanteau*," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XXVIII (Jan. 1959), 116–33.

2 *Tadhkira-i Shuʿarā-yi Muʿāsir-i Īrān* ("Notices of Contemporary Persian Poets"), by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Khalkhālī (Tehran, 1333 solar). It should be noted that the compiler frequently laments the great difficulty encountered in trying to obtain good, or even any, representative specimens of some poets' work, as a result of limited editions, the ephemeral existence of many of the original vehicles of publication, and so on: see the remarks on such difficulties in my previous article, p. 118.

3 For some authentic and easily assimilable samples of Persian classical poetry, see *Classical Persian Literature*, by A. J. Arberry, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), and *Anthologie Persane (XIe–XIXe siècles)*, by H. Massé (Paris: Payot, 1950).

4 In strict accuracy, one should concede that the Persians themselves do distinguish the "two-liner" (*do-baitī*) from the quatrain on technical grounds, the criterion being principally one of rhythm.

5 See my article on "The Persian Conception of Artistic Unity in Poetry and Its Implications in Other Fields," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XIV (1952), 239–44.

6 If this quotation is derived, as it seems to be, from the *Mathnavī*, it should be mentioned that the standard edition (by R. A. Nicholson) seems to contain

only the second half (II, 2426), and that with a slight variation for which the editor gives no variant reading. In the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that Nicholson understands the portion he does include somewhat differently from myself: "The (real) madman is he that has not gone mad, he that has seen this night-patrol and has not gone home." The night-patrol is interpreted as "the worldliness and unrighteousness from which the mystics flee" in Nicholson's commentary, whereas I look on it more in the light of the unprepossessing guardian of the abode of mysticism, who deters the casual caller.

7 *Nihufté*, published in Persian by Luzac & Co., London, 1948. The text is well printed, but unfortunately contains no notes or introduction of any kind.

MODERN ARABIC LITERATURE

P. J. E. Cachia

The intrusion of the West into the Arabic-speaking world, which began with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, may be thought of as a rock cast into a stagnant pond; the changes that have taken place in the past 150 years are the ripples and the upsurge of silt resulting from this disturbance.

I

The stagnation of eighteenth-century Islam must not be overstressed. Throughout the Ottoman empire, changes were taking place in the body politic which presaged either a new balance or complete collapse, and in the rise of the Wahhābī movement then, and of the Sanūsī order a little later, it is possible to see harbingers of a revival from within Islam. Nevertheless, so far as literature is concerned, no significant new current of fresh and invigorating ideas was discernible by the end of the eighteenth century.

Education itself started from the premiss that there was nothing new to discover: learning consisted of the accumulation of facts known to previous generations. In village schools, children learnt to memorize and to decipher the Qurʾān. In the more advanced schools attached to certain mosques—of which the most famous was and still is the Azhar in Cairo—a considerable but static body of knowledge, clustered round dogmatic theology, was available. This was communicated to the students not so much by systematic instruction as by the exposition of particular time-honoured texts, seldom less than four hundred years old. Not unnaturally, the texts so favoured were not always those which had proved most creative or significant in their time, but those which summed up the positions generally accepted by the learned, so that some of the perennially stimulating writers of past ages—such as al-Jāhiz in literature, or al-Ghazālī in theology—had fallen into neglect.

Of all the developments that had occurred in Europe since the Renaissance and of the contemporary ferment in the West, the masses and the men of letters alike were ignorant, and they would have sneered at the suggestion that these were of any relevance to them.

The isolation of the intellectuals from anything that might have stimulated a more vital and creative approach to literature was completed by the rift between the language of writing and the language of everyday speech. What had happened was that, in each of the countries where Arabic was used, the spoken language had been subjected to the various local, social, and historical forces that mould and transform all languages. The early Muslims, however, had made it a dogma that the Qurʾān consisted of the actual—not merely the inspired—words of God; and the early Arab conquerors, taunted by their very subjects with their lack of refinement, fell back on their linguistic heritage as an object of fierce pride. Thus exalted, the idiom supposedly spoken by the early Arabs and enshrined in the Qurʾān became in theory immutable, and even in practice remarkably stable and conservative. It is this idiom which, all through the centuries, Arabs have used for writing—not merely for scholarly compositions, but for everything that is to be penned, including personal letters—although literates and illiterates alike used the colloquial speech of their country of birth. As the literary idiom became all but incomprehensible to the many, so the few who did master it were confirmed in a trend which, even in a more creative age, had made of literary composition an exercise in wordy ingenuity intended for the connoisseur.

Inevitably, the masses gave tongue to their own perceptions and aspirations in tales, songs, ballads, and sagas, and these have some of the charm and vitality always associated with folklore. But folklore has never been looked on as "true" literature by the Arabs, and it has seldom roused any echo in the writings of the educated.

Before the opening of the nineteenth century, the energies of Arab scholars found an outlet mainly in the writing of commentaries, supercommentaries, and glosses on older works. Few indeed were the new works that they were stimulated to produce: a few travel books, chronologies and biographies, odd works on government or topography, and miscellaneous writings on astronomy, medicine, mathematics, drawing, and surveying.

In *belles-lettres*, originality was not even sought or prized. Ideas—and the word "idea" was used in a very restricted sense, often for a mere comparison or turn of fancy—were held to be common property, and artistry resided solely in clothing a time-honoured "idea" in a new

combination of words. Erudition and mastery of language were therefore the supreme qualities of a man of letters.

In poetry, by far the commonest form was the panegyric. Tradition also gave scope for some other motifs, such as vituperation, eroticism, wine-bibbing, lamentation, and the like, but in all the sentiment expressed was conventional. Indeed originality was so lightly regarded that poets often delighted in amplifying the works of their predecessors by adding, for example, to each half-line of a classical poem a new half-line of their own composition. Above all, poetic compositions were overlaid with far-fetched similes, metaphors, and allusions, with elaborate paronomasias and ambilogies, with chronograms (in which the numerical equivalents of the letters used in one line or hemistich added up to the year of the event being celebrated), and similar devices the number of which poets had, by dint of subtle invention and sub-division, swollen to some 150.

Fine prose was as heavily ornate as poetry, and the main vehicles accessible to writers of prose were the epistle and a kind of short story known as the *maqāma*. This was almost invariably the relation as by an eye-witness of a fraud successfully perpetrated by an accomplished and quick-witted rogue. As writers came to rely entirely on the hero's glibness and eloquence as the means of dazzling his victims, the narrative element became no more than a framework on which to hang verbal *tours de force*.

Yet this was the only narrative form developed in Arabic literature. There were no novels and no plays—indeed, with very few exceptions, no works of sustained and unified invention at all.

II

It was into so circumscribed and inward-looking a cultural world that Napoleon irrupted in 1798, not only with an efficient army disposing of unheard-of technical resources, but also with Egypt's first Arabic printing press (seized *en route* from the College of Propaganda in Rome) and with over a hundred inquisitive and energetic *savants*.

It is possible to see in the manifold activities of the French in Egypt—in the learned Institut they founded, in the newspaper they circulated among themselves, in their introduction of printing—the seeds of all the major cultural ventures that were to follow. Certainly they must have shaken some thinkers out of their complacency. The entire venture, however, ill-starred from the outset, was so short-lived, and it so roused

the antagonism of the Muslim majority that it is doubtful whether these seeds would have germinated if they had not been cultivated, perhaps even re-sown, by the Albanian adventurer who, shortly afterwards, made himself master of Egypt and founded the dynasty that was to rule it for the next century and a half.

Able and purposeful, Muhammad ʿAlī bent his energies and all the resources he could muster to the creation of an efficient army that would fulfil his immense ambitions—an army trained and organized on a European model. It was directly or indirectly to serve this army that he called in foreign experts—mostly French because the collapse of Napoleon's fortunes released just the right men for his purposes—and that he sent promising Egyptians to be trained in Europe. It was primarily to provide officers for this army that he created a system of schools, including some higher technical institutes, such as a school of medicine the direct descendant of which still exists. It was to provide textbooks for these schools and manuals of instruction for his army that he founded a printing press, on which was also printed his official Gazette, the forerunner of all Arab journalism.

When at last Muhammad ʿAlī was forced to renounce his ambitions, he curtailed all these activities, and so did his immediate successors. But of the men who had been engaged in so heady an enterprise not all could sink back into the old ways. Before long, parents were paying fees to have their children taught in schools which offered a Western type of education, even if these schools were run by Christian missionaries; and translators, no longer commissioned to produce military manuals, turned to the translation of literary works, the earliest on record being that of Fénelon's *Télémaque*, by Rifāʿah Rāfiʿ at-Tahtāwī (1801–73), in 1848. The Renaissance which had started as the imposition of a taskmaster on a suspicious and recalcitrant population was becoming the demand of a small but dynamic minority.

The trend was reinforced from 1860 onward by the influx of Syrian Christians fleeing from communal strife in their land or simply attracted by the greater opportunities offered by Egypt. Naturally, Christian Arabs everywhere were more receptive than Muslims to European ideas and ideals. In addition, Syrian Christians—unlike the Copts of Egypt, for example—had always retained some links with the West: some were in communion with Rome, other with the Orthodox Church, and they were used to thinking of France or Russia as their traditional "protectors." In the early nineteenth century, their country had had a share of the stimulation that had come to Egypt, for Napoleon's army had ventured

into it, and Muhammad ʿAlī had brought it under his sway for a while. It was also a country of particular attraction to missionaries, and from 1820 onward American Presbyterians and French Jesuits were vying with each other in the creation of schools, and were in fact soon to found the American University at Beirut on the one hand (1866), and the Collège Saint Joseph on the other (1875).

The stream of Western ideas which was thus following an ever widening course in Egypt had found in Syria a somewhat narrower, but in many ways a deeper, channel; many of the most significant new departures of the Arab Renaissance were in fact pioneered by Syrians. Those who came to Egypt, therefore, soon proved useful adjuncts of the new movement. In particular, they were the main architects of Egypt's free press.

The movement was also taken several steps forward by Ismāʿīl, who ruled Egypt from 1864 to 1879. Boasting that he would make Egypt a part of Europe, he recast and greatly expanded the school system and stimulated the writing of new text books, introduced a penal code modelled on the French one, and even sponsored Egypt's first experiment with representative government. Although his lavish spending was to end in financial and political disaster, it is to his munificence that Egypt owes its National Library, its Geographical Society (the forerunner of several learned institutions), its Opera House (for the inauguration of which Verdi's *Aïda* was commissioned), and Cairo's excellent zoo.

With his reign is also associated the main attempt to steer the new spirit now astir into an Islamic rather than a European channel. The movement was sparked by the fiery Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī who moved from one Islamic country to another preaching resistance to the encroachments of Europe, the revitalization of Islam by the removal of superstitious accretions that weighted it down, and the mustering of loyalties under the banner of pan-Islamism. In Egypt, he formed a number of disciples of whom the most distinguished was Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905).

Whatever chance such a movement had of succeeding against the flood of European ideas was compromised when its leaders threw their weight into the ʿUrābī rebellion, and shared in the ignominy of a defeat which ushered in the British occupation of Egypt. Thereafter, although Muhammad ʿAbduh held many high offices including the Rectorship of the Azhar, where in the teeth of much opposition from his colleagues he sponsored various reforms, it was his zeal rather than his tenets that

impressed a number of young men who were eventually to make their mark on the Arabic Renaissance (*Nahdah*). The movement itself tailed off into an attempt to demonstrate that the new ideas were consonant with Islam.

The first twenty years of British administration in Egypt finally confirmed the Arabs in their association of Western ways with prosperity and dignity; the very success of Europeans, humiliating as it was to the East, called for imitation. But imitation must eventually turn to emulation and rivalry, and by the turn of the century young Egyptians were in quest of an ideal to serve, a focus for their loyalty, a fulcrum on which to lever their self-respect.

These Islam no longer could provide. Islam was associated with the old, discredited ways, the more so as the majority of the theologians continued to fulminate, ineffectually but irreconcilably, against any innovation. Indeed, nineteenth-century Europe seemed to have outgrown religion of any kind and to owe its prosperity to naked materialism. Besides, Arab self-assertion clashed with the authority of the Ottoman sultans who, as self-styled caliphs, were heads of the entire Muslim community, and events were moving to the day in 1916 when the Arabs, aligning themselves with Christian powers, came out in open revolt against the Turks. Islam continued to bind the masses and to receive lip-service from all. But for the Western-educated minority which held the initiative, it ceased to be a directive force.

The new force called in to replace it was another importation from the West: nationalism. Hand in hand with its growth, the emulation of the West became a conscious, militant motive. This was the time when Egypt's Nationalist party was founded (1907), when public demand for a Western type of education far exceeded the number of school places which the government was prepared to maintain, when in fact—despite official lack of enthusiasm—a university was founded (1907), largely by public subscription. This was the time when Qāsim Amīn (1865–1908), with his books on *The Emancipation of Women* (1898) and *The New Woman* (1900), led the assault on the most powerfully defended bastion of the old social order. This was also the time when a number of young writers, many of them contributors to the newspaper *al-Jarīdah* and gravitating round its founder, Ahmad Lutfī 's-Saiyid (later Rector of the University and President of the Egyptian Academy), made a creed of the literary standards prevailing in the West as they understood them, and engaged in vehement polemics against those who still held the conventions of "elegant" writing in high honour.

These young writers claimed—indeed they arrogated to themselves—the right to coin new words and to seek new avenues of expression, a right stubbornly contested by the Conservatives. What they generally wanted to express was an exuberance of undisciplined personal emotion, for the main influence to which they had been subjected was that of French Romanticism, and this Romanticism coincided with the swing of the pendulum away from the cast-iron formalism of their immediate predecessors. They were not united on all issues, indeed they represented a wide gradation of precept and practice, but they have come to be known as the Modernist school.

The events of World War I—the Arab Revolt and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the proclamation by the Allies of the right of self-determination—widened the scope and quickened the pace of a movement the direction of which was already plain. Many more Arab lands were started on the road to nationhood. In most, the pattern followed has been much the same as Egypt's, for each in turn has been penetrated by the West, and has reacted to it first in servile imitation, then in resentful emulation. Besides, Egypt—which has had an earlier start and greater opportunities—has given them a model to follow, sometimes even positive guidance. A concrete example of how cultural trends are unified is that Egyptian teachers are seconded for service in other Arab countries, school curricula are to some extent correlated, and in countries that have no universities of their own youths try to fit themselves for admission to one of Egypt's universities, of which—in addition to the Azhar and a small American university—five are now in existence.

Thus, in the twenties the way ahead seemed clear: it was to apply to political, social, and cultural problems the formulae which had yielded most enviable results in Western Europe.

In the thirties, Arab efforts were rewarded with some spectacular successes. Some secured a measure of independence, all were courted by opposing world powers. In literature too, not only had the Modernists disposed of any internal opposition, but some of them were attracting attention in the West and were having their works translated into European languages. (The first was volume I of Tāhā Husain's autobiography, *An Egyptian Childhood*, translated by E. H. Paxton, London, 1932.) There was a sense of achievement and a feeling of self-satisfaction.

Yet already before the outbreak of World War II there were growing signs of disillusionment which quickly grew into a chafing desire for

change. For the cuttings taken from the garden of Western Europe and hastily transplanted into foreign soil did not always blossom as was hoped. Besides, those Western European varieties which had once seemed unquestionably supreme were now strongly challenged first from Germany, then from Soviet Russia.

The rash of experimentation with new forms of government in the Arab countries is but one aspect of this impatience for change. As the number of intellectuals grows and as these familiarize themselves with the literatures not only of France and England but also of Spain, Germany, and Russia, the Arabs have come to realize that "the West" stands for no one set of indisputable values, points to no one infallible way. They are no longer on a straight road, and the choice is no longer: backward or forward? They are at the cross-roads, and the question they must anxiously ask themselves is: which way forward, and to what end?

III

The absorption of a foreign culture is easiest at the technological level, and because technology plays a great part in modern Western civilization, the successes scored by Arabs and others treading the same path have often been spectacular. But the social, political, moral, and philosophical adjustments that must follow are not so easy to make. Hardest and slowest of all is the replacement of one set of aesthetic values by another.

Although at the outset of the nineteenth century there was no literary criticism worthy of the name, it is clear from the practice of poets and prose writers alike that the standards of the age immediately preceding remained unaffected by the upheavals of the French Expedition and of Muhammad ʿAlī's rule.

Not until the early twentieth century, when Jurjī Zaidān (1861–1914) published a four-volume history of Arabic literature, can modern criticism, free from the word-bound outlook of previous centuries, be said to have been born. Then, out of the war waged by Modernists on Conservatives, there emerged explicit statements of the new creed.

Torn between the objectivity enjoined by Western scholarship and the unbridled Romantic emotionalism of their generation, the Modernists have generally come to subscribe to the view that objectivity is to be practised in editing texts or in establishing facts of literary history, but that a piece of literature is to be regarded solely as a spontaneous manifestation of an uncontrolled urge. The leading Modernist, Tāhā Husain (1889–), echoing in part a line of Lamartine's, defines literature as

"writings which issue from the writer as a song issues from a warbling bird, as perfume is diffused from a fragrant flower, as light is emitted from the brilliant sun," and he refuses to qualify, restrict, or amplify this judgment in any way. It is only in the last fifteen years or so that rival theories—such as the evaluation of literature in terms of the social significance of its message—have been put forward.

These critics have done no small service by bringing old texts to light and awakening the interest of their contemporaries in past Arabic literature, even though they are often tempted to read present motive forces into the productions of the past. But the standards they seek to apply are standards borrowed from the West. In all this the critics were merely registering—often tardily—attitudes already working themselves out in literary production, especially in prose.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, poets and prose writers alike continued to search for new combinations of words in which to recast time-worn ideas, and the true pioneers of the Arabic Renaissance were the translators. These, even though most of their efforts were expended in the production of manuals and textbooks, had the task of bending a language almost ossified into the expression of new and purposeful ideas, and the same service is being rendered by the ever widening circle of writers on scientific subjects, on history, education, sociology, psychology, and the like.

Modern Arabic prose was born of their efforts, and of journalism. The first journals independent of Government control did not appear until late under Ismāʿīl's rule, but thereafter—stimulated by political conditions, and in spite of the low level of literacy in the country—they multiplied prodigiously, and by 1913 at least 282 newspapers and journals are known to have been in existence. As even the dailies prided themselves on a literary column, these provided the most obvious training and outlet for would-be writers, and there is scarcely a writer of note today who is not or has not been a journalist.

Of necessity, the style favoured and propagated by the journalists was direct and purposeful, and diametrically opposed to the preciosity in honour until then. The change is strikingly represented in the work of ʿAbdallāh an-Nadīm (1845–96), remembered mostly as the great orator of the ʿUrābī rebellion. He had made a reputation for himself as an "elegant" writer, but he changed his tack almost overnight when he founded a paper in which he debated issues of the day in a language as close to the colloquial as classical syntax would allow, and made the livelier in that he was fond of resorting to the dialogue form.

The most truly characteristic prose form that emerged was in fact the

short piece, usually termed "article," with which the writer undertook to fill a weekly column and which, according to the fertility or momentary aridity of his verve, he might cast in the form of an essay, a sketch, a critique, a review, an editorial, perhaps even a short story, or an appeal for the support of some good cause. Not so lightly esteemed as in the West, these articles are often reprinted in book form.

It was in fact the short prose piece (and not poetry) that was the first vehicle of the gushing Romanticism that has been the most constant feature of twentieth-century Arab literary production. Such were the immensely popular effusions of Mustafā Lutfī al-Manfalūtī (d. 1924), in two collections characteristically entitled *Glances* and *Tears*, almost every one of which depicts a scene of the most wretched and unrelieved misery that the writer has chanced upon.

Narrative forms also owe their development to translation and, initially at least, to the press. When they were not employed by the state, translators found it profitable to turn their attention to French novels, mostly for serial publication in journals. Not unnaturally, the prevailing taste first ran to the extravagances and cheap sensationalism of the typical *roman feuilleton*. Ahmad Shauqī (1868–1932)—of much greater and juster renown as a poet—was perhaps influenced by these as well as by folk-tales in the romances he wrote in the last years of the nineteenth century. His *Lādīlās*, for example, is a rambling, inconsequential, often ludicrous tale of an ancient Egyptian hero who makes a fetish of a log of wood that has saved him from drowning, carries it with him through countless hair-raising adventures, until—having inexplicably turned traitor to his king—he uses it to fashion a throne for himself.

Somewhat surprisingly, the 22 historical novels written by the indefatigable Jurjī Zaidān, founder of Egypt's most renowned journal (*al-Hilāl*) and author of several histories and critical works, although they glorified past Arab history and were not devoid of romantic interest, did not inspire any immediate imitators.

The first original, imagined narrative to make a mark was *The Discourse of ʿIsā ibn Hishām*, by Ibrāhīm al-Muwailihī (1858–1930), which tells of the adventures of a Pasha from Muhammad ʿAlī's time, resurrected into the changed world of the early twentieth century. Because the name of the narrator, ʿIsā ibn Hishām, is borrowed from classical *maqāmas* and because the narrative element in it is slight, it is usually referred to as "an extended *maqāma*." But it also bears the clear imprint of its origin as a newspaper serial: it is episodic, and offers opportunities for comment on contemporary issues.

Even this, though it led to some imitations at the time, was not

destined to leave a lasting line of succession. The taste was for heart-wringing romantic novels. Free translations of *Werther*, of *Paul et Virginie*, of *Les Misérables*, of Alphonse Karr's *Sous les tilleuls*, these were immensely popular. Yet it was not until 1917 that the first original Arabic novel appeared. It was a simple story of star-crossed lovers entitled *Zainab*; it was published anonymously but has since been acknowledged as the work of Muhammad Husain Haikal.

Since then, innumerable novels have been written, mostly love stories, not a few with a historical setting, many of them sentimental, some with pretentious theses to put forward, some competent, many remarkable for flashes of insight into personal or social attitudes. Yet none is great, none strikes one throughout as a genuine Arab novel.

There are several reasons why the Arab novel has been so tardy in its appearance and so mediocre in its attainments. The writers themselves complain that the cleavage between the spoken and the written idiom makes it difficult for them to hold a mirror up to nature. Also the *genre* demands among other skills powers of sustained and consistent imagination and invention, which neither the classical tradition nor recent developments have fostered. More fundamentally still, the good novel presupposes an underlying philosophy, a unified outlook on life hard to find in a hybrid culture. Specifically, the mainstay of most novels is the conception of love that has grown in modern Europe. This conception the modern Arab intellectual shares as an ideal. But, far as the social revolution has gone, it is only in a very few restricted circles that the sexes commingle in an atmosphere which permits the usual novelist's plot—at once refined and extra-marital—to work itself out. The Arab writer must therefore either create far-fetched circumstances in which credible characters evolve, or place in a local setting characters who are Arab in little more than the name. More often than not, his heroine is a blonde.

The same disabilities do not greatly hamper the short story writer, for his snapshots of people or of situations do not have to be fitted into a whole, and he can with impunity colour them with the brush of a Maupassant one day, of an O. Henry the next. Pioneered by the brothers Muhammad (1892–1921) and Mahmūd Taimūr (1894–), this narrative form quickly proved suitable and popular, and is pursued by many competent writers.

Other forms of prose writing have multiplied, especially since the 1930's. Not the least interesting development is the exploitation by Modernists of Islamic material, such as the retelling of early Muslim

legends by Tāhā Husain in *In the Margin of the Prophetic Tradition*, in imitation of Jules Lemaître's *En marge des vieux livres*, and a series of studies of the "genius" of the Prophet and other early Muslim personalities by ʿAbbās Mahmūd al-ʿAqqād (1889–). These are a mark of self-confidence on the part of the Modernists rather than a concession to orthodoxy, for even when they glorify the Islamic past, they do so from a partisan rather than a devout standpoint.

But to the Arabs of past ages, poetry had always been the supreme literary form, the ultimate repository of aesthetic awareness. Consequently, the poets of a century ago, although no less conscious than the prose writers that the conventions of their immediate forefathers were no longer in keeping with the age, could not so readily adopt the standards of a foreign culture. Instead, they sought their models in the Arab poets of an earlier, more vigorous and more purposeful age. In the hands of Mahmūd Sāmī 'l-Bārūdī (1838–1904), one of ʿUrābī's right-hand men, this poetry—sonorous, declamatory, oratorical rather than intimate or lyrical—soon reached imposing standards.

The greatest poets of the next generation—Ahmad Shauqī and Hāfiz Ibrāhīm (1871–1932)—continued to look backward. They remained faithful to the metres of classical poetry and openly acknowledged their indebtedness to past masters. True, they now addressed the general public rather than some wealthy patron, for they too published in the press. Their muse was often roused by those events, local, national, or international, which stirred public opinion. By following and developing the heroic rather than the panegyric strain in classical poetry, they made themselves spokesmen of communal loyalties and aspirations. But despite the taunts of Modernist critics they seldom wallowed in the Romanticism of contemporary prose writers, and their talents were such that they overshadowed lesser poets who tried bolder experiments.

Yet poetry could not remain forever out of step with the prevailing standards. When in 1932 both Ahmad Shauqī and Hāfiz Ibrāhīm died, the way was open for the new generation of poets to experiment with new stanza forms and even with free verse, and to express themselves mostly in Romantic outpouring but also, more recently, in imitations of contemporary Western poets. In this respect, many of the earliest experiments and most felicitous achievements have been the work of Christian Syrian *émigrés* to America, of whom the best known, Jibrān Khalīl Jibrān (1883–1931), has published in English as well as Arabic. Integrated as they are in a Western society, removed from the strains and doubts which assail the Muslim Arab in his own home, they represent

not the final synthesis but one more channel through which the West is penetrating the Arab world.

As for the theatre, its development was affected by a number of peculiar factors. To begin with, it had virtually no roots in the Arab past. Moreover, because it was not entirely dependent on the written word, it could draw on the patronage of the illiterate masses and even—at one time and to a limited extent—on that of the comparatively well-to-do foreign communities. Finally, for the same reason as well as for considerations of realism, it has been greatly embarrassed by the divergence of the literary from the spoken idiom.

The pioneers of the modern Arabic theatre were Syrian Christians, but it was again in Egypt that their efforts bore the most abundant fruit. Beginning in 1848, Mārūn an-Naqqāsh (1817–55) produced in Bairūt a number of plays, mainly comedies of Molière's which he himself had adapted. Later, under Ismā'īl, two Syrian companies came to Egypt. It was not until the turn of the century that an Egyptian Muslim, Salāmah Hijāzī (1855–1917), famous above all as a singer, formed a company of his own.

These companies and their successors have for the most part had precarious existences. The most successful line of development has been the popular comedy using the colloquial as its medium. One man in particular, Najīb ar-Rīhānī (1891–1949), actor, manager, and often part-author, created the character of a village elder who was a personification of the native countryman's sound and pawky sense, and out of this grew a kind of vivacious, good-natured satirical comedy which—for all that it often borrows its plot from foreign plays—is well rooted in the life of the community.

Serious drama has not been so fortunate. The taste of the theatre-going public has favoured heavy melodrama imbued with somewhat obvious social didacticism, often interspersed with songs, and mostly in the colloquial idiom. More ambitious artistic productions have been attempted only when state support was forthcoming. Most notable was the enterprise of Jurj Abyad who, between 1910 and 1914, with the backing of the Khedive, presented translations of great European classics. Since 1930, the Egyptian government has had to subsidize the theatre to ensure that a proportion of serious plays in the literary language are produced.

For a long while, the theatre leaned heavily on translations and free adaptations, and writers for the stage received scant regard from the intellectuals. Indeed the first plays to earn acclaim as literary works

were those of the poet Ahmad Shauqī, most of which were written in the last years of his life, and are perhaps distinguished more for their poetic than for their dramatic qualities. Many other playwrights have since come to the fore, of whom the most accomplished are Mahmūd Taimūr, many of whose plays are in the colloquial idiom, and Taufīq al-Hakīm (1898–), who writes mainly in literary prose, and who displays the widest reach in the choice of his themes and the greatest subtlety in their presentation, though one may suspect his subtlety sometimes to border on the specious.

IV

Not the least significant feature of the Arabic Renaissance has been the survival of the literary idiom through the dislocations of the past 150 years. Of necessity, neologisms have been admitted, but most of these are aptly derived from old Arabic roots; and in the syntax in use today, there is almost nothing that the grammarian of the ʿAbbasid age would condemn outright. It has not become a hybrid language, nor is it showing any signs—except in the theatre—of yielding to the colloquial idiom. Indeed, the writers who flourished eighty years ago appear bolder in their experiments with the colloquial idiom than those of today; and it may be that as the output of the schools increases and as even illiterates become, by listening to broadcasts, familiar with the sounds of the literary idiom, it is the colloquial that will tend to accommodate itself to the literary.

This stubborn linguistic conservatism is not due solely to the link with the Islamic Scriptures. For a writer to lapse into the colloquial idiom of his region would be to restrict himself to a market already reduced by the low level of literacy. This is but one aspect of the fact that a common literary language is not only the expression of, but probably also the most stable bonding agent in, pan-Arab feeling, a genuine force transcending local patriotisms. Finally, the Arabs have always taken a pride in their language scarcely paralleled in other cultures.

Of course, the fact that an Arab never writes as he might speak has taken its toll not only of realism but also of spontaneity in literature—witness the paucity of humour in Arab writings. But from the cultural point of view alone, there are massive advantages in the resulting stability of the written language: the treasure-house of all past literature is open to any man of average education if he should wish to enter it.

Nevertheless although the medium of expression is native, and al-

though the bulk of the literature produced is about Arab life past or present, yet the treatment of the subject-matter consists very largely of application of foreign formulae. It is neither surprising nor discreditable that, along with the resounding successes, there should be imperfections in the application of these formulae. The initial success of Western formulae in literary as well as in other fields, the rapid expansion of journalism, the prevalence of a somewhat crude Romantic creed, all these encourage facile, ephemeral writing. Most writers spread their efforts over a very vast field; Tāhā Husain, for example, in addition to a voluminous journalistic output, has produced translations, novels, short stories, several critical works, a volume of epigrams, several histories, and a book on education. Perhaps the notion that the supreme literary quality is mastery of words has not been entirely superseded yet.

The danger in this is that the new literature like moss might continue to expand without striking deep roots anywhere. The Arab writers of today are eager, active, outward-looking. They have broken the shackles of the immediate past. But if they are content to look to the West for newer and yet newer models to imitate, they will have done little more than exchange one set of conventions for another.

The old order centred on a religious faith has been discredited. The new order that has replaced it appears to aim mainly at national self-assertion in emulation of the West. Is this a sufficient ideal to inspire a great new, creative age in Arabic literature? One wonders whether it is merely a romantic pose that makes so many contemporary poets seek Beauty "beyond the clouds, beyond Eternity," as though it had no place in the world they know. And when one of these poets speaks of having devoted his Art to the creation of a beautiful but lifeless statue, the pathos of his situation is that, unlike Pygmalion, he knows of no deity to whom he can appeal for the gift of life.